Who killed Meredith Kercher? part 23

[whoanellie]

On another thread there were a few posts regarding the fact that the para two wording for Amanda Knox's acquittal was legally just the same as para one, but an opinion had been expressed in the past that the perception amongst the public may have been different. I was not aware then, and am not aware now, of any major Italian or any other publication or broadcast (or from any other country) that gave the impression that her verdict was in any way a lesser verdict, and that any "perception" that the public may have had as a result by how the media reported the verdict does not seem to be in any way negative. Are there any links to major media outlets that give the impression that A and R's verdict were in any way slightly lesser than if they had been acquitted under para one? Because I never found any.

Here are examples of the discussion of the perception of paragraph 1 versus paragraph 2 after the announcement of the M-B verdict

ok so with google translate of Ansa

http://www.ansa.it/umbria/notizie/20...fde02b778.html

and from The Guardian

http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...ito-italy-case

we have:
the judges concluded for the acquittal of the accused: technically "for not having committed the crime," essentially for lack of evidence (as explained by the indication, in device, the second paragraph of Article 530 of the Criminal Procedure Code).
and
One of the remarkable aspects of Friday’s decision is how the supreme court – which went out of its way to say Knox and Sollecito were innocent, not merely that there was a lack of evidence to convict them – will address those earlier assumptions about how many attackers there were that night in November 2007.
So it looks very decisive. I agree with those who say that the idea of the Kerchers attempting to sue A and R seems rather misguided. Rafaelle Sollecito, on the other hand, has just indicated on Sky news a determination to ensure he is not slandered in the future.

But at the same time, the overwhelmingly prevailing opinion was that if this was a "reasonable doubt" case in the eyes of the SC, then the case would without doubt have been sent back down to the appeal court level for (yet) another trial. The fact that this didn't happen, and that the SC totally acquitted, would seem to strongly support a belief that the SC ruled that there was entirely no case to answer. In other words, a "Paragraph 1" acquittal. I wouldn't be at all surprised if the media were reporting Maresca's "creative" interpretation of the ruling, rather than anything explicitly issued by the SC itself.

Incidentally, don't these SC rulings only consist, at this stage, of extremely curt and brief verdicts, with little or no supporting explanation? If so, then surely the SC wouldn't even have gone into this much detail yet over exactly what sort of acquittal it was etc.

Text of Dispositivo
Originally Posted by Dougm View Post
I don't know anything about that. What I have read is reports that the ISC said they "did not commit the crime". But those are unconfirmed at the moment.
Good news: I have now, finally, seen the elusive dispositivo.

It reads:

Originally Posted by Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Quinta Sezione Penale
VISTO L'ART. 620 LETT. A) C.P.P.; ANNULLA LA SENTENZA IMPUGNATA IN ORDINE AL REATO DI CUI AL CAPO B) DELLA RUBRICA PER ESSERE IL REATO ESTINTO PER PRESCRIZIONE; VISTI GLI ART. 620 LETT. L) E 530, COMMA II C.P.P; ESCLUSA L'AGGRAVANTE DI CUI ALL'ART. 61 N.2 C.P. IN RELAZIONE AL DELITTO DI CALUNNIA, ANNULLA SENZA RINVIO LA SENTENZA IMPUGNATA IN ORDINE AI REATI DI CUI AI CAPI A), D), ED E) DELLA RUBRICA PER NON AVERE I RICORRENTI COMMESSO IL FATTO; RIDETERMINA LA PENA INFLITTA ALLA RICORRENTE AMANDA MARIE KNOX PER IL DELITTO DI CALUNNIA IN ANNI TRE DI RECLUSIONE.
That is:

Originally Posted by Supreme Court of Cassation, Fifth Criminal Section
PURSUANT TO C.P.P. ARTICLE 620 LETTER A); ANNULS THE RULING UNDER APPEAL WITH RESPECT TO THE CRIME UNDER CHARGE B) OF THE RUBRIC BECAUSE THE CRIME IS EXTINCT BY PRESCRIPTION; PURSUANT TO C.P.P. ARTICLES 620 LETTER L) AND 530, PARAGRAPH II; EXCLUDING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER C.P. ARTICLE 61 N.2 IN RELATION TO THE CRIME OF CALUMNY, ANNULS THE RULING UNDER APPEAL WITHOUT REMAND WITH RESPECT TO THE CRIMES UNDER CHARGES A), D), AND E) OF THE RUBRIC BECAUSE THE PETITIONERS DID NOT COMMIT THE ACT; RECALCULATES THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UPON PETITIONER AMANDA MARIE KNOX FOR THE CRIME OF CALUMNY AS THREE YEARS OF CONFINEMENT.
Charge B) is carrying the knife out of Sollecito's house; apparently the statute of limitations on this offense has expired. (I predict the guilters will have a field day with this, emphasizing that it is not a finding of innocence. Lol.)

