• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Continuation Part 20: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito

Status
Not open for further replies.
Sigh. Yes, that's right. #2 means not quite guilty. I thought we were making progress, but apparently not.

I did. I won the bet!

You are so obtuse. There clearly is a difference. Why do you think there are the different paras? Why do they include the defendant didn't commit the act with the crime did not exist in para 1. Why is it that you keep arguing against the obvious difference? You may not like the fact that there two types of acquittal (actually 3)under 530 but there are. It may make you mad that the court ruled a 2. But to deny there is a difference is idiotic. It is as idiotic as a student getting a 70 telling another that scored 100 the results are the same because they both passed.

I said spend the money well. That means your winnings.
 
Well it seems to me this is why having separate forms of acquittals isn't ideal. Knox and Raff were ensnared by ambiguous circumstances and the investigators had their thumb on the scale at all times, and i think it's all very clear. They unfortunately lacked the foresight to go stand in front of a 7-11 cctv camera for 8 hours. Too bad so sad enjoy para 2? I think Not Guilty for everybody is fine.

And that's a reasonable position. I really think that the system should have let them out "on bail" and the mistakes of Stefanoni should have been made clear early on. Rudi should not have been allowed a separate trial. The prosecutor should have dropped the case against them before the trial and since they would have been out it wouldn't have been two years in jail before the first verdict. Had they been able to help with defense and do interviews to counter things like the pink bathroom I believe charges would have been dropped. Of course, that wouldn't have given them a clean innocent either but better than what occurred.
 
What I'd like to thank you for is putting it out there what the claim was - that from a PGP point of view, Amanda had to have been bleeding because of the quantity of her DNA - not because there is any actual blood evidence from her (other than the faucet).

I had not understood before that, that the "mixed-blood" was a derived claim - in my view a derived factoid.

Then again Judge Massei was careful in his 2010 motivations report to avoid saying there was mixed blood. Some guilters for years claimed mixed blood, and have in the past two years or so given that up.

Anyway, I now understand where the "reasoning" comes from.

The mixed blood finding is Stefanoni's, who argued that the peaks of both Mez and Amanda's DNA was high, suggesting a rich source of DNA. In addition, the luminosity of the footprints was high. FIVE mixed Amanda-Mez DNA samples were found, including within a footprint in Filomena's room. Blood dries and decays very quickly so we know they would have been bleeding contemporaneously and there likely was a violent struggle.
 
The mixed blood finding is Stefanoni's, who argued that the peaks of both Mez and Amanda's DNA was high, suggesting a rich source of DNA. In addition, the luminosity of the footprints was high. FIVE mixed Amanda-Mez DNA samples were found, including within a footprint in Filomena's room. Blood dries and decays very quickly so we know they would have been bleeding contemporaneously and there likely was a violent struggle.


Utter nonsense. More scientific illiteracy. Dried blood does not "decay very quickly" in terms of identification potential - both blood typing and DNA can be easily obtained from dried blood that is many months old. Indeed, here's a link to a study that shows how DNA can easily be successfully obtained from blood that has been dried for three years:

http://bmcbiotechnol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6750-13-23

It's totally incorrect (and total bunkum) to suggest that the mixed blood samples mean that "we know they (Knox and Kercher) would have been bleeding contemporaneously". In fact, Knox's blood could have been deposited days or weeks previously (as of course, in principle, could Kercher's).

I think many here are getting well and truly tired of "scientific facts" that are a) stunningly incorrect, b) appear to have been plucked out of thin air with total disregard for accuracy or truth, and c) seem to have been invented for the sole purpose of supporting a (discredited) thesis.
 
You are so obtuse. There clearly is a difference. Why do you think there are the different paras? Why do they include the defendant didn't commit the act with the crime did not exist in para 1. Why is it that you keep arguing against the obvious difference? You may not like the fact that there two types of acquittal (actually 3)under 530 but there are. It may make you mad that the court ruled a 2. But to deny there is a difference is idiotic. It is as idiotic as a student getting a 70 telling another that scored 100 the results are the same because they both passed.

I said spend the money well. That means your winnings.

I have never said there weren't types of acquittal. Nor has Numbers. Nor has LondonJohn. What I and others have said is that they are acquittals with no difference, in law, as to what would follow any of them from a legal perspective.

Up thread you said you would not be surprised if a #2 acquittal would allow some differing remedy.

And I actually do think you believe that there is no difference in legal consequence to any of the types of acquittals. An acquittal is an acquittal is an acquittal.
As I've said, no need to surmise, I don't think is a difference but nobody on this board knows for sure. If it turns out the two allows a new civil suit I wouldn't be shocked, but I doubt any will be filed. The 2 might protect some from lawsuits over defamation. Regardless the perception remains of more possible involvement with a 2 than a 1.​
Your posts move between perception versus what the difference, if any, of legal remedy or legal consequence of any of the types.
 
