“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[phiwum]

It's not begging the question. Again, it's an ontological statement, and largely semantic in nature. It is not intended as a proof so much as it is a means of providing a meaningful description of something.

In this case, it is a simple statement that, in order to say that something exists, it must have an effect on the universe. If it does not, then it is functionally indistinguishable from an imaginary entity, and saying that it exists is nonsensical.

Again, yes, it's utterly trivial, it's very nearly a tautology, and so forth. I never said it wasn't. But it functions, and provides a coherent means of distinguishing between real and unreal entities. I have yet to find a working alternative, but I am open to ideas about what one such might be.

No, it's not merely trivial. It makes an assertion about the nature of existence for which we have no good argument. All of your discussion comes down to whether we have evidence to conclude that the non-detectable exists, but that is not the issue at hand. The issue at hand is whether the proposition "Some things that exist cannot be detected" is literally incoherent.

That's my point. I am saying that there is, because if this stuff is undetectable, it by definition has no properties, and cannot therefore be said to actually be stuff at all.

Your point is that the existence of undetectable stuff isn't incoherent, therefore it cannot exist? That's a funny point.

By the way, you are wrong to think that undetectable stuff has no properties. It has no properties discoverable by us, but it does not follow that it has no properties. Things in a hypothetical second universe would have whatever properties such things have -- if the universe is sufficiently similar to our universe, then they would have the same sorts of properties that we are used to in this universe. However, we could not discover those properties.

Again, you turn to epistemology rather than matters of fact.

Yes, you said this before. This is what I see as unjustified, and what I am asking you to explain. I do, however, think I see where you are going wrong.

NOT NOT Q, you see, is just Q. Your restatement of my argument as "if NOT Q and NOT NOT Q are both unverifiable, we must take NOT NOT Q as true" is simply reversing the order of P and !P, then saying that, because the order is reversed, we must take P as false.

Yes, that is what I did. So what? Did I misapply your principle? Does your principle apply to Q but not to NOT Q?

However, whether or not this is correct, I will admit to once again failing to communicate my ideas clearly. I apologize; it is not often that I actually end up having an extended conversation on the subject, so I haven't had much practice in expressing them formally. Allow me to try again.

Given a proposition P, where both P and !P are defined in such a way as to be unverifiable, if either statement violates parsimony, it must be treated as false.

As we will see in a later post, this doesn't work either.

 

[phiwum]

I would consider "X exists" to be atomic, and as this is the specific kind of statement that I am discussing, it does seem fairly relevant - though default logic is only tangentially related to my point.

I take it that the above is related to your restatement about "violating parsimony". Here's why it fails.

For some propositions P, it is the case that there is a proposition Q such that

(Ex)P <-> (Ax)Q.

In this case (if the quantifiers are not eliminable), we call P (and also Q) Delta_1. Equivalently, then,

NOT (Ex)P <-> (Ex) NOT Q,

so that for some existential statements, the negation is provably equivalent to an existential statement. A simple example is the statement that x is even. By definition, x is even iff

(E n)(2 * n = x).

Equivalently, x is even iff

(A n)(2 * n + 1 != x).

Hence, x is NOT even iff (E n)(2 * n + 1 = x).

Let U be the number of particles in the universe at this moment, a number which is unknown and likely unknowable. By the above principle, we must take the following conditions to be the case.

NOT (E n)(2 * n = U)
NOT (E n)(2 * n + 1 = U)

Unfortunately, it is provable that

(E n)(2 * n = U) or (E n)(2 * n + 1 = U),

and again we see that your principle leads to contradictions.

"There is a garage dragon in my living room" is unverifiable, because garage dragons are defined as undetectable. To say that there is one there - that is, that it exists - or even that it could be there is simply false, because the garage dragon does not meet any functional definition of existence.

What does the word "functional" add to the above?

If it means, as I suspect, a definition that is fundamentally positivist (that is, one which comes with means for verifying or refuting its truth), then yes, we agree. But that's really a standard driven by knowability, and those who are arguing against you are explicitly saying that this is not the only sensible meaning of the word "existence".