The other headline (which the guilters will probably have even more of a field day with) is that, yes, indeed the infamous second paragraph of C.P.P. Article 530 was cited, which some will persist in thinking means that the acquittal is less than "full". (This is wrong; non-"full" acquittals have been abolished.)

We will know for sure when the motivations report comes out. In the meantime most news outlets describe it as a finding of innocent, like the Hellmann decision.

Many posters very much wanted it to be a paragraph 1 acquital until it became clear it wasn't, then it didn't matter - paragraph 1 and paragraph were the same. It seemed to me that that was what bothered Grinder, stickler that he was.

 

[Bill Williams]

Many posters very much wanted it to be a paragraph 1 acquital until it became clear it wasn't, then it didn't matter - paragraph 1 and paragraph were the same. It seemed to me that that was what bothered Grinder, stickler that he was.

They are not the same, because there are two of them which apply to differing situations. IIRC where Grinder and I agreed was on the issue of what difference in outcome was there between the two. There is none.

 

[Numbers]

We had a very good back and forth on this months ago. For me the issue is what is the consequence of each -Section 1 vs. Section 2.

There is no difference in consequence of being acquitted by each. It is not true to say one is "they're definitely innocent" and the other, "they probably did it, just not beyond a reasonable doubt.". One is where the crime never existed (like the transport of the knife), tbe other is when the crime existed ( like the murder) but that the accused didn't do it.
Both are exonerations.

For what it is worth, although he was a solid innocentisi Grinder had a differing point of view on this.

No, no, no, no Bill. CPP Articles 530.1 and 530.2 cover the same range of acquittals. There are 5 specifications for each, including 1. "the crime did not occur", 2. "the accused did not commit the crime", 3. "act was not a crime according to past or current law", 4. "the person accused was justified or excused and so cannot be punished by law", 5. "the person accused lacks the mental capacity to be held responsible by punishment".

Article 530.1 does not indicate how the judge makes the decision beyond listing the specifications for acquittal. That is, Article 530.1 does not refer to any standard of proof.

Article 530.2 indicates that the judge also makes the decision on the specification for acquittal if the proof for the negative of the specification was insufficient, contradictory, or lacking. For example, if the proof that a crime occurred is insufficient or contradictory or lacking, the judge acquits, citing the same cause (specification) as he would for 530.1.

As I understand from my reference text (Gialuz et al), Article 530.2 was added because of the need to achieve consistency with CPP Article 533.1, which states that the judge shall issue a conviction only when the accused is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard was adopted in Italian law in 2006.

ETA: What is important here (IMO) is that the recent introduction (2006) into Italian law of the concept that an accused is only found guilty on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt helps explains the unlawful arbitrary judgments of the Massei and Nencini courts, and the Chieffi CSC panel. They had not fully assimilated this relatively new law, and instead relied on the inquisitiorial standard, which was - approximately - that an accused person was to be found guilty on the basis of subjective probabilities.

 

[Bill Williams]

No, no, no, no Bill. CPP Articles 530.1 and 530.2 cover the same range of acquittals. There are 5 specifications for each, including 1. "the crime did not occur", 2. "the accused did not commit the crime", 3. "act was not a crime according to past or current law", 4. "the person accused was justified or excused and so cannot be punished by law", 5. "the person accused lacks the mental capacity to be held responsible by punishment".

Article 530.1 does not indicate how the judge makes the decision beyond listing the specifications for acquittal. That is, Article 530.1 does not refer to any standard of proof.

