JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
I'm starting with a premise that I think we all agree upon.
No. We don't agree that the "duplicated body" scenario poses any problem. You insist it does, but that's a problem with your hypothesis, not the scientific hypothesis.
I just think that there are important implications attached to that premise...
There are, but they affect only your hypothesis, and only negatively.
i.e., the only way we could re-create me (according to toon, pixel, my science fiction story and modern science) is to travel back in time and run my film all over again.
Equivocation. The scenario was originally a thought experiment to investigate how consciousness or the "self" would respond were it possible to make an exact duplicate or clone of you. It wasn't to investigate how such a thing might be done.
Do not attempt once again to conflate predictability with determinism. We went through this already several times. And you're still just re-committing the Texas sharpshooter fallacy.
And, that being the case, there is no limited pool of potential selves that we came from -- each of us just "popped up," came from nowhere, was a "brand new" entity -- and any theoretical 'pool' of potential selves is infinite...
Under the scientific hypothesis this is simply moot. The consciousness or self is simply an emergent property of the brain, and as such there are as many selves as there are brains. It's only under your hypothesis that this point even has relevance, since you're the one trying to argue that there is something separate from the body that creates consciousness or self and can't be shared.
This will take some discussion.
You don't discuss. You ignore most of the discussion in favor of rambling over the same points over and over, and "forgetting" that you lost those points the last time we debated them.