The mixed blood finding is Stefanoni's, who argued that the peaks of both Mez and Amanda's DNA was high, suggesting a rich source of DNA. In addition, the luminosity of the footprints was high. FIVE mixed Amanda-Mez DNA samples were found, including within a footprint in Filomena's room. Blood dries and decays very quickly so we know they would have been bleeding contemporaneously and there likely was a violent struggle.

The mixed blood finding is NOT Stefanoni's. This is what Massei said Stefanoni told his court in 2009:

Massei p. 239 said:
With regards to the mixture of DNA attributable to the biological profiles of Meredith and Amanda Knox, she affirmed that, certainly, there was blood content, there being a specific test carried out; further information given relative to the very pale pink colour could have led one to think that there might have been the presence of water. She added that in actuality there is water in blood, but in a different concentration; in blood there is less water than in a trace, which contains more water and is less rich in blood. Though, from the point of view of other substances (sweat, etc.), no tests were done. Therefore, it was definitely a mixture of biological substances, but it was not in any case possible to determine whether it was blood plus blood, or blood and saliva, or blood and exfoliation cells. One could only say that there was definitely blood present, and that the trace was found in the very same places.​
 
Well, that's an interesting question. I think they should have been acquitted with a paragraph 2 verdict by Massei. Unlike many others I do believe that had all the evidence presented been serious, precise, and consistent the verdict could have gone the other way. But it wasn't so they should have been acquitted para 2. I don't understand why the SC used 530 while Hellmann used 605.

Perhaps you should look a little more deeply into the Hellmann court's motivation report and not merely at the short-form verdict.

Here is an excerpt from the Hellmann MR. Note that the issues of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, CPP Art. 533, and the legal rationale for acquittal, CPP 530, as well as the legal reform in 2006, introducing BARD are mentioned, as well as Article 27 of the Italian Constitution. Perhaps your focus on 530.1 versus 530.2 is a little too narrow.

What the Hellmann MR does is give a general statement that the prosecution evidence does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the accused must be acquitted (except Knox was convicted of the calunnia charge). The specification for the acquittal is "the accused did not commit the crime". They didn't commit the crime, according to the Hellmann MR, because the prosecution did not establish that the evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

I have, in a previous post, presented the English translation of CPP Article 605. That article states, in relevant part: With the exception of the cases provided for in Art. 604 {cases of nullity}, the appeal judge shall deliver a judgment confirming or amending the appealed judgment.

In the short verdict, the formula "the accused did not commit the crime" is used, although Hellmann uses a BARD argument against a guilty verdict. Again, this indicates that under Italian law, this specification formula may be applied to those found not guilty (acquitted) under a BARD argument. It is a statement that someone has not been found not guilty (acquitted) under one of the other specifications (such as, the crime did not occur). Because there was reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime, and the crime occurred, the accused must be acquitted under the specification "the accused did not commit the crime".

The Public Minister’s argument can be accepted only in part. It is indeed true that, even before the legal affirmation of the principle in question, conviction could be declared only when the evidence against [the defendant] was such as to overcome the presumption of innocence, which informs all of [the relevant] law (Article 27, 2nd paragraph of the Constitution, but for example also the last part of C.P.P. Article 527, 3rd paragraph), so that, even in the presence of evidence against the defendant [that was, however,] not wholly sufficient, or contradictory, the verdict had to be one of acquittal. But to assert that the reformulation of C.P.P. Article 533 via the insertion of the principle in question, effected by Article 5 of the law of February 20, 2006, no. 46, was an operation of “mere aesthetic surgery”, so to speak, seems to debase the profound significance of this principle, which, instead, the legislator wished to reaffirm.

Moreover, examination of the legislative history [lavori parlamentari] leading to the adoption [deliberazione] of the law of February 20, 2006, no. 46 reveals that this is a principle of legal culture [civiltà giuridica] widely accepted not only by (obviously) those who voted in favor of the law, but also by those who displayed their opposition, since they did not oppose it due to disagreement with the substance of the principle, but only due to opinions about legal methodology [valutazioni di tecnica normativa], believing that coordination problems between the new text of C.P.P. Article 533 and [the existing] C.P.P. Article 530 could arise.