Article 530.2 indicates that the judge also makes the decision on the specification for acquittal if the proof for the negative of the specification was insufficient, contradictory, or lacking. For example, if the proof that a crime occurred is insufficient or contradictory or lacking, the judge acquits, citing the same cause (specification) as he would for 530.1.

As I understand from my reference text (Gialuz et al), Article 530.2 was added because of the need to achieve consistency with CPP Article 533.1, which states that the judge shall issue a conviction only when the accused is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard was adopted in Italian law in 2006.

ETA: What is important here (IMO) is that the recent introduction (2006) into Italian law of the concept that an accused is only found guilty on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt helps explains the unlawful arbitrary judgments of the Massei and Nencini courts, and the Chieffi CSC panel. They had not fully assimilated this relatively new law, and instead relied on the inquisitiorial standard, which was - approximately - that an accused person was to be found guilty on the basis of subjective probabilities.

Maybe, then, this is why Grinder argued so vociferously - because I was wrong!

If I have time I'll go back and see what the two of us had been on about.

 

[Numbers]

....

Many posters very much wanted it to be a paragraph 1 acquital until it became clear it wasn't, then it didn't matter - paragraph 1 and paragraph were the same. It seemed to me that that was what bothered Grinder, stickler that he was.

Part of the problem in perception was, I believe, that the Hellmann court verdict of acquittal cited as specification "the accused did not commit the crime". But it was not an acquittal that cited Article 530.1 (which apparently some assumed). Nor did it cite Article 530.2. It cited CPP Article 605, which conveys an appeal court the authority to modify a verdict as it deems proper. Note that the two specifications of acquittal cited are selected from those contained in Article 530.

The Corte di Assise di Appello of Perugia,

pursuant to C.P.P. Article 605 ,

in partial modification of the ruling announced on the date of December 4-5, 2009 by the Perugia Corte di Assise of first level in the matter of Amanda Marie Knox and Raffaele Sollecito, appealed by them and [also] incidentally by the Prosecutor of the Republic of Perugia,
....
ACQUITS

both of the defendants of the crimes attributed to them under Charges A,B,C, and D for not having committed the act, and of the crime under Charge E because the act did not take place; rejecting the request made against them by civil party Aldalia Tattanelli;

 

[Numbers]

Maybe, then, this is why Grinder argued so vociferously - because I was wrong!

If I have time I'll go back and see what the two of us had been on about.

There were actually several points that, as I recall, Grinder was making.

For example, Grinder stated that a "not guilty" verdict was not the same as a verdict of "innocence". And of course, there is no verdict using the word "innocence" in Italy. However, all Italian verdicts in which the judge finds that the person accused did not commit the crime and references CPP Article 530.1 receive the specification "acquitted because the accused did not commit the act (crime)". Some believe that this is a "verdict of innocence"; Art. 530.1 does not say that, however, but it does not define empirically how the judge decides.

On the other hand, CPP Article 530.2 instructs that a verdict of acquittal must be given also if the proof (evidence) is insufficient, contradictory or lacking that the accused committed the crime. This section of the law provides an empirical guide to the judge, in accordance with Italy adopting CPP Article 533.1 (the judge convicts only if the accused is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; this law was only introduced into Italian law in 2006). If the judge acquits under 530.2 because his empirical evaluation concludes that the accused did not commit the crime, the same specification "acquitted because the accused did not commit the act (crime)" is used.

And there are actually 5 different specifications for acquittal under CPP Article 530, each of which applies to 530.1 and to 530.2.

Some persons in Italy or elsewhere may perceive a difference in quality between an acquittal under CPP Article 530.1 compared to Article 530.2, but there is no difference in legal consequences, either civil or criminal, for an acquittal under either as long as the specification is "acquitted because the accused did not commit the act (crime)", at least insofar as the civil case ran concurrently with the criminal case.

To help clarify what the dispute with Grinder was over these issues, here is Grinder's post of 10 April 2016 9:08 am, #1381 of Continuation 21:

Whether or not 530.2 has any difference legally is secondary in this case to the perception. There is no one posting on this board that equals the status of Professor Anna Bull

Professor Anna Bull was appointed Professor of Italian in 1996, having taught at Bath since 1987. She graduated from the University of Naples and wrote her doctorate at the University of Reading, where she subsequently held a lectureship.