Everything else, from the P and !P and so on, is just an attempt to illustrate that point. It may be poorly phrased, or even wrong, as stated, but it is simply a means of elaborating upon that central point. For the sake of argument, I would prefer that this were addressed directly. I am still open to being educated on the rest of it, as it is intensely interesting, but I feel that it is important to note that the central argument stands on its own, independent of my own additions.

Concerns about functional definitions are appropriate if we are restricting our discussion to science, where the methodology is aimed at producing objectively refutable hypotheses. Because science has limited its attention to such hypotheses, it has been very successful. After all, why bother puzzling over whether some undecidable proposition is true or false?

But, this strategic choice, as useful as it is, does not serve to disprove the claim that some undecidable propositions are meaningful, and hence either true or false. It's well enough for science to ignore such propositions, since they are outside the scope, but it doesn't follow that science has told us the truth value of these propositions.

In short, science doesn't tell us the garage dragon doesn't exist. Science simply ignores the hypothesis, since it isn't amenable to scientific methods. There is no bit of reasoning in science which goes "... because garage dragons don't exist ...".

 

[tsig]

I take it that the above is related to your restatement about "violating parsimony". Here's why it fails.

For some propositions P, it is the case that there is a proposition Q such that

(Ex)P <-> (Ax)Q.

In this case (if the quantifiers are not eliminable), we call P (and also Q) Delta_1. Equivalently, then,

NOT (Ex)P <-> (Ex) NOT Q,

so that for some existential statements, the negation is provably equivalent to an existential statement. A simple example is the statement that x is even. By definition, x is even iff

(E n)(2 * n = x).

Equivalently, x is even iff

(A n)(2 * n + 1 != x).

Hence, x is NOT even iff (E n)(2 * n + 1 = x).

Let U be the number of particles in the universe at this moment, a number which is unknown and likely unknowable. By the above principle, we must take the following conditions to be the case.

NOT (E n)(2 * n = U)
NOT (E n)(2 * n + 1 = U)

Unfortunately, it is provable that

(E n)(2 * n = U) or (E n)(2 * n + 1 = U),

and again we see that your principle leads to contradictions.



What does the word "functional" add to the above?

If it means, as I suspect, a definition that is fundamentally positivist (that is, one which comes with means for verifying or refuting its truth), then yes, we agree. But that's really a standard driven by knowability, and those who are arguing against you are explicitly saying that this is not the only sensible meaning of the word "existence".



Concerns about functional definitions are appropriate if we are restricting our discussion to science, where the methodology is aimed at producing objectively refutable hypotheses. Because science has limited its attention to such hypotheses, it has been very successful. After all, why bother puzzling over whether some undecidable proposition is true or false?

But, this strategic choice, as useful as it is, does not serve to disprove the claim that some undecidable propositions are meaningful, and hence either true or false. It's well enough for science to ignore such propositions, since they are outside the scope, but it doesn't follow that science has told us the truth value of these propositions.

In short, science doesn't tell us the garage dragon doesn't exist. Science simply ignores the hypothesis, since it isn't amenable to scientific methods. There is no bit of reasoning in science which goes "... because garage dragons don't exist ...".

Go and look in the garage.

 

[phiwum]

Go and look in the garage.

Yes, that's nice, tsig. As insightful as ever. As insightful as when you claimed I was playing word games yesterday, on the basis of your ignorance of the discussion.

Good point! Go look for the undetectable dragon! That will settle it!

 

[AdamSK]

In what way are undecidable propositions meaningful? The purpose of language and thought is to interact successfully with the universe; any definition which is not functional doesn't seem like it would have any value.

 

[Aepervius]

There is a very large difference between saying "physicalism and empiricism are useful philosophical positions for doing reliable science" and "everything that exists is matter".

The first statement is pretty much true, the second statement is meaningless (according to Moulines).

(Whether you agree with OP and Moulines or not, you must agree that the statement "Matter makes up everything that exists, by the definition of matter. Therefore everything that exists is matter" is a pretty boring and useless ontological position.)

But that is generally not the statement I would employ so he is fighting a strawman.

By materialism or physicalism or whichever name they would want to make up, I would say that from our own postulat, and from the evidence we have right now, there is no indication that there is any evidence of anything existing beyond particle and fields as we define them in physic. E.g. no telepathy field we have evidence for.

