LondonJohn
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- May 12, 2010
- Messages
- 21,455
Here's what they wrote:
No trace belonging to them was found in particular on the sweater that the victim
was wearing at the time she was attacked nor on her shirt underneath, which would
have been the case if they had participated in the murder (instead, traces of Guede
were found on a sleeve of the aforementioned sweater: ff, 179-180).
This aforementioned negative circumstance accords with the fact, already
highlighted, of the absolute impracticability of the posthumous clean-up hypothesis,
removing some biological traces while leaving others.
9.4.1. With this premise, with regards to Amanda Knox’s position, it is now
observed that her presence in the house, the scene of the murder, is an acclaimed
fact of the trial, based on her own admissions, also contained in her signed memorial,
in the part where she explains how, when she was in the kitchen, after the young
Englishwoman and another person went into Kercher’s room to have sex, she heard
her friend’s harrowing scream, to the lacerating and unbearable point that she slid
down, squatting on the floor, holding her hands firmly on her ears, so as to hear no
more of it. On this point, the reliability of the opinion of the judge a quo [of the trial
from which this appeal is being heard] is certainly acceptable concerning this part of
the accused’s account, based on the plausible consideration that it was she who first
mentioned a possible sexual motive for the murder and spoke about the victim’s
harrowing scream, when the investigators still did not have the results of an
examination of the body or of the post-mortem, nor witness information taken later
regarding the victim’s scream and the time it was heard (statements from Capezzali
Nara, Monacchia Antonella and others).
They certainly didn't have to write this section or they could have left it at " it is now
observed that her presence in the house, the scene of the murder, is an acclaimed
fact of the trial," but they didn't. Why did they write the last section? I think the only way to read that section and not think they are agreeing with the lower court on her presence is a form of conformation bias or having a vested interest.
Here is what Cheli wrote:
Hence it isn’t particularly surprising that Marasca agrees with Guede’s ruling about the presence of multiple attackers and the burglary being staged: ruling otherwise would have caused a major “conflitto in giudicato”, and probably that was also one of the causes of the annulment of the first acquittal.
There is however a difference: while Marasca writes very few words, if any, in upholding the concept of a staged burglary, so much so that one derives it was deemed staged more from the verdict than from the ruling, he expands quite a bit on the reasons for supporting the multiple attackers theory.
Some of those reasons are the usual ones and have been debated for years, and I will not discuss them further now (lack of defensive wounds, just to quote one), but while this could just be a mechanical rehashing of corny arguments, there is also something new that makes me think the judges of the panel, or at least a majority of them, really believed in what they were writing.
Specifically they really believed that Meredith Kercher’s killer was much more “criminally skilled” than petty thief Rudy Guede and, all the more so, than two nerdy students.
The particularly strange thing is the use of Knox's infamous "confession/accusation" statements in the SC judgement - when these statements were (correctly) excluded from the murder trial process!
What I see here is a terrific amount of backside-covering. I think that the first instinct of Italian judges - from the top down - is the preservation of the system, and the preservation of the sanctity and fairness of the system. In many respects this is inevitable: criminal justice systems soon start to crumble if the public gets even a whiff of a belief that those orchestrating the system don't really know what they are doing. Judges need to be seen as ubermenchen if their authority is to be unquestioningly accepted.
So in this particular case, I see the Marasca SC panel trying extremely hard to minimise any criticism of all the previous trials - especially when it comes to deliberation and verdicts. At the same time, IMO it was crystal clear to the Marasca SC panel that there simply was zero credible, reliable evidence of Knox's participation in the murder, and that therefore their primary role (and what IMO should have been their sole role) was to acquit Knox and Sollecito and refuse the state any recourse to retry.
So outside of the "biggie" - acquitting Knox and Sollecito in the most definitive terms short of there having been proof positive that they were innocent - it looks clear to me that the Marasca SC panel was bending over backwards to try to justify the previous monstrous applications of law by their judicial colleagues in the lower courts. This also extended to an unwillingness to criticise the prosecutors to the proper extent - and this speaks once again to the wholly improper way in which prosecutors are considered (both formally and culturally) to be "on the same side" as the judges and part of the judiciary. I think Marasca et al also deliberately held back on attacking the police to the proper extent - again, if the public loses confidence in the police (especially where gross negligence and incompetence are involved, and even more so where malpractice may be involved), then there are potentially huge ramifications upon law and order.
Personally, I think that outside of the "headlines" (i.e. the unequivocal acquittal of Knox and Sollecito), the Marasca SC report reads like a bumbling piece of political prose whose primary objective is protection of the criminal justice system. In my opinion, the reports veers off again and again into areas in which it ought to have no remit and no reason to pass comment or opinion.
And once again, I believe that a lot of this is due to the malign ongoing influence of (and reactionary attitude towards) the old inquisitorial system, where courts were tasked with determining the "judicial truth" of any crime, and then to convict or acquit people within that overarching "truth" narrative. However, under its current constitutional obligations (which, don't forget, were somewhat forced upon Italy by the Council of Europe - Italy didn't unilaterally choose to modernise properly), the sole job of all the courts in the Knox/Sollecito trial process - up to and including the SC - was to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of Knox and/or Sollecito regarding the crimes with which they'd been indicted and charged.
The Marasca SC panel therefore could - and should, IMO - have simply stuck to examining the actual evidence (and lack of evidence) and its reliability and credibility, concluded (correctly) that there was zero credible, reliable evidence pointing to the guilt of either, acquitting both on that basis, and ruling that the utter paucity of proper evidence (and the gross incompetence and negligence with which this case was investigated and prosecuted) mean that no further trial would be appropriate. Full stop.