If it is factual that "not proven" and "not guilty" have or had the same legal status in Scotland only strengthens the similarity between "not proven" and 530.2.

I don't believe anyone here has the knowledge to categorically state there is absolutely no difference between a .1 and a .2 verdict. No one has the knowledge to claim it is similar to dropping the charges.

Anna Bull and Cheli both being well educated in Italy believe the difference has meaning.

I have read the posts of Numbers but in law the code doesn't always say it all. I think Mach had a relevant snippet from a court ruling indicating there is a legal difference. I don't know if his quote was on point or not.
___
Thus, Grinder was advocating for at least the potential that there was a legal difference based upon some sources. This generated some lively discussion which I hope was informative.

One should be aware that in a civil law jurisdiction such as Italy, the law is defined entirely by the legal codes passed by the Parliament and the decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court (which is not the Supreme Court of Cassation or CSC)*. Judicial decisions of the CSC may be taken as guidance (not precedent) by the CSC or lower courts in particular cases.

*And, of course, the Italian Constitution (which is enacted and amended by the Parliament) and international laws to which Italy has agreed by treaty to adhere to, which for Italy includes the European Convention on Human Rights and its European Court of Human Rights (the Convention defines the ECHR, which is part of the Council of Europe, to which Italy belongs by treaty).

The source of my information on Italian law includes:

The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: Critical essays and English translation, edited by Mitja Gialuz, Luca Luparia, and Federica Scarpa; Wolters Kluwer Italia (C) 2014

Gialuz is Professor of Criminal Procedure at the University of Trieste
Luparia is Professor of Criminal Procedure at the University of Milan
Scarpa is Professor of English Language and Translation at the University of Trieste

 

[Vixen]

Part of the problem in perception was, I believe, that the Hellmann court verdict of acquittal cited as specification "the accused did not commit the crime". But it was not an acquittal that cited Article 530.1 (which apparently some assumed). Nor did it cite Article 530.2. It cited CPP Article 605, which conveys an appeal court the authority to modify a verdict as it deems proper. Note that the two specifications of acquittal cited are selected from those contained in Article 530.

Tut tut tut. It was pointed out to you that the wording in the penal code does not have the words 'the accused did not commit the crime'. That was just a meaningless nicetie added by Bruno-Marasca which has no legal meaning.

In Grinder's view, that wording was simply a court template convention.

 

[Vixen]

There were actually several points that, as I recall, Grinder was making.

For example, Grinder stated that a "not guilty" verdict was not the same as a verdict of "innocence". And of course, there is no verdict using the word "innocence" in Italy. However, all Italian verdicts in which the judge finds that the person accused did not commit the crime and references CPP Article 530.1 receive the specification "acquitted because the accused did not commit the act (crime)". Some believe that this is a "verdict of innocence"; Art. 530.1 does not say that, however, but it does not define empirically how the judge decides.

On the other hand, CPP Article 530.2 instructs that a verdict of acquittal must be given also if the proof (evidence) is insufficient, contradictory or lacking that the accused committed the crime. This section of the law provides an empirical guide to the judge, in accordance with Italy adopting CPP Article 533.1 (the judge convicts only if the accused is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; this law was only introduced into Italian law in 2006). If the judge acquits under 530.2 because his empirical evaluation concludes that the accused did not commit the crime, the same specification "acquitted because the accused did not commit the act (crime)" is used.

And there are actually 5 different specifications for acquittal under CPP Article 530, each of which applies to 530.1 and to 530.2.
Some persons in Italy or elsewhere may perceive a difference in quality between an acquittal under CPP Article 530.1 compared to Article 530.2, but there is no difference in legal consequences, either civil or criminal, for an acquittal under either as long as the specification is "acquitted because the accused did not commit the act (crime)", at least insofar as the civil case ran concurrently with the criminal case.

To help clarify what the dispute with Grinder was over these issues, here is Grinder's post of 10 April 2016 9:08 am, #1381 of Continuation 21:

Whether or not 530.2 has any difference legally is secondary in this case to the perception. There is no one posting on this board that equals the status of Professor Anna Bull

Professor Anna Bull was appointed Professor of Italian in 1996, having taught at Bath since 1987. She graduated from the University of Naples and wrote her doctorate at the University of Reading, where she subsequently held a lectureship.