The condition required by this law to arrive at a verdict of guilty does not, therefore, allow one to formulate a belief in terms of probability: that is, to issue a guilty verdict, it is not sufficient for the probability of the prosecution hypothesis to be greater than that of the defense hypothesis, even when the former is significantly larger [notevolmente più numerose]; but [rather] it is necessary that every explanation other than the prosecution hypothesis not be plausible at all, according to a criterion of reasonability. In any other case, acquittal of the defendant is required.

FOR THESE REASONS [P.Q.M.]

The Corte di Assise di Appello of Perugia,

pursuant to C.P.P. Article 605 ,

in partial modification of the ruling announced on the date of December 4-5, 2009 by the Perugia Corte di Assise of first level in the matter of Amanda Marie Knox and Raffaele Sollecito, appealed by them and [also] incidentally by the Prosecutor of the Republic of Perugia,

DECLARES

Amanda Marie Knox guilty of the crime under Charge F, without the aggravating circumstance of C.P. Article 61 no. 2, and with mitigating circumstances equivalent to the aggravating circumstance under C.P. Article 368; and sentences her to three years of confinement; confirming, with regard to this charge only, the civil sanctions of the ruling under appeal, sentencing Amanda Marie Knox to the payment of court costs and attorney’s fees incurred at the present level [of appeal] by Patrick Diya Lumumba, in the total amount of 22,170 euros for rights and fees in addition to the reimbursement of general expenses and accessories of law;

ACQUITS

both of the defendants of the crimes attributed to them under Charges A,B,C, and D for not having committed the act, and of the crime under Charge E because the act did not take place; rejecting the request made against them by civil party Aldalia Tattanelli;

ORDERS

the immediate release of Amanda Marie Knox and Raffaele Sollecito if not detained for other cause;

[and] indicates the term of ninety days for the submission of the motivation.

Perugia, October 3, 2011
 
Last edited:
You are so obtuse. There clearly is a difference. Why do you think there are the different paras? Why do they include the defendant didn't commit the act with the crime did not exist in para 1. Why is it that you keep arguing against the obvious difference? You may not like the fact that there two types of acquittal (actually 3)under 530 but there are. It may make you mad that the court ruled a 2. But to deny there is a difference is idiotic. It is as idiotic as a student getting a 70 telling another that scored 100 the results are the same because they both passed.

I said spend the money well. That means your winnings.

I've looked into the matter further and can confirm that Article 530 para 2 does indeed equate to the Scottish Law of "not proven".

It was used to acquit Berlusconi April 2007 and a couple of neo-fascists after the Bologna massacre 1969 (IIRC). However, this was in the lower Appeal court with Cassazione confirming it.

Like the Scottish version, it appears to pop up in high profile contentious cases.

With Berlusconi, he got his co-defendant to lie for him, hence giving rise to "insufficient evidence" when later events exposed the co-defendant as having been bribed to so. (Fininvest case.)
 
Utter nonsense. More scientific illiteracy. Dried blood does not "decay very quickly" in terms of identification potential - both blood typing and DNA can be easily obtained from dried blood that is many months old. Indeed, here's a link to a study that shows how DNA can easily be successfully obtained from blood that has been dried for three years:

http://bmcbiotechnol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1472-6750-13-23

It's totally incorrect (and total bunkum) to suggest that the mixed blood samples mean that "we know they (Knox and Kercher) would have been bleeding contemporaneously". In fact, Knox's blood could have been deposited days or weeks previously (as of course, in principle, could Kercher's).

I think many here are getting well and truly tired of "scientific facts" that are a) stunningly incorrect, b) appear to have been plucked out of thin air with total disregard for accuracy or truth, and c) seem to have been invented for the sole purpose of supporting a (discredited) thesis.

I am summarising Stefanoni, and I rather suspect she knows more about the topic than you do.
 
At least this is agonizingly close to acknowledging the issues at hand, at least at my end of the field where the goalposts of interest are.

The trouble is, the metaphor of passing grades is wrong. You've had to return to the concept that one is an acquittal and that the other is more of an acquittal.

You are referring to Cheli on the matter of perception. Great, good for you. I wish you would read more of his stuff, as well as other stuff from the PIP point of view, rather than cherry-picking.

Be all that as it may, you are agonizingly close to answering the question.... ok, ok, not "the" question, but one asked throughout the thread when you've tried to aim your P.A.T. at a differing set of goalposts.

And I actually do think you believe that there is no difference in legal consequence to any of the types of acquittals. An acquittal is an acquittal is an acquittal.

There is no such thing as an acquittal, vs. an acquittal with eye-brows raised. As mentioned way way up thread if the discussion is on perception, everyone with have their own version of it.

Great! Have a nice day! (But it is good to know that what this is really about is winning and losing an argument! I've just won a bet!!!)


