We've been wrong all along.
Jabba isn't trying to prove immortality. He's trying to create it.
Proof of Immortality III
- Thread starter Humots
- Start date
- Status
We've been wrong all along.
Jabba isn't trying to prove immortality. He's trying to create it.
jt512
Philosopher
- Joined
- Sep 24, 2011
- Messages
- 5,116
That's not quite the fallacy. Let's say you have a hypothesis K that the possible outcomes of a die roll are random and equally likely, and therefore that the probability that the outcome will be "three" is 1/6. You then roll the die and the outcome is indeed a three. Then, the following is still correct: P("three"|K) = 1/6. The outcome of the experiment does not change the probability of the outcome under the hypothesis. If you don't believe this, roll the die a million times and calculate the empirical relative frequency of the outcome "three."
Jabba's fallacy is that, under his "scientific" hypothesis, he is unwittingly conditioning on the observed outcome as well as the hypothesis, and he is not taking this into account when he states the probability. He observes "Jabba exists" and states that, under the hypothesis R that "Jabba" was a random outcome, P("Jabba"|R) is very small. This is indeed true. But Jabba exists. Even if Jabba is the outcome of a random process, it was the random outcome that actually occurred. Furthermore, Jabba could only make the observation "Jabba exists" if Jabba exists. Therefore, the event he is observing is not an event in a sample space that contains the events "Jabba exists" and "Jabba does not exist," but rather, it is an event in the conditional sample space in which "Jabba exists" is the only element. Therefore, he is actually calculating P("Jabba"|R, "Jabba"), the probability that Jabba exists given that a random process occurred and he was the outcome. This probability is 1, and, since he is conditioning on his own existence, it is this probability he must use in Bayes' formula.
This fact that he is conditioning on his own existence is fatal to his argument. Since P("Jabba"|R, "Jabba") = 1, the posterior probability of his immortality hypothesis cannot be greater that its prior probability (because P("Jabba"|~R) ≤ 1). So his argument, which is intended to increase the posterior probability of immortality relative to its prior, can only lower it.
Last edited:
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
I agree; your formulation is better.
jt512
Philosopher
- Joined
- Sep 24, 2011
- Messages
- 5,116
Thank you. I'm glad we were able to come to agreement. That is something quite rare on the Internet.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
Indeed it is. I feel we've been substantially in agreement all along regarding Jabba's error, if not the particulars of it. But it sometimes takes some back-and-forth to see the same picture from the same perspective. Thanks for providing that.
Your middle paragraph arguing from the sample-space perspective is, I think, the most cogent expression of what many of us have been trying to find the words to accurately express. It also has the benefit of demonstrable rigor. And the point about his immortal existence being less probable necessarily than his given existence is also a point many others have expressed in different ways -- but here, now, with rigor. Thanks for taking the time to spell it out in detail.
Waterman
Critical Thinker
- Joined
- Aug 5, 2008
- Messages
- 251
Ok I have been following this thread for some time and I am trying to wrap my head around Bayes and this concept. I know that the target audience will probably say tl;dr
I have a bag of 7 gaming dice that are each numbered sequentially. (D4, D6, D8, D10, D12, D20, D100) – For the non-nerds D4 is a 4 sided die, D6 is a 6 sided die etc.
One falls out and lands on the number 8. What can I definitively conclude? First that it is not the d4 or the d6 as those are not possible results.
There are 5 dice that could produce a 8 as a result.
Each Die has a different probability of producing an 8. 1:8, 1:10 1:12, 1:20, 1:100
Using a Bayesian type approach we could reach the conclusion that the probability that the die we selected that showed an 8 would be something like
1 Roll - D8 33.4%, D10 27.1%, D12 22.6%, D20 13.6% and D100 2.7%
OR D8 33.4% ~D8 66.6%
I am winging it so this may not be precisely correct but bear with me. This whole thing about Bayes is that it can’t prove what die was rolled. If I were betting on which one I would place my bet on the ~D8 .
Let’s say the cat then bats it around the table and it comes up a 6. How would that change the odds.
2 Rolls - D8 44.4%, D10 28.4%, D12 19.7%, D20 7.1% and D100 0.3%
OR D8 44.4% ~D8 56.6%
Ok it is about even odds. We continue to roll the mystery die and continue to get number between 1 and 8
5 Rolls - D8 68.0%, D10 22.3%, D12 9.0%, D20 0.7% and D100 0.0002%
OR D8 68.0% ~D8 32.0%
10 Rolls - D8 88.9%, D10 9.5%, D12 1.5%, D20 0.009% and D100 1*10^(-9)%
OR D8 88.9% ~D8 11.1%
Looks like a good bet it is a D8!