If it is factual that "not proven" and "not guilty" have or had the same legal status in Scotland only strengthens the similarity between "not proven" and 530.2.

I don't believe anyone here has the knowledge to categorically state there is absolutely no difference between a .1 and a .2 verdict. No one has the knowledge to claim it is similar to dropping the charges.

Anna Bull and Cheli both being well educated in Italy believe the difference has meaning.

I have read the posts of Numbers but in law the code doesn't always say it all. I think Mach had a relevant snippet from a court ruling indicating there is a legal difference. I don't know if his quote was on point or not.
___
Thus, Grinder was advocating for at least the potential that there was a legal difference based upon some sources. This generated some lively discussion which I hope was informative.

One should be aware that in a civil law jurisdiction such as Italy, the law is defined entirely by the legal codes passed by the Parliament and the decisions of the Supreme Constitutional Court (which is not the Supreme Court of Cassation or CSC)*. Judicial decisions of the CSC may be taken as guidance (not precedent) by the CSC or lower courts in particular cases.

*And, of course, the Italian Constitution (which is enacted and amended by the Parliament) and international laws to which Italy has agreed by treaty to adhere to, which for Italy includes the European Convention on Human Rights and its European Court of Human Rights (the Convention defines the ECHR, which is part of the Council of Europe, to which Italy belongs by treaty).

The source of my information on Italian law includes:

The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: Critical essays and English translation, edited by Mitja Gialuz, Luca Luparia, and Federica Scarpa; Wolters Kluwer Italia (C) 2014

Gialuz is Professor of Criminal Procedure at the University of Trieste
Luparia is Professor of Criminal Procedure at the University of Milan
Scarpa is Professor of English Language and Translation at the University of Trieste

That is not so. 530,1 has four (or is it five) subsections, 530,2, has just one. Please stop misleading readers.

 

[Bill Williams]

That is not so. 530,1 has four (or is it five) subsections, 530,2, has just one. Please stop misleading readers.

As a way for us way up in the cheap seats to get our heads around the legalities of the Italian system, as it relates to the RS/AK prosecutions, we all need to read this peer reviewed analysis of the case, from Boston University in 2012.

https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2014/05/note_mirabella.pdf

One of the reforms of 1989 was to remove the judge as the main investigator, and put investigation in the hands of the public prosecutor. This was part of the movement from the Inquisatorial to the Adversarial system.

But it clearly got stuck, and in the hands of Mignini and Comodi the problems are apparent. The public prosecutor was supposed to investigate as if both the prosecutor and the defender, meaning both incriminating and exculpatory evidence was his responsibility, with an almost minor role assigned to the defence to add things if they thought it was necessary.

Mignini was just not interested in exculpatory evidence. And for the Maseei and Nencini courts, they simply assumed that when Mignini brings little evidence of innocence - ignoring lab contamination for instance - then it is up to the defence to show how the prosecution has failed in that.

"Show us the route of contamination", if the prosecutor has not brought that as part of his role as a neutral arbiter of evidence.

I'm sure all can figure out what went wrong when entrusting that responsibility to Mignini - as Italy was in the middle of a switch of systems.

 

[Vixen]

As a way for us way up in the cheap seats to get our heads around the legalities of the Italian system, as it relates to the RS/AK prosecutions, we all need to read this peer reviewed analysis of the case, from Boston University in 2012.

https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2014/05/note_mirabella.pdf

One of the reforms of 1989 was to remove the judge as the main investigator, and put investigation in the hands of the public prosecutor. This was part of the movement from the Inquisatorial to the Adversarial system.

But it clearly got stuck, and in the hands of Mignini and Comodi the problems are apparent. The public prosecutor was supposed to investigate as if both the prosecutor and the defender, meaning both incriminating and exculpatory evidence was his responsibility, with an almost minor role assigned to the defence to add things if they thought it was necessary.

Mignini was just not interested in exculpatory evidence. And for the Maseei and Nencini courts, they simply assumed that when Mignini brings little evidence of innocence - ignoring lab contamination for instance - then it is up to the defence to show how the prosecution has failed in that.

"Show us the route of contamination", if the prosecutor has not brought that as part of his role as a neutral arbiter of evidence.

I'm sure all can figure out what went wrong when entrusting that responsibility to Mignini - as Italy was in the middle of a switch of systems.

