Cont: Proof of Immortality, V for Very long discussion

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Dave,
- No.
- But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?

No you can't, you have yet to establish that such a thing exists and that it is even identifiable, so how do you know your own self awareness is the same one day to the next Jabba?
 
So if some magical duplication ray hit you and split you into two identical "Jabbas" each Jabba would be no more or less the "real" Jabba then the other since there is no "One True" Jabba but each Jabba would immediately start differing as they experienced new stimuli.


What if he were Scottish?
 
Dave,
- No.
- But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?

Jabba. Jabba? JABBA?? Earth calling, hello?

Jabba, it does not matter what YOU call it. The materialistic model, the one you wanna call OOFLam, is not YOUR model to choose about. In that model, there is no such thing as a particular self awareness, no matter how much you feel there should be one. It is not there, period.

And thus you can't make any devious math making the model virtually impossible. In the OOFLam model, any functioning human brain produces the perception of self-awareness. It is a lottery with 7 billion numbers and 7 billion winners.

Whatever model you want to make about some special awareness entity and potential selves between your father and Cleopatra belong on the OTHER side of your formula. In La La Land.

Hans
 
Dave,
- No.
- But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?
No. Because there is nothing missing in the copy.
 
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239Dave,
- In the above, you seem to be agreeing with me that a perfect copy of your brain would not exhibit your "particular self-awareness." Am I misunderstanding?

Stop lying. Dave has answered your straw man more than once already.
 
Dave,
- No.
- But mostly, I'm trying to see if I can use "particular self-awareness" for referring to what's missing in the copy. Can I?

No, because it's no more "missing" than any other part of the original. You could just as accurately say the original brain is missing, because a copy is separate from the original. It would be misleading to single out one part of the copy and say "This is different from the original" when everything about the copy is separate from the original.
- I see your point...

- Though, I think that all I need for advancing my argument at this particular juncture (at this particular premise) is your agreement that what we're talking about is, itself, different between the original and the copy. That difference is one of the premises necessary to allow for the infinity of different potential whatevers that I'm claiming. If each new recycling is different, one of the potential limits to the number of potential whatevers is eliminated.
- But anyway, can we settle on a name for this particular whatever I'm trying to address?
 
- Though, I think that all I need for advancing my argument at this particular juncture (at this particular premise) is your agreement that what we're talking about is, itself, different between the original and the copy.

STOP DOING THAT!

You can't win an argument by making us agree with you before we agree with you.

There is nothing different between the original and the copy until outside forces alter them.

NO ONE IS GOING TO AGREE THAT YOU ARE RIGHT JUST SO YOU CAN PROVE YOU ARE RIGHT.
 
It is not even meaningful to refer to one as the original and the other as a copy.

They are the same. Neither is the original; neither is the copy.
 
- I see your point...

- Though, I think that all I need for advancing my argument at this particular juncture (at this particular premise) is your agreement that what we're talking about is, itself, different between the original and the copy. That difference is one of the premises necessary to allow for the infinity of different potential whatevers that I'm claiming. If each new recycling is different, one of the potential limits to the number of potential whatevers is eliminated.
- But anyway, can we settle on a name for this particular whatever I'm trying to address?

Perhaps this might be a convenient time to actually read and try to understand the many posts that have actually addressed this and shown you your errors?
 
It is not even meaningful to refer to one as the original and the other as a copy.

They are the same. Neither is the original; neither is the copy.

I would disagree. A copy would be the result of some copying process. Technically, the original pre-existed the copying process, whereas the copy was the output of process. They would not occupy the same space even during the copying process, so by observing that, you would be able to tell them apart.

Not that this has any relevance for Jabba's argument.

Hans
 
- I see your point...

- Though, I think that all I need for advancing my argument at this particular juncture (at this particular premise) is your agreement that what we're talking about is, itself, different between the original and the copy. That difference is one of the premises necessary to allow for the infinity of different potential whatevers that I'm claiming. If each new recycling is different, one of the potential limits to the number of potential whatevers is eliminated.

You realize this would apply to literally everything else in existence, right?

What does the number of potential things over all time have to do with the likelihood of any particular thing existing?
 
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