Loss Leader
I would save the receptionist., Moderator
Who gives a toss about reincarnation? This isn't what we're discussing. WE'RE DISCUSSING H.
That's what I thought. Jabba brought up and then abandoned the topic himself.
Who gives a toss about reincarnation? This isn't what we're discussing. WE'RE DISCUSSING H.
Dave,So are you using "reproducible" to mean make a copy? I assumed you were because you posted this:
Dave,
- At first, not the way you were -- I was using it to mean the same, when it came to selves. Now, I'm trying to use it in your meaning of making a copy. I think I should now use "re-create" to indicate my previous meaning.
Dave,
- At first, not the way you were -- I was using it to mean the same, when it came to selves. Now, I'm trying to use it in your meaning of making a copy. I think I should now use "re-create" to indicate my previous meaning.
Nobody was talking about that and you know it.
The mind is not severable from the brain with our current level of technology. Jabba's entire premise is based upon there being some sort of inherent, natural difference between the normal everyday neurological functioning of a brain and his belief that there is an immortal soul that God created and put in all of us, not in some hypothetical post-Singularity future where we've backed up our brains to the cloud.
There now your pedantic exception has been noted and addressed, let's move on before Jabba spins it off into a 30 page derail.
No let's hear Jabba's take on it. Jabba, when you introduce the notion of the sense of self being severable from the brain to support your claim that some deity made our souls are immortal, do you mean that said deity is using our current level of technology in doing so?
Jabba's claim about souls is that there is an infinite number of them, one of which is randomly assigned to a body at some point, possibly at conception.
He is very clearly not talking about uploaded cosciousnesses.
Hence our current level of technology for separating sense of self from brain doesn't seem very relevant indeed.
So I'll consider JayUtah's counterargument based on the claim of an incapability of severing a sense of self from a brain to have been refuted.
So I'll consider JayUtah's counterargument based on the claim of an incapability of severing a sense of self from a brain to have been refuted.
- I might know how to clear this up: you think that the human brain is, in theory although not in practice, physically reproducible, and that consequently the sense of personal identity is also. You believe that theoretically we could produce a perfect copy of a personal identity -- however, you do not believe that we could even theoretically produce the same personal identity. [...]
Dave,Can you think of anything in nature that can come back after it's gone? Anything where, if you repeated the steps that resulted in the thing, you would get the same thing?
Dave,
- No. But then, I can't think of anything else like consciousness or self -- and besides, all I was trying to show here was why I thought we could assign the likelihood of my current existence to chance, as in a lottery, and equal to something over infinity.
Dave,
- No. But then, I can't think of anything else like consciousness or self -- and besides, all I was trying to show here was why I thought we could assign the likelihood of my current existence to chance, as in a lottery, and equal to something over infinity.
Of all the temerity.
Thanks for telling Dave what he believes. It would be rude to ask him I guess.
Dave,
- No. But then, I can't think of anything else like consciousness or self
Dave,
- No. But then, I can't think of anything else like consciousness or self -- and besides, all I was trying to show here was why I thought we could assign the likelihood of my current existence to chance, as in a lottery, and equal to something over infinity.
But then, I can't think of anything else like consciousness or self...
all I was trying to show here was why I thought we could assign the likelihood of my current existence to chance, as in a lottery, and equal to something over infinity.
- It seems to me that the simplest Bayes formula --
P(A|E)=P(E|A)*P(A)/P(E|B)*P(B) --
makes more sense for my purpose than does the bivariate formula I've been trying to use. I can't even find the old formula anymore. Objections?