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Proof of Immortality III

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And yet the most common trump card played against skeptics is that we aren't upon minded enough and we dismiss incredible claims too quickly.

We literally can't win. We've held Jabba's hand, refuted every thing he's said in every single possible method, indulged his inane demand for some extra special "Very Effective Debate" and he hasn't done us the base courtesy of even acted like he's listened to anything we said.
 
Keep it on the topic and not the other posters.
Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic  Posted By: kmortis
 
So, I'm running into a difficulty with infinity.

If Jabba wants to calculate the odds that he is mortal in this universe (H), then ~H would have to be every other universe including those in which he is mortal, immoral or never existed. So, even if he proved ~H, that set would still include an infinite number of universes where he exists and is mortal.

In order for ~H to be: All universes where Jabba is reincarnated or immortal; then H would have to be: All universes where Jabba exists and is mortal.

But the total number of universes where Jabba exists and is mortal is infinite. And the total number where he never existed is infinite. So, he should be feeding infinity into his equation at every step. A mathematical answer is nonexistent.

Should we limit our set to all universes where Jabba exists, we still get an infinite set where he's mortal and an infinite set where he is immortal. There's no math that can be gleaned from that.


ETA: And I'm assuming that a universe with an immortal Jabba is even possible. We can imagine an earth where life never evolved except for the spontaneous appearance of one five hundred and eighty foot lobster. But that scenario may be impossible in any universe. We could exclude an infinite set of ridiculous worlds and we would still have an infinite set of possible ones.
 
And yet the most common trump card played against skeptics is that we aren't [open] minded enough and we dismiss incredible claims too quickly.

It's not a trump card, in the sense that while it may seem to signal an end or a major shift in debate, I doubt the typical reader will be fooled. It's not so much a trump card as a table-flip.

I've written at length on just how "open-minded" fringe claimants really are, so I'll just summarize here. "Open-mindedness" as used in fringe arguments typically means only open-minded enough to accept the fringe claim. It doesn't mean accepting similar fringe claims. More specifically, the fringe claimant advocating "open-mindedness" has never been so open-minded as to consider the possibility that he himself might be wrong. Hence it reduces to special pleading. Jabba has specifically been asked whether admitting failure is an option. He has not answered, so I assume he's not open-minded to the extent he'll consider his own errors.

This rhetoric always has the effect of begging one's critics to accept a lower standard of proof, and it almost always comes across that way to a dispassionate reader. It's an emotional ploy. People want to be thought of as "open-minded," so the fringe claimant just redefines what that means. In the larger sense, the contention is often between fringe claimants and skeptics and their modes of thought. As you note, skeptics are characterized as rigid, narrow thinkers (in a bad way), and fringe claimants are imaginative, free thinkers who accept a broader range of possibilities. Hence there is a desire to insinuate, "If you don't accept my claims on my terms, you're too rigid a thinker to be worthwhile."

As to premature dismissal of claims, that's just not true. Which is to say, you're right in alleging that it appears true, but even a cursory examination of the facts satisfies the accusation. A fringe claimant's fatal error often appears early on. Bubba, for example, simply does hit-and-run posts with no supporting evidence. These need no detailed rebuttals, even if the intent was to bait one.

In Jabba's case he's literally had four years to make his case. The extreme indulgence expended in trying to engage him cannot possibly be construed as a premature rejection.

...he hasn't done us the base courtesy of even acted like he's listened to anything we said.

This is very true. It's a sort of high-functioning rudeness. It's not the kind of personal sparring that gets moderated away. It's the Dolores Umbridge sort of approach where one is not immediately objectionable, but the overall calculated effect is quite discernibly distasteful.
 
That's correct, however in the former case the conclusion that Drug A works better than Drug B has a probabilistic component only because of our inability to measure accurately all the factors that apply to drug testing, the nature of sampling, and those attendant concerns. The actual proof of efficacy is based on observations which in turn come from a qualitative biochemical rationale. We observe abated symptoms. which are qualitative facts we measure -- but only inexactly, hence statistics.

Ditto the measurements in practical physics. The argument prior to its measurement was that the Higgs boson should exist based on the purely qualitative characteristics of a model that predicted it, and which otherwise served qualitatively as an adequate model of particle behavior. The measurements of the observations at the hadron collider -- being uncertain numbers -- have a statistical component. That is not the same as the model being statistical in nature or the proof being the conclusion of probability computation absent observation and measurement.

I view Jabba's exercise as inherently different because his conclusion is not a quantity derived by qualitatively supportable means, to which a statistical component of confidence is attached. It is instead a statement of belief based solely on a computation of probability that a certain thing should be the case.