The important factors here are:

1) 530.2 DOES NOT IN ANY WAY mean necessarily that the acquitted person(s) is "partially guilty" or even that there are some indicators of guilt but not enough to reach the BARD standard. In fact, 530.2 can be (and must be) applied by an acquitting court even where there is ZERO evidence of guilt.

2) It's clear that 530.1 is only ever applied where the court can be satisfied that the defendant's innocence can be proven to the court's satisfaction, or where the court deems that no crime was committed at all.

3) Therefore, Knox and Sollecito COULD ONLY EVER IN PRACTICE HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED UNDER 530.2 (and yes, I was wrong to ever have suggested that it might have been possible or appropriate to acquite them under 530.1). That's because clearly neither Knox nor Sollecito can prove their innocence (they only have self-supporting alibis, and there is no independent corroborating evidence to prove that they must be innocent), and because the crime of murder clearly actually occurred here.

4) But the acquittals of Knox and Sollecito under 530.2 in no way necessarily indicate that the acquitting court believed they "might" have participated in the murder but that there wasn't enough evidence to convict. In this instance, the acquitting court makes it clear that there was ZERO credible, reliable evidence of their guilt.

5) Had - hypothetically - the morons of the Perugia authorities and judiciary decided to arrest, charge and try (say) Mr and Mrs Bianchi - an elderly couple who lived alone in a small apartment near to the girls' cottage and who claimed to have spent the night of the murder together in their apartment (but there was no evidence to prove this, other than their own self-serving claim) - then Mr and Mrs Bianchi would (should) have been similarly acquitted under 530.2. They cannot PROVE their innocence. Technically speaking, therefore, one cannot conclusively rule them out from participating in the murder. But there's not one piece of evidence pointing to their guilt. That's 530.2. Just like Knox and Sollecito.

6) For the last time (maybe........), nobody's arguing that 530.1 and 530.2 are used for different "types" of acquittal - even though it's important to remember that in Italian law there is only one form of acquittal. And it's also (obviously) true that a 530.1 acquittal would carry more of a definitive weight of total innocence than a 530.2 acquittal. But that's only because a 530.1 acquittal is only applied where a defendant's innocence can be proven, or where no crime took place.

7) And to repeat for one final time: Knox and Sollecito could (and should) only ever have been acquitted under 530.2. Therefore, it's moot and irrelevant to debate how and why a 530.2 acquittal might reflect differently/poorly upon the nature of their acquittals - once they were unable to PROVE their innocence (which is not at all uncommon for factually-innocent defendants), their acquittals could ONLY EVER BE of the 530.1 variety.
 
I have never claimed to be anything other than a layman, so to pounce on a poorly worded sentence, doesn't mask the fact Amanda was likely bleeding quite significantly as of the time of the murder and it almost certainly was not "because of a pierced ear", as her DNA was in greater quantity than Mez in one of the mixed samples found.

Vixen, sweetheart. Help me understand this now. If you are self-admittedly a "layman", then when you have an opinion on something (such as that written above), and a world-class forensic geneticist like Peter Gill publishes something which explains precisely why your opinion is wrong in a journal like Forensic Science International: Genetics (the most important forensic genetics scientific journal in the world), shouldn't you perhaps weigh that opinion slightly more than your own?

I am summarising Stefanoni, and I rather suspect she knows more about the topic than you do.

Vixen, sweetheart. We (as in everyone) rather suspects that the entire forensic science community (of which Peter Gill, FSI, Bruce Budowle, etc. etc. are a part of) knows more about the topic at hand than Stefanoni. So when the published literature contradicts an Italian lab tech's (sorry... doctor. With a 3 year college degree.) opinion, the world-wide consensus opinion in the forensic community is more likely to be correct here. Doncha think?
 
It wasn't a blooper. So I referred to bodily fluids as consisting of protein. Big deal. DNA is indeed the building block of organic matter. Sorry if that is not set out in the scientific jargon. However, I am not going to do so because it is irrelevant whether I am a biochemist or not, when you ought to know by now I am a bean counter by trade.

And for what it's worth, although I don't doubt your googling ability -- DNA is not a "bodily fluid". "Bodily fluids" are mostly water. It may contain proteins but it does not "consist of" proteins. DNA is not the "building block" of organic matter. Carbon is the building block of organic matter.

Granted, you are a chartered accountant and have been evaluated in your professional knowledge in all the relevant scientific fields by professional evaluators, so you probably know more about all this than me, LondonJohn, Planigale, Peter Gill, and Bruce Budowle put together.
 
I dare say by the time of the trial they modified it down and Massei side-stepped it, to avoid unnecessary disputes with a potential to lead to appeal.

