Dancing David
Penultimate Amazing
Part of the brain is observing?! Which part?
that is like asking which part of the intestines digest...
Part of the brain is observing?! Which part?
That's how it subjectively appears? You sure about that?
The HPC relies on the notion of a persisting, observational self in order to be credible. Without this it's done for.
Dave Chalmers believes that there is an observer inside his brain which is experiencing consciousness, and that consciousness can be so intense that it can't possibly just be emerging from processing activity.
He's got everything the wrong way around. Consciousness exists. The observer doesn't.
The aging epistemologist takes to the lectern and intones with gravitas, "We may never know what reality really looks like." Knowing what reality looks like is the easy bit. Knowing who's looking - that's more tricky.
There is no one observing, there is a body which may or may not have perceptions of an 'observer', an un-needed complication.
Observations need not have an 'observer'.
nick said:Who, subjectively, is actually observing?
GD said:Part of your brain
nick said:Part of the brain is observing?! Which part?
that is like asking which part of the intestines digest...
... so see if you can really tell me what you think the HPC is.

As I see it, both houses are empty, unless you can show me the exact algorithm of this consciousness delusion
that's obviously, pragmatically, important to us and not to, for example, computers. Exactness is required and AI
cannot find this either, and cover-ups and cop-outs about complexity and evolution are inexact, vague, magical
miracle tech arguments. Neurobabble.
But the argument that I present has an extra merit, the one I explained. And it's quite exact but difficult to
understand or explain. At least, it's more exact than what's currently fashionable.
The key point is that there is a fundamental metaphysical issue that you always end up with when trying to understand why there is something at all
The hard problem(s) of consciousness. No satisfactory theory has yet emerged.
As I see it, both houses are empty, unless you can show me the exact algorithm of this consciousness delusion
that's obviously, pragmatically, important to us and not to, for example, computers. Exactness is required and AI
cannot find this either, and cover-ups and cop-outs about complexity and evolution are inexact, vague, magical
miracle tech arguments. Neurobabble.
But the argument that I present has an extra merit, the one I explained. And it's quite exact but difficult to
understand or explain. At least, it's more exact than what's currently fashionable.
I might be a little slow this morning, but I'm stuck on the presumption that there needs to be a reason for existence. It seems the rest of the argument hangs of this presupposition.
So, my question is "why, and who decided this?"
The long standing assumption that we matter in the universe.
'this is a statement about existence, not the HPC'
Yes, I'm arguing that the HPC always boils down to the question of what existence actually means/is. And infinite
regression will appear when attempting to answer this question, but you're free to consider this sophistry,
if you want. I consider this the most important question of all.
'the presumption that there needs to be a reason for existence'
Again, you're free to consider this question unimportant. Like I said, it's the pragmatic perspective; There's
apparently a world, no need to ask further questions about its origin. But what question is science actually
trying to answer, then?
Sorry what I see is some vague metaphysical hand waving so please explain what the Hard Problem of Consciousness is?
We really don't need a first cause or anything like that, organic bodies appear to exist in an apparent universe.
So please explain what the HPC is?
Infinite regression is some silly sophistry at best.
this is a statement about existence, not the HPC
Here is the problem, you are just asserting the HPC, you have not explained it in the least.
So what is it and why bring it up at all if you can't explain it?
He doesn't have to explain it. It was coined by Chalmers, presumably because it is a hard problem to solve. The (ETA: five, I guess) three main outstanding problems (to me at least) are:
1. Why are we conscious at all?
2. How does consciousness emerge from neural activity,
2.1 if moving electrons around in some way results in consciousness, would a system that's functionally identical to a working brain (e.g.,
a "brain" made of pumps, valves, water, etc) also be conscious?
3. What is it like to be something? What is it like to be Dancing David? Is that information forever closed off from everyone but you? If so, why are mental states informational "black holes" (the information of what it is like to be you is privy only to you), and if not, how would I go about trying to figure out what it is like to be you, or a bat, or a mouse, etc.?
4. If mental states exist, and are different than brain states (e.g., the two are causally connected but ontologically different), how do mental states exist in a physical universe? What is the nature of their existence?
5. If mental states are the same as brain states, does Mary learn anything new in the Mary's Room thought experiment when she sees color for the first time? I think it's clear she does, therefore mental states are different than brain states, and we're back to problem (4).
So for those reasons (and probably a bunch more), it's a hard problem. Nobody's close to a solution (and no, Dennet didn't solve it in "Consciousness Explained". It's not like work on consciousness stopped 20 years ago, when his book came out).
I might be a little slow this morning, but I'm stuck on the presumption that there needs to be a reason for existence. It seems the rest of the argument hangs of this presupposition.
So, my question is "why, and who decided this?"
Interestingly, roughly two unsolvable areas remain :
The hard problem(s) of metaphysics : Why is there something at all? What is 'Existence'? What's its purpose? etc.
The hard problem(s) of consciousness. No satisfactory theory has yet emerged.
Let's take the materialistic position. It resolves the metaphysical problem by pragmatism. We exist in a world,
stuff happens. Deal with it. The problem of consciousness is then assumed to be resolvable in terms of these
real things existing in the world around us without requiring a deeper metaphysical link.
This is what the scientific method (which should be impartial to philosophical issues) tells us, with evidence in
spades. The metaphysical problem however remains as some kind of primordial absurdity, unsolvable.
Something just _is_, must remain as a basic unresolved issue.
We are not. There is not a self that is conscious. There is consciousness, and within that consciousness runs a programme that makes it seem that there is someone that is experiencing consciousness.
This is just basic stuff really.
We don't know for sure that it necessarily does. Consciousness is a 3D workspace that certainly seems to emerge from brain activity. But we don't know how the brain finally is. We know what it looks like in the workspace. We know how it functions, in the terms of the workspace. But finally this could mean virtually nothing. The answer could be completely left-field. Though as brain imaging develops this one could get easier.
We don't know where consciousness is. Consciousness is actually a type of meta-space if you think about it from the perspective of the processor that is generating it. This truth many people don't grasp and so they tie together the brain and consciousness in a way that doesn't further understanding.
When you say something like "the brain is conscious" personally I think you have to be careful. The brain that is conscious is not the brain that appears in consciousness.

There's nothing it's like to be you.