New Article on Custer's Last Stand

[WayneK]

I have not been to the site, but I am going to guess from your comments that there is a combination of poor disposition and poor choice of ground, likely conferring excellent vantage points to the Native Americans while denying it to themselves and also leaving flanks unanchored (I don't know if Custer and his men set up a 360 degree perimeter early on or not).

I have joined Border Reiver in criticizing Custer for engaging without the proper reconnaissance. I stand by that. Yet I am willing to concede that once engaged he fought well for the circumstances. He remained aggressive and tried to implement the tactics that had worked before, i.e., capture the non-combatants to force the warriors to capitulate.

Yes, that's it. Custer never formed a 360 degree perimeter. For whatever reason, Custer was unable to form his five companies into a unified defensive position. If you stand at Custer Hill and look towards Calhoun Hill, it's appalling how far away it is: 700 yards (640 m). Every time I look at it I can't believe how far apart the positions are.

So Companies E and F were deployed somewhere near Custer Hill. Company L was on Calhoun Hill. This was the only company that died in a clear defensive position with both officers in place behind their men. Company C was found on a ridge towards the river, 400 yards from Calhoun, and completely out of supporting distance of the others. Keogh's Company I was found in a line on the east part of the ridge starting near Calhoun's Company and extending towards Battle Ridge. It was not a position a company would take for defense so it's believed to represent soldiers shot down while fleeing towards Custer Hill.

In contrast, Reno and Benteen were able to form their 7 companies into a single circular line making the best use of the meager cover available. It wasn't an inherently strong position because it included a wide swale, but they made the best of it by putting the horses and supplies in the middle.

It's true that Reno and Benteen had more men (approx. 340 vs Custer's 210) and also had the advantage of the spare ammunition in the packs. So maybe that was the deciding factor. But I think if you look how dispersed Custer's position was, there was no way for them to make a long stand against the numbers he faced.

I'll add some points later.

 

[bluesjnr]

My area of interest is not this period in American history as I'm more concerned with the American Civil War from the Confederate aspect, therefore what I'm about to say is tainted by that fact. That and the fact that I know nothing about Cavalry tactics of 1879.

I'm surprised that the men were organised into skirmish lines at, I believe, the outset. An"earthshaking" volley was heard which suggests that a battle line existed for the length of time it took to fire that volley. I believe that had the battle line been maintained a greater volume of fire would have been more effective. The Springfield was an extremely accurate rifle with a greater range then the Henry, which had the advantage of a higher rate of fire. It was this rate of fire coupled with the ability of the Indians to get in close due to a poorly organised skirmish line on the right side that turned the battle.

Men could be wheeled by company or battalion and still be mobile while presenting devastating, long range firepower. This depth in numbers would allow firing by files, by ranks and volley fire and would have have nullified the greater rate of fire the Indians enjoyed and kept them at the range of the troopers Springfield. The Henry had an effective range of 200 yds, the Springfield 600 yds. The Indians could have, should have, been kept at arms length.

 

[WayneK]

I don't think Custer picked a poor defensive position. I think he was maneuvering in a way that left his forces too separated when the Indians arrived in force. Once that happened, the soldiers had to fight it out where they stood, as bad as the position was.

The position assumed by Custer's five companies is perhaps the best indirect evidence that Custer split his five companies into two wings. I don't know how else to explain the scattered positions they ended up in.

One possible explanation is that all Custer's men did fight together. They were all together on Finley Ridge, where they left enough dead to indicate a company position, and through happenstance the men killed there were from C Company. They then all retreated togther and fought on Calhoun Hill together. Then they were overcome and pushed back to Custer Hill together.

This scenario would produce a distribution of markers that looked like the command was dispersed, when in fact they found together in a succession of positions. The evidence, however, doesn't support this. With few exceptions, the bodies found on Finley Ridge were from C Company, on Calhoun Hill from L company, on the side of the ridge from I company, and and Custer Hill from E and F Companies, with scattered survivors from the other three.

Indian testimony also indicates that the soldiers were fighting from Custer Hill and Calhoun Hill at the same time.

 

[Garrette]

Yes, that's it. Custer never formed a 360 degree perimeter. For whatever reason, Custer was unable to form his five companies into a unified defensive position. If you stand at Custer Hill and look towards Calhoun Hill, it's appalling how far away it is: 700 yards (640 m). Every time I look at it I can't believe how far apart the positions are.

So Companies E and F were deployed somewhere near Custer Hill. Company L was on Calhoun Hill. This was the only company that died in a clear defensive position with both officers in place behind their men. Company C was found on a ridge towards the river, 400 yards from Calhoun, and completely out of supporting distance of the others. Keogh's Company I was found in a line on the east part of the ridge starting near Calhoun's Company and extending towards Battle Ridge. It was not a position a company would take for defense so it's believed to represent soldiers shot down while fleeing towards Custer Hill.