No, the Brady law as it is called int he USA is based on a case where prosecutors knew of evidence that would serve to be in Brady's favour, but failed to do so.


There is no onus on Mignini, and later, Commodi, to 'find the route of contamination', as there was no conceivable possibility of contamination, as the forensic team who foudn the murder weapon at Raff's, was completely different and separate fromt he team at the cottage, who found the bra-clasp. Raff would never have had any legitimate reason to set foot in Mez' room, or at least, he never spoke up to say he had ever been there.


What you fail to realise is that Italian Law framework is predicated on very different principles to US/UK ones. The laws of England and Wales are based on case law and precedent, with judges empowered to 'interpret the law' as they see fit.

In Italy, lawyers literally have to learn the Penal Code off by heart and judges have no power to 'interpret' them.

So when you say Italy is changing from inquisitorial to adversarial that does NOT mean their framework is now taking the shape of our framework.

Quoting Brady and exculpatory evidence would be a waste of breath. The onus is on the defence to show clearly how contamination has occurred and its route. Pete Gill endorses this himself in his own writings, saying the route of contamination must be explained.

Nobody was able to give a sensible explanation as to:

a. How Mez' DNA turned up on a knife in Raff's apartment.

b. How Raff's DNA, unmixed with Amanda's (one mixed sample was found in the cottage and no other DNA of Raff's), could be found full-profile, non-LCN, high RFU's with a probability of 1 in 3 billion against it being there randomly, on the victim's bra-clasp, under a sheet, under the body, under the duvet, under papers scattered during a 'burglary'.

None of the merits court judges accepted there was any contamination. Conti & Vecchiotti were forced to concur under oath there was no reasonable possibility of contamination in Stafnaoni's laboratory.

We see just how crooked Vecchiotti is, when in the netflix film, 'Amanda Knox', she claims Stefanoni's laboratories WERE contaminated.

 

[Bill Williams]

No, the Brady law as it is called int he USA is based on a case where prosecutors knew of evidence that would serve to be in Brady's favour, but failed to do so.


There is no onus on Mignini, and later, Commodi, to 'find the route of contamination', as there was no conceivable possibility of contamination, as the forensic team who foudn the murder weapon at Raff's, was completely different and separate fromt he team at the cottage, who found the bra-clasp. Raff would never have had any legitimate reason to set foot in Mez' room, or at least, he never spoke up to say he had ever been there.

This is complete gibberish. You know nothing about the "Brady law".

And yes, if you read the piece I linked to (which you couldn't possibly have done) under the hybrid system the onus IS on the prosecutor to find and present ALL exculpatory evidence.

The routes of contamination are many and obvious. Under cross-examination in 2009 Stefanoni could neither confirm **nor deny** that she herself, at collection, had not contaminated evidence with her own gloves.



Raffaele had been banging on Meredith's door in the morning, and the police medical team came into the room right through that spot without anti contamination measures, as Napoleoni testified at trial.

46 days later the clasp was found in a different spot in the bedroom. You constantly misrepresent the evidence.

 

[Numbers]

As a way for us way up in the cheap seats to get our heads around the legalities of the Italian system, as it relates to the RS/AK prosecutions, we all need to read this peer reviewed analysis of the case, from Boston University in 2012.

https://www.bu.edu/ilj/files/2014/05/note_mirabella.pdf

One of the reforms of 1989 was to remove the judge as the main investigator, and put investigation in the hands of the public prosecutor. This was part of the movement from the Inquisatorial to the Adversarial system.

But it clearly got stuck, and in the hands of Mignini and Comodi the problems are apparent. The public prosecutor was supposed to investigate as if both the prosecutor and the defender, meaning both incriminating and exculpatory evidence was his responsibility, with an almost minor role assigned to the defence to add things if they thought it was necessary.

Mignini was just not interested in exculpatory evidence. And for the Maseei and Nencini courts, they simply assumed that when Mignini brings little evidence of innocence - ignoring lab contamination for instance - then it is up to the defence to show how the prosecution has failed in that.

"Show us the route of contamination", if the prosecutor has not brought that as part of his role as a neutral arbiter of evidence.

I'm sure all can figure out what went wrong when entrusting that responsibility to Mignini - as Italy was in the middle of a switch of systems.