And that is the point : he is going toward wanting a precise definition of matter and is getting worked out at "all is matter" when is reality there is a serie of postulat and evidence he ignore.

Again unless we have evidence of having visited the whole universe, from his philosophical standpoint materialism is not a good position he wants us to have evidence for every single particle being as we define them. But from the science standpoint this is an utterly ridiculous position and would never be used. Like ever.

 

[Aepervius]

In what way are undecidable propositions meaningful? The purpose of language and thought is to interact successfully with the universe; any definition which is not functional doesn't seem like it would have any value.

They are not useful. But they allow you to be employed as a philosopher and make incendiary article about materialist.

 

[phiwum]

In what way are undecidable propositions meaningful? The purpose of language and thought is to interact successfully with the universe; any definition which is not functional doesn't seem like it would have any value.

That's certainly similar to the approach of positivism, but Nonpareil's argument is different enough from positivism that I'm not reading him as a positivist. It's one thing to say that undecidable propositions are meaningless and quite another to say that they are false.

I think also that we have a difficult task in clarifying what one mean by decidability. If we nest even a couple quantifiers, we get propositions which are not refutable with certainty. Nest more, and we lose the capacity to approach truth in the limit. Whatever theory of meaning you have in mind, it seems to me that if each sentence P(c) is meaningful, then the sentence (A x)Px is also meaningful and I'm not altogether certain that this is the case if decidability is the test for meaningfulness.

But, to summarize, if one says that we need to be able to specify possible observations which would act, broadly speaking, as evidence for or against a claim or else the claim is meaningless, I'll accept that this is a coherent and even attractive position.

If one says that it is false that an undetectable thing exists, because existence requires interaction with our known universe, I think the claim is bizarre.

Maybe I'm splitting hairs, but this is where I draw the line.

 

[LarryS]

And what is that matter defined as, then, if not as the sum of its properties?

If I may use the same simplified example, of snow being white and cold. We have the thing or content of snow; and its properties, cold and white. Snow is not purely any one of its properties, that is, snow is not purely white nor is it purely cold.
We can't state that snow is pure whiteness and pure cold, but rather, snow is some kind of unity of cold and white.
This is what is usually meant by the phrase 'a thing is the sum of its properties'.
But then we must ask, what is there in the thing besides its properties that unifies these properties? That's the point - we can't discover any unity between or within these properties.
Put another way, we'd be incorrect if we said that snow is cold, because snow is not purely cold, snow is cold and white. We'd be incorrect if we said snow is the relation between cold and white, because snow is not the relation, snow is not the X that holds white and cold together . . . what we say is snow 'has' cold and snow 'has' white. But then we're back to where we started, we now have to define 'has', and what is the thing that 'has'.

 

[NotEvenWrong]

But that is generally not the statement I would employ so he is fighting a strawman.

What statement would you not make?

By materialism or physicalism or whichever name they would want to make up, I would say that from our own postulat, and from the evidence we have right now, there is no indication that there is any evidence of anything existing beyond particle and fields as we define them in physic. E.g. no telepathy field we have evidence for.

Of course nothing physical exists outside of how they are defined in physics. That's the entire point of physics and the foundation for the physicalist assumption.

Yet consciousness exists. And is not (currently) explainable in terms of particles or fields. Or pi, e, the set of real numbers, etc. I would say all of those exist yet they aren't made up of particles.

Of course you'll then say "those don't actually exist!!!", because they aren't made up of particles. And thus why materialism goes around in circles and is completely uninteresting. Which is why materialism/physicalism is useful as an assumption and starting point for science, because science needs to be based on observation. But beyond that it's not a particularly interesting dogma.

And that is the point : he is going toward wanting a precise definition of matter and is getting worked out at "all is matter" when is reality there is a serie of postulat and evidence he ignore.

I am guessing he is aware of the postulates in science. Precise definitions are useful when doing philosophy. Or math. Or science. Anything rigorous, really.

Again unless we have evidence of having visited the whole universe, from his philosophical standpoint materialism is not a good position he wants us to have evidence for every single particle being as we define them. But from the science standpoint this is an utterly ridiculous position and would never be used. Like ever.