I quite agree. By the time the trial came around, if anyone had argued "mixed-blood", and that had been cited by Massei as a reason for conviction, you bet it would be ground for appeal.

On this one it seems that both Stefanoni and Massei simply quoted the proper science.... namely:

but it was not in any case possible to determine whether it was blood plus blood, or blood and saliva, or blood and exfoliation cells. One could only say that there was definitely blood present​
 
I have come to believe that the posters on ISF are more concerned about what paragraph of CPP Article 530 is used in an acquittal than some Italian judges.

Looking at the Hellmann court motivation report and verdict, the verdict was clearly based on an argument that guilt was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the accused were acquitted on the murder/rape charges. While that would suggest that the appeal aquittal verdict for those charges would cite CPP Art. 530.2, Hellmann does not cite that provision explicitly. Instead, the MR simply states that the accused are acquitted, and that the acquittal is because "the accused did not commit the act". For one charge, relating to theft IIRC, the acquittal is because "the crime did not occur". IIRC, that verdict on the theft was actually a judgment originating with the Massei court.

Some may be under the impression that Hellmann declared Knox and Sollecito "innocent". That is not literally true; he acquitted them. That means that he found that they were not guilty.

In everyday language, and as a value judgment, we may refer to persons who are not guilty as "innocent". I suggest that is not a typical legal term. For example, in the US, in a criminal trial, the defendant will plead "guilty" or "not guilty". There is no plea of "innocent" to my knowledge.

Much of the discussion lately has been centered on the confusion of the term "innocent" and "not guilty" or "acquitted" and the specification formulas used in Italian law.

As far as I can tell, Italian verdicts of acquittal never state that someone is "innocent". There is no such wording in the CPP. The legal term is "aquitted". For acquittals, there are standard wordings for five specifications making clear the reason for the acquittal.

One is "the accused did not commit the act (crime)". This is not a statement of "innocence", but identifies that the accused was found not guilty, because guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The same wording might be used if the accused could "prove their innocence" (I doubt that this is a practical possibility in most cases, but that was actually the standard for Italy under the inquisitorial system, prior to 1988 - 2006 reforms to create an adversarial system.)

There are, as I posted earlier, other acquittal specifications, such as "the crime did not occur" as shown for Charge E (the theft charge) in the Hellmann MR. In fact, there was a theft in this case, but IIRC it was "unthefted" by a legal "fact" in the Massei MR.
 
Last edited:
Perhaps you should look a little more deeply into the Hellmann court's motivation report and not merely at the short-form verdict.

Here is an excerpt from the Hellmann MR. Note that the issues of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, CPP Art. 533, and the legal rationale for acquittal, CPP 530, as well as the legal reform in 2006, introducing BARD are mentioned, as well as Article 27 of the Italian Constitution. Perhaps your focus on 530.1 versus 530.2 is a little too narrow.

I did and mention ed it up thread. Had I not you wouldn't have found it.

What the Hellmann MR does is give a general statement that the prosecution evidence does not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore the accused must be acquitted (except Knox was convicted of the calunnia charge). The specification for the acquittal is "the accused did not commit the crime". They didn't commit the crime, according to the Hellmann MR, because the prosecution did not establish that the evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Well that is only a BARD acquittal. He didn't use 530 but rather 605.

Do you have a link to verdicts by other courts at different levels? If so, give us the link. I bet they always say "did not commit the crime" even when a para 2. If they wanted to say the defendant was innocent why not use para 1? M&B clearly left the impression that there wasn't enough untainted evidence to convict.
 
Funny that those around a year ago were sure it was a para 1 but now say it would be impossible for M&B to give a para 1. They even accused Maresca of lying about the verdict because the stupid defense lawyers indicated it was a 1.

Of course as Cheli pointed out the 2 gave notice that the verdict would not be a clear statement of innocence as a 1 would have.

Funny not one article has been found to refute Cheli.
 
I did and mention ed it up thread. Had I not you wouldn't have found it.
Well that is only a BARD acquittal. He didn't use 530 but rather 605.

....

Thank you for reminding me of Hellmann's MR. I had read it about 2 years ago, before I knew anything about Italian law, and hadn't appreciated then any issues.

But I think your issue is really with claiming that there is a verdict of "innocent" in Italian law. Do you have any citations or examples showing a verdict of that type?

And as I have pointed out several times, the acquittal specification "the accused did not commit the crime" is one used even when the person is not guilty "merely" because the prosecution did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (the standard by law in Italy since 2006, put into CPP Art. 533.1). It's not some clue that a supernatural insight has shown the judge that the accused is truly, truly innocent.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom