Proof of Immortality, the IV league

[Hokulele]

For those following the conversation who would like a rather basic (but entertaining!) description of what is meant by Bayes factors and Prior beliefs and how they affect the values used, I highly recommend this blog:

https://www.countbayesie.com/blog/2015/2/18/hans-solo-and-bayesian-priors

https://www.countbayesie.com/blog/2016/3/16/bayesian-reasoning-in-the-twilight-zone

 

[jsfisher]

jt,
- I'm saying that if H (OOFLam) is wrong, the likelihood of my current existence is MUCH greater than it is if H is right, and that the difference between the two more than makes up for the difference between the prior probabilities of H and ~H.

Start with P(E) = 1.

You're selecting an existing thing (yourself) then asking if it exists. Why, yes, it does. P(E) = 1.

Now, for any H you may care to use: P(E) = P(E|H) x P(H) + P(E|~H) x P(~H)

It is that right-hand side were you think the magic lies, and that's where you want to invent numbers that feel good.

Go ahead. Make up any numbers you like for the right-hand side. Just be sure it all reduces to P(E) = 1. Try as I may, I keep ending up with P(E|H) and P(E|~H) both equal to 1. Can you do any better?

 

[jond]

Mojo,
- I assume that it requires a current body in order to be recognized in a physical world.

Now that you have acknowledged that your model includes both a body and a self, do you finally understand why the scientific model (which only requires a body) is far more likely?

 

[jt512]

For those following the conversation who would like a rather basic (but entertaining!) description of what is meant by Bayes factors and Prior beliefs and how they affect the values used, I highly recommend this blog:

https://www.countbayesie.com/blog/2015/2/18/hans-solo-and-bayesian-priors

https://www.countbayesie.com/blog/2016/3/16/bayesian-reasoning-in-the-twilight-zone

The second of those linked articles is very well written, and the example used is a direct parallel to my God-in-the-desert example.

 

[jt512]

I'm starting to come around to the opinion that a person needs to be licensed by the World Health Organization in order to use Bayes' Theorem.

I'd be happy if they just read and understand this article that Hokulele found.

 

[abaddon]

I'd be happy if they just read and understand this article that Hokulele found.

Really? You are happy to agree that immortal souls exist and reincarnate as Jabba claims?

 

[jt512]

Really? You are happy to agree that immortal souls exist and reincarnate as Jabba claims?

Did you fail to read the article, or just fail to understand it?

On second thought, never mind. I have no idea what your question has to do with what I wrote.

 

[abaddon]

Did you fail to read the article, or just fail to understand it?

On second thought, never mind. I have no idea what your question has to do with what I wrote.

Nothing at all. It has to do with what Jabba wrote about you. Claims which you have not denied.

 

[Mojo]

You're selecting an existing thing (yourself) then asking if it exists. Why, yes, it does.

I think that I can Essentially Prove^TM that it doesn't using Jabbayesian statistics.

 

[jt512]

Nothing at all. It has to do with what Jabba wrote about you. Claims which you have not denied.

Have I confirmed them? If not, why would you care what claims Jabba made about me?

 

[Hokulele]

Really? You are happy to agree that immortal souls exist and reincarnate as Jabba claims?

jt512's thoughts on this are irrelevant, the burden is on Jabba to supply evidence for his claims, or address the issues with his "proof". Chasing others to agree or disagree is basically another form of Jabba's "If you don't disagree with me, you must agree with me." argument.

Seeing as how jt512 has pointed out the flaw in the argument made in the OP (the way back when original OP), I do not see the need to bludgeon them into taking up any of Jabba's sub-sub-sub-sub-sub-topics if they choose not to.

To be honest, I have learned quite a bit about the underlying math from the likes of them and jsfisher, that I could almost be thankful to Jabba for starting this whole mess.

 

[Jabba]

...
As I have explained before, the fundamental issue with Jabba's argument is that under both hypotheses, he can only observe the data (E), that he exists, if, in fact, he exists. Thus he is conditioning the data on the data itself. That is, his Bayes factor is
P(E|E, H1) / P(E|E, H2) = 1 / 1 = 1...

jt,
- I'm saying that if H (OOFLam) is wrong, the likelihood of my current existence is MUCH greater than it is if H is right, and that the difference between the two more than makes up for the difference between the prior probabilities of H and ~H.

I know that's what you are saying, and I have explained repeatedly, including in the post you just replied to, why you are wrong.

jt,
- Sorry about that. Somehow, I got the following as something you said, instead of something that Nonpareil had said:

Originally Posted by jt512 View Post
...
He is saying that, since the probability of his existence is one given that he has an immortal soul, and the probability of his existence would be much less than that if he didn't, the former hypothesis must be true. The Bayes factor is very high, after all...

...
As I have explained before, the fundamental issue with Jabba's argument is that under both hypotheses, he can only observe the data (E), that he exists, if, in fact, he exists. Thus he is conditioning the data on the data itself. That is, his Bayes factor is
P(E|E, H1) / P(E|E, H2) = 1 / 1 = 1...

- In regard to the immediately above, I would think that I could use an implication of accepted facts as new info (as E) if the implication had not been considered in the prior probabilities.

- If that doesn't respond to your objection, perhaps the following will.
- In determining the likelihood of E, there are two likelihoods that need to be considered (and, multiplied): P(E|E) and P(E|H). The first is 1.00, the second is (something like) 7 billion over infinity; and the result is (something like) 7 billion over infinity.
- I can't swear that this is the right way to think about it -- but so far, I think it is...
- I encountered the same issue re the likelihood of me existing right now. One would think, "Well that's obvious (though not easy to express)! When else would I be thinking about these things, except when I exist?

