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Proof of Immortality III

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Each specific member of said group has exactly the same improbability of joining the list. If I'm surprised that I'm on the list then why should I not be surprised that any other individual is on the list?

:wwt

I don't know...maybe because you don't want to commit a grouping error? But you don't seem to mind committing a grouping error. So I really don't know why you commit a grouping error leading into a false comparison fallacy.

As I laboriously explained, you shouldn't be surprised that some other lottery winner has won a lottery. Because that posterior probability is 1. And the prior probability that "someone" will win a lottery is very nearly 1.

Conversely, since every person who plays the lottery has an equal chance of winning, and I play the lottery, then why should I be surprised that I win it as opposed to any other individual who plays?

:wwt

You should be surprised that you, specifically, have won a lottery. Because that prior probability was, give or take, 0.00000006, depending on the specific lottery odds.

See, those two probabilities are vastly different in both class and magnitude.

No, you shouldn't be surprised about having won the lottery "as opposed to" any irrelevant, extraneous person or event you happen to toss in to cloud the issue, whether it be someone else who plays the lottery or someone whose toe might be lopped off by a micrometeorite. None of that extraneous detritus is remotely relevant to the question of whether you would be correct to be surprised to have won a lottery. Leave it out.

If you can't work it out for yourself, just trust me on this. You should be surprised. You should also be surprised if your toe is lopped off by a micrometeorite. But relatively small stuff like winning lotteries and getting a toe lopped off by a micrometeorite pale to insignificance when compared to the giganogartantuan prior odds against the existence of your specific brain. So, if you have no other possible explanation to your current momentary flicker of sentience in the midst of eternity or aternity, be surprised. Be very surprised.

And I am compelled by experience to preemptively add that the time to be surprised at the occurrence of an event is after it happens. Mainly because that is the only time you can be surprised at the occurrence of an event.

Bitter experience also compels me to caution you against looking stupid by proclaiming that the posterior probability of an event is 1, therefore surprise at the occurrence of an event is always too late.

Your argument specifically is the lottery fallacy.

It's the fallacy that you winning the lottery is somehow more special than any other individual winning. It isn't more special, it's just more personal to you.

I plead not guilty and accuse you of commiting a grouping error.

I am not a member of the group of (other individuals who have won a lottery), and never will be.

If I were to win a lottery, I still wouldn't be a member of the group of (other individuals who have won a lottery). I would become the sole member of a unique class consisting of (myself, having won a lottery)

There would only be one me that has won a lottery. All these other people you keep wanting to bring in are irrelevant. They do not belong in the class that determines whether I would be correct to be surprised at having won a lottery.

Unless of course you don't buy a ticket, in which case it's incredibly strange that you win, and an indication that someone in the lottery organisation is about to be investigated for fraud.

I didn't buy a ticket to the life lottery. So, by your own admission, yeah. It is very suspicious (to me) that I exist. But I can't really say I'm surprised, because I don't automatically subscribe to your premises as to the fundamental nature of reality.

But suspicion at my existence should not extend to you. Keep your classes straight.
 
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I'm not saying you've accepted that there is no immaterial self. I'm saying that you've accepted that there is no material self in the OOFLam model. You can't use the givens of a model to calculate the likelihood of something existing that that model doesn't include.
Dave,
- I accept that there is a material self. I just believe that there is plenty of reason to think that there is also an immaterial self.
- Then I say that if OOFlam allows for the possibility of an immaterial self, the likelihood of my current existence is virtually zero cause while science can predict the identity of a material self, it has no ability to predict the identity of an immaterial self -- and all we can do is figure the likelihood of all the different necessary events in order for my personal immaterial self to be here now.
- Probability is based solely upon the info we have.
 
Dave,
- I accept that there is a material self. I just believe that there is plenty of reason to think that there is also an immaterial self.
- Then I say that if OOFlam allows for the possibility of an immaterial self, the likelihood of my current existence is virtually zero cause while science can predict the identity of a material self, it has no ability to predict the identity of an immaterial self -- and all we can do is figure the likelihood of all the different necessary events in order for my personal immaterial self to be here now.
- Probability is based solely upon the info we have.

That only makes sense if immaterial selves exist.

Most of the people you claim to be trying to convince don't believe immaterial selves exist.
 
Dave,
- I accept that there is a material self. I just believe that there is plenty of reason to think that there is also an immaterial self.
- Then I say that if OOFlam allows for the possibility of an immaterial self, the likelihood of my current existence is virtually zero cause while science can predict the identity of a material self, it has no ability to predict the identity of an immaterial self -- and all we can do is figure the likelihood of all the different necessary events in order for my personal immaterial self to be here now.
- Probability is based solely upon the info we have.