Roll 11 comes up #9! New data time to reevaluate:
Roll 11 - D10 88.1%, D12 11.9%, D20 0.04% and D100 1*10^(-9)%
However Jabba says that it is a D9 now is the most likely even though he hasn’t demonstrated that a D9 exists in the possible set of solutions. Because if there WAS a D9 the likely hood would be:
Roll 11 – D9 73.7%, D10 23.1%, D12 3.1%, D20 0.01% and D100 1*10^(-9)%
Even without a Bayesian analysis the current scientific model (SM) is consistent with the assumption that souls are an unnecessary element to explain the existence of an individual human. In order to begin refuting this you need to take the steps in the following order. If you begin with the assumption that this is wrong, and the play with numbers to make it appear that way then that is circular reasoning.
So the task before Jabba is to:
1. Show an observation (not a speculation) that is inconsistent with the current hypothesis (SM), not just a mathematical trick dividing by infinity. This is akin to; at Roll 10 the working hypothesis is that it was a D8 with a good degree of certainty. A result of 9 on Roll 11 is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
2. Confirmation that the result is as reported and just not misinterpreted (sense of continuity, desire, NDE, OBE). That it is a 9 and not an upside down 6, in science this must be observed and confirmed by others.
3. IF confirmed, the conclusion can then be that the solution lies in ~SM. However this is a big bucket of options and does not necessarily require there to be immortal souls. A possible alternative would be that there is an immaterial ‘spark, seed soul, original sin’ passed from parent to child. It may be possible that this does not persist after death. Plus other ideas that are not consistent with the theory preferred by Jabba (D9). It still could be the D10, D12 D20 or D100.
4. After this more data will be needed to converge on a preferred theory that is consistent with the observations. It will be necessary to show that a proposed alternate solution is actually plausible (existence of an immortal immaterial component). This is akin to showing that there is D9 in the bag that was previously unobserved.
5. Show the likely hood of that result relative to the other alternatives. This requires additional data on the relative probabilities of all the options and requires observations not just speculation. This will be a challenge because making observations of something that is claimed to have no material properties is a little tricky.
So far Jabba has only played mathematical tricks with trying to treat infinity as a number and pretending that it can be stuck in an equation to make something that is more improbable than SM to seem reasonable by comparison.
At this time Jabba’s existence, no matter how unlikely it may be, IS consistent with the current SM. Your failure to grasp that is not a failing of the SM but in your understanding of it.
What observations do you have that is inconsistent with the SM?
I have a bag of 7 gaming dice that are each numbered sequentially. (D4, D6, D8, D10, D12, D20, D100) – For the non-nerds D4 is a 4 sided die, D6 is a 6 sided die etc.
One falls out and lands on the number 8. What can I definitively conclude? First that it is not the d4 or the d6 as those are not possible results.
There are 5 dice that could produce a 8 as a result.
Each Die has a different probability of producing an 8. 1:8, 1:10 1:12, 1:20, 1:100
Using a Bayesian type approach we could reach the conclusion that the probability that the die we selected that showed an 8 would be something like
1 Roll - D8 33.4%, D10 27.1%, D12 22.6%, D20 13.6% and D100 2.7%
OR D8 33.4% ~D8 66.6%
I am winging it so this may not be precisely correct but bear with me. This whole thing about Bayes is that it can’t prove what die was rolled. If I were betting on which one I would place my bet on the ~D8 .
Let’s say the cat then bats it around the table and it comes up a 6. How would that change the odds.
2 Rolls - D8 44.4%, D10 28.4%, D12 19.7%, D20 7.1% and D100 0.3%
OR D8 44.4% ~D8 56.6%
Ok it is about even odds. We continue to roll the mystery die and continue to get number between 1 and 8
5 Rolls - D8 68.0%, D10 22.3%, D12 9.0%, D20 0.7% and D100 0.0002%
OR D8 68.0% ~D8 32.0%
10 Rolls - D8 88.9%, D10 9.5%, D12 1.5%, D20 0.009% and D100 1*10^(-9)%
OR D8 88.9% ~D8 11.1%
Looks like a good bet it is a D8!