Bill, thanks for finding this article. I've just started to read it; it seems to have some interesting commentary on the Italian judicial system and the Knox - Sollecito case. The article was published in April, 2012 so it, of course, probably only covers events to the Hellmann trial.

From my initial reading, I don't think that the author fully analyzed the case and the way the Italian courts functioned compared to the way they are supposed to function under Italian law and the European Convention of Human Rights. The author states that the Italians modified their legal system to come closer to American standards; she neglects to point out that the Convention requires adversarial features in a judicial system - the defense is entitled to "equality of arms" with the prosecution. This was not how the Italian judicial system had functioned under the Italian inquisitorial system, and the reform toward an adversarial system was imperfect, as shown by the Knox - Sollecito case. That is, judges such as Massei either simply accepted the prosecution claims or even made up scenarios were there was no evidence or contrary to evidence to satisfy a wrongful finding of (provisional) guilt by probability rather than by the standard, new to Italy, of finding an accused guilty only when proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of evidence.

The purpose of this Note is to explore the changes made to the Italian criminal procedure code, to assess the state of Italian criminal proceedings at present, and to consider the method used in comparing Italian criminal procedure to adversarial systems. In the United States, Italian criminal procedure had not received much consideration until the details
of the Amanda Knox trial became a national sensation. Using the Knox
case as a foundation, this Note will explore whether the vehement American critique of the Italian system has merit. The analysis suggests that the criticism may stem from a misunderstanding of how the Italian system works, from a basic disconnect between concepts of “truth” in common law and civil law systems, and from an imperfect comparison of fundamentally different criminal procedure systems.

 

[Numbers]

This is complete gibberish. You know nothing about the "Brady law".

And yes, if you read the piece I linked to (which you couldn't possibly have done) under the hybrid system the onus IS on the prosecutor to find and present ALL exculpatory evidence. The routes of contamination are many and obvious. Under cross-examination in 2009 Stefanoni could neither confirm **nor deny** that she herself, at collection, had not contaminated evidence with her own gloves.

[qimg]http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/imagehosting/thum_5397154cd64bdf2e8d.jpg[/qimg]

Raffaele had been banging on Meredith's door in the morning, and the police medical team came into the room right through that spot without anti contamination measures, as Napoleoni testified at trial.

46 days later the clasp was found in a different spot in the bedroom. You constantly misrepresent the evidence.

Yes indeed. The provision is in Italian law:

CPP Article 358 Investigative activities of the Public Prosecutor

1. The Public Prosecutor shall carry out any activity necessary for the purposes referred to in Article 326 and shall also carry out ascertainments on the facts and circumstances in favour of the suspected person.

Obviously Mignini et al. did not carry out their legal responsibilities under CPP Art. 358.

 

[Bill Williams]

Yes indeed. The provision is in Italian law:

CPP Article 358 Investigative activities of the Public Prosecutor

1. The Public Prosecutor shall carry out any activity necessary for the purposes referred to in Article 326 and shall also carry out ascertainments on the facts and circumstances in favour of the suspected person.

Obviously Mignini et al. did not carry out their legal responsibilities under CPP Art. 358.

As it presently sits in Italy, when it is left up to the defence to bring forth exculpatory evidence, that is tantamount to the defence accusing the prosecutor of not doing his duty.

In a culture where professional honour is both valued highly and protected through criminal sanction - a defender risks calunnia simply by bringing something to court missed (willfully?) By the prosecutor.

No wonder the convicting courts ripped into folk such as Conti-Vecchiotti. The mere need for the court itself to ask for independent analysis casts a pall on the Court's attitude towards tbe prosecutor.

Marasca-Bruno's motivations report covers this, because despite the legislation you cite, the judge seems also to be expected to be more of an expert than the expert.

 

[Welshman]

Can someone confirm something.

Edited by zooterkin: 

<SNIP>
Edited for rule 0 and rule 12.

Vixen claims that C&V testified at the Hellman trial that contamination was ruled out but later said in the Netflix documentary there was an issue with contamination which contradicts what they said at trial. Is it the case that C&V did not rule out contamination at the Hellman trial

Edited by zooterkin: 

<SNIP>
Edited for rule 0 and rule 12.