- Whatever, I would accept that point.
- However, there's another likelihood that seems to solve that problem. What's the likelihood of "now" being between 1942 , and (say) 2042?
- Hopefully, that will communicate...

 

[jsfisher]

... I would think that I could use an implication of accepted facts as new info (as E) if the implication had not been considered in the prior probabilities.

You cannot, of course, because that would be a completely different E than what you started with. However, imply whatever you like--it matters not to me at this point--as long as your calculation balances out to P(E) = 1.

 

[godless dave]

jt,
- Sorry about that. Somehow, I got the following as something you said, instead of something that Nonpareil had said:

Originally Posted by jt512 View Post
...
He is saying that, since the probability of his existence is one given that he has an immortal soul, and the probability of his existence would be much less than that if he didn't, the former hypothesis must be true. The Bayes factor is very high, after all...

- In regard to the immediately above, I would think that I could use an implication of accepted facts as new info (as E) if the implication had not been considered in the prior probabilities.

- If that doesn't respond to your objection, perhaps the following will.
- In determining the likelihood of E, there are two likelihoods that need to be considered (and, multiplied): P(E|E) and P(E|H). The first is 1.00, the second is (something like) 7 billion over infinity; and the result is (something like) 7 billion over infinity.
- I can't swear that this is the right way to think about it -- but so far, I think it is...
- I encountered the same issue re the likelihood of me existing right now. One would think, "Well that's obvious (though not easy to express)! When else would I be thinking about these things, except when I exist?

- Whatever, I would accept that point.
- However, there's another likelihood that seems to solve that problem. What's the likelihood of "now" being between 1942 , and (say) 2042?
- Hopefully, that will communicate...

You still seem to be treating E as an uncaused event that does not depend on any prior events. Under H, this is not the case. Under H, the likelihood of E is the likelihood of your physical body existing, which depends on your parents existing previously, which depends on their parents existing previously, etc.

 

[Dancing David]

Mark,
- I think that I know why it appears that I'm committing it.
- Hopefully, this will communicate. It's like claiming that the lottery was rigged because somebody (anybody) won it. If that doesn't communicate, I'll try harder.

You haven't successfully shown it is a lottery.

 

[Fudbucker]

You say this, but you haven't actually explained how.



Yes, I'm aware. That's the point. Manipulating the hypothesis can give you any Bayes factor you want, because the probability of the result given the hypothesis is not dependent on how probable the actual hypothesis is. p(shuffled this way) is very small, but p(royal flush|shuffled this way) is one.

My point is that Bayesian formulas are easily manipulated. In order to have any actual weight as evidence, the priors must be clearly defined, and the calculations must be made with great care.

You can get any Bayes factor you want. What counts is being able to use it. You have to be able to compare the actual probabilities of the hypotheses themselves, not just how likely each one is to result in the given outcome. You must be able to show how likely it is that God actually reached down and guided these lost souls to water, not just say "if he did, they would have a much greater chance of surviving".

Otherwise, all you end up with is a big, fat zero.

This is Jabba's fundamental issue with Bayes throughout this thread. He is saying that, since the probability of his existence is one given that he has an immortal soul, and the probability of his existence would be much less than that if he didn't, the former hypothesis must be true. The Bayes factor is very high, after all.

But he can't establish that p(immortal soul) itself is anything other than zero, so the Bayes factor never enters the equation.

He has no evidence.

He has no argument.

All he has is "I'd be less likely to exist if I weren't special, so I must be special."

A big, fat zero.

The bolded is totally wrong. My belief that you are a poker cheat, prior to playing you, might have some nebulous value that I haven't even bothered to consider. But after you've dealt yourself your fifth (or tenth, or 20th, whatever) royal flush, my belief that you cheat at poker will be .9999, no matter what my prior degree of belief was.

 

[Fudbucker]

Nothing at all. It has to do with what Jabba wrote about you. Claims which you have not denied.

LOL.

 

[Mojo]

- In determining the likelihood of E, there are two likelihoods that need to be considered (and, multiplied): P(E|E) and P(E|H). The first is 1.00, the second is (something like) 7 billion over infinity; and the result is (something like) 7 billion over infinity.

Remind us again: where do you get that "infinity" from?

- I can't swear that this is the right way to think about it -- but so far, I think it is...

So far, you're wrong.

- I encountered the same issue re the likelihood of me existing right now. One would think, "Well that's obvious (though not easy to express)! When else would I be thinking about these things, except when I exist?

- Whatever, I would accept that point.
- However, there's another likelihood that seems to solve that problem. What's the likelihood of "now" being between 1942 , and (say) 2042?

Your current existence requires your body, remember? It has a finite lifetime whether or not you also have an immortal soul.

 

[Jabba]

...
- In regard to the immediately above, I would think that I could use an implication of accepted facts as new info (as E) if the implication had not been considered in the prior probabilities.

You cannot, of course, because that would be a completely different E than what you started with. However, imply whatever you like--it matters not to me at this point--as long as your calculation balances out to P(E) = 1.

js,

- I didn't say that right.

- I should have said, "In regard to the immediately above, I would think that I could use an implication of an accepted fact (the current existence of my self (E)) as new info if the implication had not been considered in the prior probabilities.

- Hopefully, that's what you're referring to...

 

[Hokulele]

js,

- I didn't say that right.

- I should have said, "In regard to the immediately above, I would think that I could use an implication of an accepted fact (the current existence of my self (E)) as new info if the implication had not been considered in the prior probabilities.

- Hopefully, that's what you're referring to...

Data is data in a Bayesian formula. You can't change that. Implications of that data are pretty much your priors, so not considering those implications when calculating them is just ... weird.

P(E) is still your observed data, and it is still 1, no matter how you slice it.