We have NO EVIDENCE of an immaterial self. None. And we have no methodology to explain how an immaterial self could interact with a material brain. This has nothing to do with statistics, and everything to do with evidence.

But since you insist on trying to make a statistical model: please explain why you think an immaterial self is more likely than a material self. Under OOFlam, all you need to do is figure out the likelihood of your physical body existing. However: Under your belief system you need to figure out the likelihood of your body existing, plus the likelihood of your soul existing, then the likelihood of the two joining. That is where the likelihood approaches zero.
 
Right (for once). But despite the improbability of the event, and your surprisal by it, you should realize that you won the lottery by chance, not by having an immortal lottery soul.

Trust me. If I win a lottery, I won't think I have an immortal lottery soul.

That's the good news. The bad news is, I will not take your word for it that you have the fundamental nature of reality all nailed down, simply because you proclaim yourself a "materialist".

FYI, there are and have been a number of accomplished, respected scientists who are not and have not been strict, hard-headed materialists, including visionaries like Newton and Einstein, and some more recent and current operatives. These are the types who typically push the front forward.
 
I just believe that there is plenty of reason to think that there is also an immaterial self.

And if those reasons are purely subjective, then more power to you. But you say you can prove the existence of an immaterial self. That transforms the proposition from subjective to objective, and you'll be expected to provide proof. The nature of that proof must assume that your critics do not share your a priori belief in an immortal soul. You don't have to embrace that belief, but you cannot assume the existence of a soul in your proof; to do so renders the proof a circular argument.

Then I say that if OOFlam allows for the possibility of an immaterial self...

No, this is just more foolishness trying to jump-start your proof and, in the process, making it circular. The fact that we have entertained your claim to be able to proof means you can assume your critics allow that it is possible for one to exist, in an abstract sense. But the null hypothesis, which you're trying to overcome, is exactly that one does exist. You may not overcome the null simply by stating your belief and intent to overcome it.

...while science can predict the identity of a material self, it has no ability to predict the identity of an immaterial self

Asked and answered repeatedly. When you can finally reconcile the Mt. Ranier analogy, then you can state this. Since you cannot, you may not. In order to declare that the Mt. Ranier analogy is unfaithful, you go through many torturous declarative claims that have the effect of applying a double standard that starts your line of reasoning from one set of first principles and the analogy from an entirely different set. You simply declare that Mt Ranier can be predicted by natural law simply by "geology," but then declare that similar first principles in the "natural law" of biology and physiology cannot predict any given personality. This is a double standard.

Science cannot predict the precise appearance of any given mountain, starting with first principles. Science cannot predict the outcome of any given personality, starting with first principles. This is the nature of predictiveness in complex systems, not evidence that something besides the system is perturbing or dictating the outcome. You want natural law to be a simplistic caricature of what it really is, so that you can declare that it should be predictable. Sorry, but the universe is not required to be as simple as you require it to be in order for your beliefs to hold.

and all we can do is figure the likelihood of all the different necessary events in order for my personal immaterial self to be here now.

Equivocation. The likelihood that you are here now, in your present form, is 1. That has nothing to do with the likelihood that that demonstrable existence has anything to do with the existence of an immortal soul. As has been laboriously laid out by numerous people, you cannot simply wish that connection into existence simply because you believe it.

Probability is based solely upon the info we have.

Arguably correct, which means it must thoroughly discard all the speculative nonsense you've injected into the problem. You must relegate back to merely abstract possibility the notion of an immortal soul when discussing the finite-life null hypothesis. And you must discard the wishfully conjured proposition that science could not discern a soul if it existed.
 
:wwt

I don't know...maybe because you don't want to commit a grouping error? But you don't seem to mind committing a grouping error. So I really don't know why you commit a grouping error leading into a false comparison fallacy.

As I laboriously explained, you shouldn't be surprised that some other lottery winner has won a lottery. Because that posterior probability is 1. And the prior probability that "someone" will win a lottery is very nearly 1.



:wwt

You should be surprised that you, specifically, have won a lottery. Because that prior probability was, give or take, 0.00000006, depending on the specific lottery odds.

See, those two probabilities are vastly different in both class and magnitude.

No, you shouldn't be surprised about having won the lottery "as opposed to" any irrelevant, extraneous person or event you happen to toss in to cloud the issue, whether it be someone else who plays the lottery or someone whose toe might be lopped off by a micrometeorite. None of that extraneous detritus is remotely relevant to the question of whether you would be correct to be surprised to have won a lottery. Leave it out.

If you can't work it out for yourself, just trust me on this. You should be surprised.


Butt should I continue to be surprised if I win the lottery after having played a couple billion times?