Roll 11 comes up #9! New data time to reevaluate:
Roll 11 - D10 88.1%, D12 11.9%, D20 0.04% and D100 1*10^(-9)%
However Jabba says that it is a D9 now is the most likely even though he hasn’t demonstrated that a D9 exists in the possible set of solutions. Because if there WAS a D9 the likely hood would be:
Roll 11 – D9 73.7%, D10 23.1%, D12 3.1%, D20 0.01% and D100 1*10^(-9)%
Even without a Bayesian analysis the current scientific model (SM) is consistent with the assumption that souls are an unnecessary element to explain the existence of an individual human. In order to begin refuting this you need to take the steps in the following order. If you begin with the assumption that this is wrong, and the play with numbers to make it appear that way then that is circular reasoning.
So the task before Jabba is to:
1. Show an observation (not a speculation) that is inconsistent with the current hypothesis (SM), not just a mathematical trick dividing by infinity. This is akin to; at Roll 10 the working hypothesis is that it was a D8 with a good degree of certainty. A result of 9 on Roll 11 is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
2. Confirmation that the result is as reported and just not misinterpreted (sense of continuity, desire, NDE, OBE). That it is a 9 and not an upside down 6, in science this must be observed and confirmed by others.
3. IF confirmed, the conclusion can then be that the solution lies in ~SM. However this is a big bucket of options and does not necessarily require there to be immortal souls. A possible alternative would be that there is an immaterial ‘spark, seed soul, original sin’ passed from parent to child. It may be possible that this does not persist after death. Plus other ideas that are not consistent with the theory preferred by Jabba (D9). It still could be the D10, D12 D20 or D100.
4. After this more data will be needed to converge on a preferred theory that is consistent with the observations. It will be necessary to show that a proposed alternate solution is actually plausible (existence of an immortal immaterial component). This is akin to showing that there is D9 in the bag that was previously unobserved.
5. Show the likely hood of that result relative to the other alternatives. This requires additional data on the relative probabilities of all the options and requires observations not just speculation. This will be a challenge because making observations of something that is claimed to have no material properties is a little tricky.
So far Jabba has only played mathematical tricks with trying to treat infinity as a number and pretending that it can be stuck in an equation to make something that is more improbable than SM to seem reasonable by comparison.
At this time Jabba’s existence, no matter how unlikely it may be, IS consistent with the current SM. Your failure to grasp that is not a failing of the SM but in your understanding of it.
What observations do you have that is inconsistent with the SM?
Last edited:
Jabba
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2012
- Messages
- 5,613
- I'm thinkin again.
- The real issue, I think, is whether or not the event needs to be singled out/targeted ahead of time in order for its likelihood to be appropriately placed in the Bayesian formula. I claim that it is appropriate to place that likelihood into the Bayesian formula if we have a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis in which, this particular event is more likely than it is, given the original hypothesis.
- The issue now becomes – how/why would a reasonably possible hypothesis change things? I’m certainly not sure at this point -- but I'm thinking that it makes any occurrence of the event to be special...
- Say that we have two hypotheses: A and ~A.
- P(A) = .60.
- P(~A) = .40.
- P(E|A) = 1/1080.
- P(E|~A) = .62.
- Say that E occurs, and you now have to bet the farm on either A or ~A.
- Wouldn’t you have to bet your farm on ~A?
- If you say "no," and can explain it to me, that could go a long way towards cooling my ardor.
- The real issue, I think, is whether or not the event needs to be singled out/targeted ahead of time in order for its likelihood to be appropriately placed in the Bayesian formula. I claim that it is appropriate to place that likelihood into the Bayesian formula if we have a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis in which, this particular event is more likely than it is, given the original hypothesis.
- The issue now becomes – how/why would a reasonably possible hypothesis change things? I’m certainly not sure at this point -- but I'm thinking that it makes any occurrence of the event to be special...
- Say that we have two hypotheses: A and ~A.
- P(A) = .60.
- P(~A) = .40.
- P(E|A) = 1/1080.
- P(E|~A) = .62.
- Say that E occurs, and you now have to bet the farm on either A or ~A.
- Wouldn’t you have to bet your farm on ~A?
- If you say "no," and can explain it to me, that could go a long way towards cooling my ardor.
wollery
Protected by Samurai Hedgehogs!
- Joined
- Feb 27, 2003
- Messages
- 11,308
You have to define event E, and its probability under both hypotheses before it occurs, otherwise you are committing the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy.
Think about a lottery. I buy a ticket with numbers 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. The chances it will win are about 1 in 10 million. If those numbers turn up I might be shocked. I know that a certain set of six numbers will come up, but my ticket won with a tiny chance!
Okay, now let's re-frame the problem. I wait for the lottery draw to occur, note the numbers down and say, "Hey, if I had bought a ticket with those numbers I'd be rich!" Well, yes, but I didn't buy a ticket with those numbers, whatever numbers came out I'd be saying the same thing. It could have been the numbers 8, 27, 29, 35, 38, & 46. I'd still be saying, "Wow, I could have won if I'd had those numbers!"