In contrast, Reno and Benteen were able to form their 7 companies into a single circular line making the best use of the meager cover available. It wasn't an inherently strong position because it included a wide swale, but they made the best of it by putting the horses and supplies in the middle.

It's true that Reno and Benteen had more men (approx. 340 vs Custer's 210) and also had the advantage of the spare ammunition in the packs. So maybe that was the deciding factor. But I think if you look how dispersed Custer's position was, there was no way for them to make a long stand against the numbers he faced.

I'll add some points later.

What is your thinking on why Custer failed to form a cohesive defensive position?

 

[WayneK]

I'm surprised that the men were organised into skirmish lines at, I believe, the outset. An"earthshaking" volley was heard which suggests that a battle line existed for the length of time it took to fire that volley. I believe that had the battle line been maintained a greater volume of fire would have been more effective. The Springfield was an extremely accurate rifle with a greater range then the Henry, which had the advantage of a higher rate of fire. It was this rate of fire coupled with the ability of the Indians to get in close due to a poorly organised skirmish line on the right side that turned the battle.

Men could be wheeled by company or battalion and still be mobile while presenting devastating, long range firepower. This depth in numbers would allow firing by files, by ranks and volley fire and would have have nullified the greater rate of fire the Indians enjoyed and kept them at the range of the troopers Springfield. The Henry had an effective range of 200 yds, the Springfield 600 yds. The Indians could have, should have, been kept at arms length.

I agree with most of what you wrote. This is a contentious issue but I believe the soldiers had better guns. The army had considered repeating rifles but chose the single-shot Springfield for its superior power, accuracy, and durability (interestingly, the officer heading up the investigation was Reno).

Rapid fire is not necessarily a good thing. What you want is accurate fire. There's an understandable tendency to start firing wildly as soon as the fighting starts. I believe it was Lt DeRudio at the Court of Inquiry who said that his primary duty as an officer during a fight was to make the men slow down their firing.

It's unknown where the volleys were fired from, what they meant, or if they even were volleys at all. They may have simply been the opening of the heavy fighting. The timing of the first volleys matches perfectly with the time when the Indians from Reno's fight would have been reaching Custer's position. Or maybe they were a "come on" signal to Reno and Benteen.

 

[bluesjnr]

I agree with most of what you wrote. This is a contentious issue but I believe the soldiers had better guns. The army had considered repeating rifles but chose the single-shot Springfield for its superior power, accuracy, and durability (interestingly, the officer heading up the investigation was Reno).

Rapid fire is not necessarily a good thing. What you want is accurate fire. There's an understandable tendency to start firing wildly as soon as the fighting starts. I believe it was Lt DeRudio at the Court of Inquiry who said that his primary duty as an officer during a fight was to make the men slow down their firing.

It's unknown where the volleys were fired from, what they meant, or if they even were volleys at all. They may have simply been the opening of the heavy fighting. The timing of the first volleys matches perfectly with the time when the Indians from Reno's fight would have been reaching Custer's position. Or maybe they were a "come on" signal to Reno and Benteen.

I took it as a given that effective fire control would be part of organising troopers into a battle line. Lieutenants and Sergeants would be giving fire orders. I agree with you regarding the choice of weapon for the Army (always wanna call 'em Union).

 

[WayneK]

I took it as a given that effective fire control would be part of organising troopers into a battle line. Lieutenants and Sergeants would be giving fire orders. I agree with you regarding the choice of weapon for the Army (always wanna call 'em Union).

Yeah, I'm no expert on 19th Century drill. Reno's men, I'm pretty sure, were firing at will. I don't think you would normally fight by firing volleys except in special circumstances but I'm not sure.

There are surprising ways in which understanding Army methods can help understand what happened. Since you're interested in the Civil War, perhaps you've heard of Brian Pohanka (very sadly passed away)? He told me that if Custer did divide his battalion into two wings, it would have been strictly according to seniority and not any other way. The senior commander under Custer would have gotten three companies (Keogh, I believe), and the 2nd senior would have gotten two (Yates).

I can't remember if this was a protocol concerning which wing Custer would accompany.

Have you read the book "The Yellowlegs"? It was one of my all-time favorite books on the cavalry but I can't find my copy.

 

[Border Reiver]

I took it as a given that effective fire control would be part of organising troopers into a battle line. Lieutenants and Sergeants would be giving fire orders. I agree with you regarding the choice of weapon for the Army (always wanna call 'em Union).

Fire control and ammunition supply were often critical factors in colonial campaigns in determining victory. The ammo supply ending up with Reno and Benteen, along with their numbers after joining up, plus their cohesive defensive formation were likely factors in their commands surviving to attend the Board of Inquiry.

If the U.S. Army had gone with a repeater, at this time it still would have been a black powder weapon. Rapid firing would have produced a large amount of smoke, the presence of which would have hampered long range shooting and nullifying the Springfield's advantage in range.