Left out from your diatribe is any thought that the lottery has been going on for 13.5 billion years on billions of planets in billions of galaxies and that's just in our universe. If Jabba doesn't know how many tries the universe took to make him, how can be correctly calculate odds? His perspective doesn't matter because he lacks necessary information.
 
We have NO EVIDENCE of an immaterial self. None.

Which is to say, there is no observation we can make, that can reasonably pertain to a self, that isn't connected to the brain. When the brain exists, all observable aspects of the self exist. When the brain doesn't exist, all observable aspects of the self cease to exist.

Jabba's rebuttal is that if this were true, we should be able to predict the self given certain physiological first principles. Specifically, he claims we should be able to predict the specific, unique self that his him. Since he claims we cannot, then he claims this proves it is unlikely for that precise formulation of the specimen to arise without something else besides physical law to determine it.

This conflates predictability with complexity, and the difference has been explained to him more times than it should rationally take.

But since you insist on trying to make a statistical model...

His justification in taking a statistical approach is manifold. First, as he stated a few days ago, he believes it allows him to encode his subjective belief in a soul as a prior probability and, via Bayesian inference, thereby prove it as an objective probability. He wants to prove that it's so highly improbable that a soul does not exist that we have to rationally conclude one must exist.

Second, the conflation of predictability versus complexity is best concealed by a probabilistic argument. It lets him hide the premise that deterministic systems must also be deterministically predictable. Then if he can float the proposition that a system is not predictable, he can argue it cannot be deterministic and therefore must allow for nondeterministic elements such as a soul.
 
Which is to say, there is no observation we can make, that can reasonably pertain to a self, that isn't connected to the brain. When the brain exists, all observable aspects of the self exist. When the brain doesn't exist, all observable aspects of the self cease to exist.

Jabba's rebuttal is that if this were true, we should be able to predict the self given certain physiological first ... cannot be deterministic and therefore must allow for nondeterministic elements such as a soul.


I'm so confused. Did I win the lottery or not?
 
I'm so confused. Did I win the lottery or not?

Depends on how you equivocate the probability. If you subjectively believe that you have won the lottery, then even a probability as low as p = 0.00000001 means you must have won it. Conversely, if you are the special snowflake you think you are, and there is a probability of 10-80 that one particular snowflake would win the lottery, and it does, then it can only have done so by having a special immortal lottery snowflake soul, because the probability was so far against it without that divine influence.

You don't have four legs. Congratulations, you're a lottery-winning not-table.
 
If you can't work it out for yourself, just trust me on this. You should be surprised. You should also be surprised if your toe is lopped off by a micrometeorite. But relatively small stuff like winning lotteries and getting a toe lopped off by a micrometeorite pale to insignificance when compared to the giganogartantuan prior odds against the existence of your specific brain. So, if you have no other possible explanation to your current momentary flicker of sentience in the midst of eternity or aternity, be surprised. Be very surprised.

Looks like someone has never heard of the conjunction fallacyWP. Jim's existence is a necessary condition for Jim winning the lottery, so Jim winning the lottery must be less likely than Jim existing. Every single action involving Jim should be "more surprising" than his existence.

Unless you want to take Jim's existence as a given in one calculation, and virtually nothing as a given in the other. Of course, that would be extremely disingenuous.
 
Dave,
- OK.
- In other words, you already assume that I used to beat my wife...
- You already assume that there is no such thing as immaterial selves.

No. If anyone needed any proof that you weren't really paying attention to your critics, this post would be it.

Go back, read what he and I have both written, and try again.
 
Dave,
- OK.
- In other words, you already assume that I used to beat my wife...
- You already assume that there is no such thing as immaterial selves.

I assume there is no such thing as immaterial selves until I see evidence that there are.
 
Dave,
- OK.
- In other words, you already assume that I used to beat my wife...
- You already assume that there is no such thing as immaterial selves.
Nobody is assuming anything. We're waiting for you to provide evidence to support a belief one way or another.

Is my mind closed off because I assume you're not 8 feet tall? Or completely hairless like one of those weird cats? I don't think so. If you showed me any evidence of the above at all (like a single picture) I would have some reason to include the concept in my thinking.

But don't say I'm assuming there isn't a soul. I'm agnostic about it. I hold no belief until I see evidence.

Do you have any evidence?
 
Nobody is assuming anything. We're waiting for you to provide evidence to support a belief...

He's trying to stir up a tempest in a teapot over the difference between the axiom that a soul "might possibly" exist and the proscription that Jabba cannot assume the existence of a soul in his argument to prove one. He wants to claim that by denying him the latter, we are effectively "tricking" him into asserting (against his belief and the axiom) the non-existence of a soul.

I fail to recall a prior case of so battered and inept an attempt to formulate an otherwise straightforward hypothesis for testing.
 
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