That's the Texas Sharpshooter fallacy. You can't just look at an event after it has occurred and consider it a hit. Whatever has happened has happened.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
Asked and answered. Your formulation of the event is wrong.
You do not. You have a predetermined belief, for whose existence you have zero evidence. It is, in fact, the absence of that evidence which is compelling you to make up a pseudo-mathematical proof instead. You do not have a reasonably possible alternative.
Asked and answered. it cannot be more likely, for the reasons given. You refuse to acknowledge those reasons.
The issues are as they have been put to you many times, and which you have ignored many times. When you are ready to address the refutation in a manner that goes beyond simply regurgitating your claims several times a week, please let a grown-up know.
It has already been explained to you countless times. Do not pretend another recitation of it will eke past your filter.
Mojo
Mostly harmless
JABBA: I think I can prove that I've won the lottery.
LOTTERYCO: OK, let's see your ticket.
JABBA: This week's winning numbers are 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. Under the hypothesis that I didn't win, this is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. Look, here's a Bayesian formula showing that it if those numbers have come up, the hypothesis that I haven't won is infinitely unlikely to be correct. Since there is a reasonable possibility that I have won, the hypothesis that I have won is therefore infinitely more likely to be correct than the hypothesis that I haven't won, so I must have won.
LOTTERYCO: Hang on, it only shows that the hypothesis that you haven't won must be incorrect because you have put the likelihood of those numbers coming up as one over infinity. It isn't, it's just very unlikely.
JABBA: As I said, the likelihood of those numbers coming up is infinitesimal, because there are an infinite number of possible combinations.
LOTTERYCO: No, there are a finite number of possible combinations.
JABBA: What if Cleopatra had bought a ticket?
LOTTERYCO: That wouldn't change the fact that there are only a finite number of possibilities.
JABBA: my formula shows that it is impossible for me to have not won.
LOTTERYCO: No, it doesn't. Your argument relies on a false dilemma because it is merely trying to disprove one particular alternative to you winning, and the Texas sharpshooter fallacy because that combination of numbers is no more or less likely than any other combination. it isn't special.
JABBA: It doesn't need to be special because we have an alternative hypotheses under which that result is more likely.
LOTTERYCO: No we don't. The result is just as unlikely if you have won. Your winning would also require you to have bought a ticket with those numbers on it. Do you have that ticket?
JABBA: My formula shows that is impossible for me to have not won.
LOTTERYCO: Only because you have begged the question by claiming that the result is impossible if you haven't won. It isn't; it is entirely consistent with you not winning.
JABBA: But it is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible.
LOTTERYCO: No, it is possible, because there are a finite number of possible outcomes.
JABBA: If it is reasonably possible that I have won, then I must have won because the formula shows that it is impossible for me to have not won.
LOTTERYCO: No, it doesn't, for reasons the have already been provided. The only thing that matters here is whether you bought the winning ticket.
JABBA: The issue now is whether it matters that the result is no more or less likely than any other possible result if there is a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis to me not winning.
LOTTERYCO: Stop messing about and show us your ticket.
JABBA: This week's winning numbers are 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. Under the hypothesis that I didn't win, this is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. Look, here's a Bayesian formula showing that it if those numbers have come up, the hypothesis that I haven't won is infinitely unlikely to be correct. Since there is a reasonable possibility that I have won, the hypothesis that I have won is therefore infinitely more likely to be correct than the hypothesis that I haven't won, so I must have won...
LOTTERYCO: Someone call security.
LOTTERYCO: OK, let's see your ticket.
JABBA: This week's winning numbers are 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. Under the hypothesis that I didn't win, this is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. Look, here's a Bayesian formula showing that it if those numbers have come up, the hypothesis that I haven't won is infinitely unlikely to be correct. Since there is a reasonable possibility that I have won, the hypothesis that I have won is therefore infinitely more likely to be correct than the hypothesis that I haven't won, so I must have won.
LOTTERYCO: Hang on, it only shows that the hypothesis that you haven't won must be incorrect because you have put the likelihood of those numbers coming up as one over infinity. It isn't, it's just very unlikely.
JABBA: As I said, the likelihood of those numbers coming up is infinitesimal, because there are an infinite number of possible combinations.
LOTTERYCO: No, there are a finite number of possible combinations.
JABBA: What if Cleopatra had bought a ticket?
LOTTERYCO: That wouldn't change the fact that there are only a finite number of possibilities.
JABBA: my formula shows that it is impossible for me to have not won.
LOTTERYCO: No, it doesn't. Your argument relies on a false dilemma because it is merely trying to disprove one particular alternative to you winning, and the Texas sharpshooter fallacy because that combination of numbers is no more or less likely than any other combination. it isn't special.
JABBA: It doesn't need to be special because we have an alternative hypotheses under which that result is more likely.
LOTTERYCO: No we don't. The result is just as unlikely if you have won. Your winning would also require you to have bought a ticket with those numbers on it. Do you have that ticket?
JABBA: My formula shows that is impossible for me to have not won.
LOTTERYCO: Only because you have begged the question by claiming that the result is impossible if you haven't won. It isn't; it is entirely consistent with you not winning.
JABBA: But it is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible.
LOTTERYCO: No, it is possible, because there are a finite number of possible outcomes.
JABBA: If it is reasonably possible that I have won, then I must have won because the formula shows that it is impossible for me to have not won.
LOTTERYCO: No, it doesn't, for reasons the have already been provided. The only thing that matters here is whether you bought the winning ticket.
JABBA: The issue now is whether it matters that the result is no more or less likely than any other possible result if there is a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis to me not winning.
LOTTERYCO: Stop messing about and show us your ticket.
JABBA: This week's winning numbers are 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. Under the hypothesis that I didn't win, this is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. Look, here's a Bayesian formula showing that it if those numbers have come up, the hypothesis that I haven't won is infinitely unlikely to be correct. Since there is a reasonable possibility that I have won, the hypothesis that I have won is therefore infinitely more likely to be correct than the hypothesis that I haven't won, so I must have won...
LOTTERYCO: Someone call security.
Last edited:
Mojo
Mostly harmless
The next day:
JABBA: I can only deal with one point at a time, so I'll start by demonstrating that my assessment of the likelihood of those numbers coming up is correct.
But I think you would rather discuss the possibility of Cleopatra buying a ticket, so I'll start with that.
I'll be back.
[Leaves]
JABBA: I can only deal with one point at a time, so I'll start by demonstrating that my assessment of the likelihood of those numbers coming up is correct.
But I think you would rather discuss the possibility of Cleopatra buying a ticket, so I'll start with that.
I'll be back.
[Leaves]
Mojo
Mostly harmless
Three days later:
JABBA: This week's winning numbers are 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. Under the hypothesis that I didn't win, this is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. Look, here's a Bayesian formula showing that it if those numbers have come up, the hypothesis that I haven't won is infinitely unlikely to be correct. Since there is a reasonable possibility that I have won, the hypothesis that I have won is therefore infinitely more likely to be correct than the hypothesis that I haven't won, so I must have won...
LOTTERYCO: Security!
JABBA: This week's winning numbers are 7, 15, 26, 28, 38, & 44. Under the hypothesis that I didn't win, this is so unlikely that it is virtually impossible. Look, here's a Bayesian formula showing that it if those numbers have come up, the hypothesis that I haven't won is infinitely unlikely to be correct. Since there is a reasonable possibility that I have won, the hypothesis that I have won is therefore infinitely more likely to be correct than the hypothesis that I haven't won, so I must have won...
LOTTERYCO: Security!
Jabba
Philosopher
- Joined
- Feb 23, 2012
- Messages
- 5,613
jt,,
- You'd bet your farm on A?
Pixel42
Schrödinger's cat
I would certainly bet the farm on the winning numbers in last Wednesday's lottery being 11, 17, 35, 36, 40 and 59, despite how extremely unlikely it was that that particular set of numbers would come up.
turingtest
Mistral, mistral wind...
We generally see two types of Woo Slinger. The more common argument supporting the Woo (that is a logical fallacy to support belief in some nonsense) or the less common belief supporting the argument (that I've up and decided that science is stodgy and close minded so I'm gonna pick some Woo to use as an example).
Jabba has done something rather unique. His dog is a tail and his tail is a dog and they are both wagging each other. He's created the first ever, at least in my experience, self sustaining stable feedback loop of argument and conclusion.
Jabba is immortal because skeptics are big closed minded meanies and they are big closed minded meanies because they won't accept his arguments for immortality.
Whether or not Jabba cares more for his immortality and his argumentatives are means to that end or he's using immortality as an example of skeptics not following his "very effective debate style" seems to change with the tides.
JayUtah
Penultimate Amazing
Asked and answered. Do not keep trying the same rhetorical stunts when it has been shown that none of your critics fall for them.
- Status