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[Bill Williams]

Edited by zooterkin: 

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Vixen claims that C&V testified at the Hellman trial that contamination was ruled out but later said in the Netflix documentary there was an issue with contamination which contradicts what they said at trial. Is it the case that C&V did not rule out contamination at the Hellman trial

Edited by zooterkin: 

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This is the problem with Vixen never giving citations. At most what can be said is that Vixen read on one of the nutcase websites that Vecchiotti hsd ruled out contamination.

Reading the C-V report shows how much they trashed Stefanoni her lab and her work. If I remember they cited the lack of adequate documentation available to tbe court from Stefanoni to tell one way or another about contamination.

But there I am with no citation of my own. So it's up to you.

 

[Methos]

Edited by zooterkin: 

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Edited for rule 0 and rule 12.

Vixen claims that C&V testified at the Hellman trial that contamination was ruled out but later said in the Netflix documentary there was an issue with contamination which contradicts what they said at trial. Is it the case that C&V did not rule out contamination at the Hellman trial

Edited by zooterkin: 

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Edited for rule 0 and rule 12.

This one is based on this exchange between judge Hellmann and Prof. Vecchiotti during cross examination on September 5th, 2011 (page 79):

PRESIDENTE – Dica se sei giorni le sembrano sufficienti o no, perché non ci sia stato rischio di contaminazione, la domanda è questa.
VECCHIOTTI C. - Sono sufficienti, ammesso che è andato così.

Translation:

PRESIDENT - Say if the six days seem sufficient or not, because there was no risk of contamination, question is this.
Vecchiotti C. - There are sufficient, if it went well.

ETA: This exchange was about the possibility, that 36b could have been the result of contamination, not on contamination in general...

 

[toto]

Here are examples of the discussion of the perception of paragraph 1 versus paragraph 2 after the announcement of the M-B verdict












Many posters very much wanted it to be a paragraph 1 acquital until it became clear it wasn't, then it didn't matter - paragraph 1 and paragraph were the same. It seemed to me that that was what bothered Grinder, stickler that he was.

Yes, I get your last point. But if there really is no legal difference, and the point is how the classification of the verdict is perceived by the general public, then I would argue that the mainstream media of whatever country one chooses to look at , did NOT portray her definitive acquittal as in any way a "lesser", more ambiguous verdict. That's all I am saying.

 

[Vixen]

As it presently sits in Italy, when it is left up to the defence to bring forth exculpatory evidence, that is tantamount to the defence accusing the prosecutor of not doing his duty.

In a culture where professional honour is both valued highly and protected through criminal sanction - a defender risks calunnia simply by bringing something to court missed (willfully?) By the prosecutor.

No wonder the convicting courts ripped into folk such as Conti-Vecchiotti. The mere need for the court itself to ask for independent analysis casts a pall on the Court's attitude towards tbe prosecutor.

Marasca-Bruno's motivations report covers this, because despite the legislation you cite, the judge seems also to be expected to be more of an expert than the expert.

That is a very silly assertion. A court of law is a legally privileged context. The prosecutor CANNOT prosecute a barrister for bringing up an issue in an open court. There is no such thing as 'libel' or slander' in a court of law. This is why newspapers love quoting judges and QC. The more scathing and acerbic, the better the headlines.


V&C were hardly independent, as was proven, when they handed the defense a DVD but not the prosecution. Legal breach #1. When the carabinieri turned up to seize said DVD, they ran crying to Hellmann, who told them straight they must give the other party a copy.

 

[Bill Williams]

That is a very silly assertion. A court of law is a legally privileged context. The prosecutor CANNOT prosecute a barrister for bringing up an issue in an open court. There is no such thing as 'libel' or slander' in a court of law. This is why newspapers love quoting judges and QC. The more scathing and acerbic, the better the headlines.


V&C were hardly independent, as was proven, when they handed the defense a DVD but not the prosecution. Legal breach #1. When the carabinieri turned up to seize said DVD, they ran crying to Hellmann, who told them straight they must give the other party a copy.

Blah blah blah.

Fresh from misrepresenting Vecchiotti at trial. Someone else provides the citation - no wonder you didn't provide it.

Once again, you quote something as proven with no citation, just an equally stupid assertion from the nutter websites.