I think you're getting the positions backwards. It is the materialists in this thread that require something to interact with "us" in order to "exist". The ones supporting Moulines (to varying degrees) are saying that is ridiculous -- clearly there are things which exist that we can't detect and do not have access to, but they still exist. Such as the part of the universe which we cannot reach due to speed of light limitations and expansion of the universe. Or particles we can't measure. Etc.

 

[Dancing David]

If I understand well this "materialism" is the same thing that "positivism".I see some problems:
(a) It doesn't include the class of materialists who are not positivists.
(b) This concept of "matter" doesn´t include mental entities that are neither measurable nor observable. It opens the door to dualism.
(c) If any concept of matter can be extracted from this definition it will be indefinite and in continuous evolution. So any sustancious conclusion cannot be drawn about the nature of "matter" on these bases. (This objection would be not valid for a non-ontological materialism).

It was more a general observation that a definitive.

And you can measure mental states in general through survey, used in CBT all the time.
No dualism at all in the naturalist perspective.

 

[Dancing David]

This is an interesting discussion but it begs a question if the limits of materialism are the 4 fields described above, how does one account for innovation and creative pursuits such as art and music or in fact fundamental research which takes our knowledge to a new level and provides new experiences. Therefore the limits of our present knowledge might be creativity or innovative capacity, how does materialism account for the thought and action processes of an Einstein, Mozart or a Da Vinci.

It is a brain process, what specifically do you think the issue is?

 

[Dancing David]

So the universe is not defined by a set of characteristics?

What is your alternative position?

The universe is not defined by a set of characteristics. For example, if we said that snow is white and cold, then it can't be either of those two distinct characteristics - snow is not merely 'white' nor merely 'cold' - because cold and white is not cold. Snow then has to be a unification of these characteristics, and we would need to discover a unity or relation between or within these two characteristics.
We could say snow 'has' whiteness and cold, but then we would then need to define 'has' . . . and still we haven't gotten anywhere because we are trying to get at the 'snow' that 'has' these properties.

Why do characteristics have to be mutually exclusive sets?

 

[Dancing David]

A thing can not be any one of its properties, nor a unity of its properties, because there is no unity relation between or within properties.

That does not parse for me, can you explain a little further ?

 

[Dancing David]

Hate, fear, love… are not measurable. I doubt they are not matter for you.

Those are learned verbal/cognitive descriptions of states of the physical body.

They are learned descriptions and something in fact many adults have a hard time distinguishing between. In general 'emotions' are cognitive states and entrained behaviors of interaction during particular events.


In social emotional learning curricula people are taught to identify and distinguish between 'emotional' states.

they do not exist in the abstract.

 

[LarryS]

I think you're getting the positions backwards. It is the materialists in this thread that require something to interact with "us" in order to "exist". The ones supporting Moulines (to varying degrees) are saying that is ridiculous -- clearly there are things which exist that we can't detect and do not have access to, but they still exist. Such as the part of the universe which we cannot reach due to speed of light limitations and expansion of the universe. Or particles we can't measure. Etc.

and according to Materialism, 'matter' itself being that which is independent of consciousness, 'matter' an objective reality outside of awareness - defined as such matter is not detectable - and in fact, we never found this world independent of consciousness. Yet, it is reasonable to assert/believe that it exists.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

If any of the gentlemen who don't believe in Materialism could please share with us some methods to vanish/dematerialize all the snow in the driveway, please let us know.

 

[phiwum]

If any of the gentlemen who don't believe in Materialism could please share with us some methods to vanish/dematerialize all the snow in the driveway, please let us know.

You do realize, I hope, that philosophical debates over whether a particular thesis is meaningful really don't have much to do with removing snow.

 

[LarryS]

If any of the gentlemen who don't believe in Materialism could please share with us some methods to vanish/dematerialize all the snow in the driveway, please let us know.

Produce snow that lies outside of our being aware of it and I will gladly eat it - even if it be yellow.

 

[Ron_Tomkins]

You do realize, I hope, that philosophical debates over whether a particular thesis is meaningful really don't have much to do with removing snow.

Yes, I'm very aware that philosophical discussions are mostly semantic word games that have no practical use in reality. That is precisely why I made the comment.