I don't understand what you mean by "qualitative" here and why you think some sort of underlying qualitative foundation is necessary to draw conclusions from statistical or probabilistic arguments.

Consider a company that is developing a drug to reduce fever. They develop two versions of the drug, A and B, that differ only in whether there is a methyl group or an ethyl group in a particular position of the molecule. They have no theory that would predict which version of the drug would be superior; they're just experimenting with different versions.

Since the developers have no idea which drug is better, their prior probabilities are 0.5 for the hypothesis that drug A is better, and 0.5 for the hypothesis that drug B is better. The company then tests the two drugs in a clinical trial. They randomize 100 patients with fever to two groups, one which gets drug A, the other, drug B, and they find that on average drug A reduces fever by 0.5 ⁰F more than drug B. A Bayesian t-test indicates that the results are 1300 times as likely under the hypothesis that drug A is superior than under the hypothesis that drug B is superior. After combining the data with the priors, they calculate that the posterior probability that drug A is superior exceeds 0.999. In other words, they are convinced that drug A is superior.

In the above example we have no "qualitative" theory to predict which drug is better, and our observations, patients' body temperatures, are quantitative, not qualitative. So we have drawn a conclusion that drug A is superior by probabilistic means apparently without the qualitative elements that you say are necessary.
 
I don't understand what you mean by "qualitative" here...

Largely this:

The company then tests the two drugs in a clinical trial.

It's markedly different, in my book, to apply statistical methods to empirical data than to apply statistical conjures in place of gathering data. But I get what you are trying to say regarding qualitative theory. In the example you give, there is no qualitative argument for the methyl group over the ethyl group. But I think that oversteps the point that, for me, is more salient. The qualitative aspect of the argument to which I would more probably gravitate is that the company has a qualitative reason to believe that either drug will lower fever -- because, you know, there's other chemistry besides the quibbling over a small submolecule.

I see the contrast between Jabba's purely probabilistic handwaving and the probabilistic treatment of empirical data and a well-formed rationale as the contrast between taking either drug A or drug B versus eating mud. There is a qualitative rationale behind either drug, regardless of measurable differences in performance. There is no qualitative rationale, as I see it, for mud as a fever cure.
 
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- As Jack Benny said to the mugger who had to tell Jack twice, "Your money or your life!" -- "I'm thinking! I'm thinking!"
 
I don't understand what you mean by "qualitative"

Good luck with that, I've been trying to get him to define that term more than once.

As far as I can tell, it is meant to hide the irrationality in JayUtah's preferences regarding different observations. A biopsy, for instance, will be called "qualitatively different" from another cancer test, even though there is no inherent difference between these as evidence for/against the hypothesis "you have cancer", other than the probabilities involved. It's much less likely for a biopsy to be positive when you don't have cancer than that other cancer test, and this dependence on the probabilities involved seems to be a constant whenever he does that "qualitative" thing.

So, barring any actual definition forthcoming - which is highly unlikely - I'll go with "qualitative" being the term JayUtah uses to hide his inability to work with very large or small probabilities - such as "mass hallucination as explanation for a false positive biopsy" or "customer wrongly saying an email is spam when it isn't" in another thread.
 
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Good luck with that, I've been trying to get him to define that term more than once.

As far as I can tell, it is meant to hide the irrationality in JayUtah's preferences regarding different observations.


It appears to me that "qualitative" means the difference between having an indeterminable and a falsifiable truth value.

The argument for a clockwork universe is qualitatively different than the argument that strong magnets can temporarily alter a person's brain function.
 
I assert I have computed a 17% chance an invisible fairy lives in my backyard. No amount of manipulation on that number makes it valid if I can't prove fairies exist. Similarly, I roll a fair die and it comes up 3. The observation is not affected by the probabilistic argument that there was only a 1 in 6 chance of that happening so it probability didn't happen. Qualitatively different kinds of reasoning. Science indeed measures things and uses statistical methods to give appropriate meaning and weight to those measurements. But that's a qualitatively different form of reasoning that substituting a probabilistic estimate when there are no measurements. Jabba is trying to prove something must exist that isn't known to exist. His argument for its existence is a purely abstract exercise that, at best, manipulates made-up numbers as if they were probabilities and comes up with an overall probability suggesting it is highly improbable that an immortal soul doesn't exist. He has no facts or measurements for the numerical methods to work upon.
 
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Good luck with that, I've been trying to get him to define that term more than once.

As far as I can tell, it is meant to hide the irrationality in JayUtah's preferences regarding different observations. A biopsy, for instance, will be called "qualitatively different" from another cancer test, even though there is no inherent difference between these as evidence for/against the hypothesis "you have cancer", other than the probabilities involved. It's much less likely for a biopsy to be positive when you don't have cancer than that other cancer test, and this dependence on the probabilities involved seems to be a constant whenever he does that "qualitative" thing.

So, barring any actual definition forthcoming - which is highly unlikely - I'll go with "qualitative" being the term JayUtah uses to hide his inability to work with very large or small probabilities - such as "mass hallucination as explanation for a false positive biopsy" or "customer wrongly saying an email is spam when it isn't" in another thread.


Mass hallucinations are not required for false positive biopsies. False positive biopsies are not particularly rare. A 1999 study at Johns Hopkins1 found misdiagnoses of cancer in 1.4% of biopsies, with a rate as high as 9.5% for certain types of cancer. The study was repeated 10 years later on prostate biopsies and found the rate hadn't improved. Of course there is a qualitative difference between a biopsy and a screening test (they are physically different), but for purposes of estimating the probability that a patient has cancer, the difference is quantitative—that is, you use the evidence in Bayes' formula in exactly the same way, only the values of the likelihoods will differ.

1 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10590387
 
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Mass hallucinations are not required for false positive biopsies.

In my previous example many pages ago I intended biopsy to be a clear determination of whether one had cancer, as opposed to statistically controlled testing by other means to which rates of false positives and negatives attach. Not being a medical person, I wasn't aware that biopsies too had such profound error rates. So perhaps it's a poor example and I was unwise to rely on it. I wanted to consider the direct observation of cancerous cells under a microscope to be a qualitatively different test, for the purposes of my illustration, than less direct tests which must be considered probabilistically in order to attain their useful meaning. The assumption was that cancer cells are unmistakable under direct observation. And I consider that further to be a qualitatively different exercise than simply guessing the probability that I have cancer, whether one applies statistical massage to that guess or not.

This is a concept to which Loss Leader and others have also alluded. A pillar fallacy in Jabba's argument is, again relying on the fair die, that a probabilistic argument stating how improbable it is for a die to have rolled the number that came up doesn't dispute the fact of the face that's showing on the die. "Qualitative" describes the difference in the kind of argument in each case and the non-numerical properties of its rhetorical structure that affect its rigor and accuracy. One can agree that, for whatever number comes up, the probability is only 1 in 6. And for certain purposes that would be a valid approach. But no amount of probability changes the observation. That's because the properties of observation are different than the properties of deduction, which in turn are different from the properties of induction such as conclusions for which statistical margins of error can be defined. That's what I mean by a qualitative difference in reasoning.

Again, I agree that conclusions drawn in science very often must have a probabilistic expression because that is the proper way to accommodate the uncertainty that arises in empirical examination. The statistical profile of quantitative data is the essence of scientific inquiry. The contrast I mean to draw, as I've said before, is between that and a statistical profile that is proffered in place of data. As you've seen, it is easy to draw up a model based on no actual data and manipulate the model in a way that seems to create knowledge out of what are fundamentally guesses. Guessing at the probability of some phenomenon not known to exist at all is what's happening in Jabba's argument. While purely probabilistic models have an important place, I see them as fundamentally unable to prove such rudimentary things as the existence of unknown phenomenon when literal evidence for it lacks.
 
Mass hallucinations are not required for false positive biopsies.

It's not required but it's sufficient, I mainly used it to make the point that any observation has a non-zero probability of giving a false positive - the mass hallucination case works with anything.

Of course there is a qualitative difference between a biopsy and a screening test (they are physically different), but for purposes of estimating the probability that a patient has cancer, the difference is quantitative—that is, you use the evidence in Bayes' formula in exactly the same way, only the values of the likelihoods will differ.

That's somewhat my point, in that all observations are qualitatively the same - in the sense that they differ only in the values of the likelihoods, as long as we don't ignore the very small probabilities of ways in which they could be "wrong".
 
- I need to provide my reasoning for two claims (at least).

1. I claim that the unlikelihood of my current existence is based upon new information because the particular info i now consider was not considered in the previous estimates of prior probability.
2. I claim that we don't need a "special case" for a target as long as we have a reasonably possible alternative hypothesis. I say that because the new reasonably possible hypothesis would refer to all comers..
 
Jabba said:
Mojo,
- I've already happened, but the implications of my happening have not been factored into the prior probabilities. That's how it's "new."

What implications?
 
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