The battles of The NorthWest Rebellion in Canada a few years later back up the logistics side of it - their the Plains Cree and the Metis were able to launch successful raids, but large scale battles quickly went into the Government's favour, as did the campaign, due to the difficulty in the Cree and Metis getting resupplied (by the final battle at Batoche, the Metis stripped the lead from the Church roof for bullets) as all of them were using personally owned hunting weapons of varying calibres.

 

[bluesjnr]

Yeah, I'm no expert on 19th Century drill. Reno's men, I'm pretty sure, were firing at will. I don't think you would normally fight by firing volleys except in special circumstances but I'm not sure.

There are surprising ways in which understanding Army methods can help understand what happened. Since you're interested in the Civil War, perhaps you've heard of Brian Pohanka (very sadly passed away)? He told me that if Custer did divide his battalion into two wings, it would have been strictly according to seniority and not any other way. The senior commander under Custer would have gotten three companies (Keogh, I believe), and the 2nd senior would have gotten two (Yates).

I can't remember if this was a protocol concerning which wing Custer would accompany.

Have you read the book "The Yellowlegs"? It was one of my all-time favorite books on the cavalry but I can't find my copy.

I have heard of Brian Pohanka, as an advisor on a couple of films (didn't he get a cameo in Gettysburg?) and I have a book, The Illustrated History of the Civil War, which he co-authored. That is the extent of my familiarity.

I haven't heard of the book you mention, probably because I don't read much about Cavalry but coincidentally, we have a recent new recruit who does a civilian impression at our reenactment events and also a Cavalry Sergeant from time to time (he was formerly 15th Light Dragoons -Waterloo). He and I have talked over a fire and a drink about Cavalry tactics and this book might be something of interest to me and make the conversation less one-sided. I'll take it as a recommendation and thanks.

 

[WayneK]

What is your thinking on why Custer failed to form a cohesive defensive position?

I think I gave my general answer right before you posted your question. In short, it appears that Custer may have dividend his battalion into two wings that were being maneuvered in some way. He may have left one wing posted on Nye-Cartwright ridge to effect the junction with Benteen and the pack train. The other wing may have made a feint at the ford and/or moved farther downstream towards a ford north of camp.

The Cheyenne's have a tradition that some of Custer's command came down to the flat northwest of the existing museum and approached the ford there. If this scenario is correct, then he ended up where he did because his two wings were too widely separated to reunite. If he was at the north ford while the other wing was still on Nye-Cartwright Ridge, they an were astonishing 3 miles apart.

Once the danger was perceived, the two wings hurried to join each other. The south wing made it as far as the south end of Battle Ridge and the north wing made it back to the north end of Battle Ridge. There they were both engulfed by returning Indians, making further movement impossible.

This is just one of many scenarios that can be spun from the evidence.

 

[bluesjnr]

An interesting read here which brings together many of the theories put forward here.

 

[dropzone]

My area of interest is not this period in American history as I'm more concerned with the American Civil War from the Confederate aspect, therefore what I'm about to say is tainted by that fact. That and the fact that I know nothing about Cavalry tactics of 1879.

Federal cavalry tactics were developed during the war to use less-experienced horsemen as mounted infantry on indifferent horses, instead of the cliched Confederate cavaliers on finely-blooded chargers. Less glamour and glory than a saber charge, but by the end of the war the Federal cavalry could give as good as it got. But since every commander followed his own tactical ideas, there were no standards until 1874, with the publication of Emory Upton's Cavalry Tactics.

I'm surprised that the men were organised into skirmish lines at, I believe, the outset.

That was SOP, according to Upton. He believed in cavalry operating in squads of four, with three deployed along the skirmish line, spaced at five yards apart to reduce the size of the target receiving massed, poorly-aimed fire. The fourth took the horses to safety behind the lines until they were needed.

The philosophy was that cavalry was to be used as skirmishers, to harass the enemy at his flanks. Cavalry stopped being battle winners before Balaclava, though few people noticed it. It existed to augment a main battle force, not to fight the whole battle, and frankly, Custer didn't have enough men to form a proper battle line, with protection of the flanks and rear, on uneven, hostile terrain.

Men could be wheeled by company or battalion and still be mobile while presenting devastating, long range firepower. This depth in numbers would allow firing by files, by ranks and volley fire and would have have nullified the greater rate of fire the Indians enjoyed and kept them at the range of the troopers Springfield. The Henry had an effective range of 200 yds, the Springfield 600 yds. The Indians could have, should have, been kept at arms length.

The additional range of the Springfield never came into play because the enemy was too close. Wouldn't have helped, either, because budget cutbacks reduced the ammunition available for target practice. It was more "spray and pray" than aimed fire, except the "spray," from the brass recovered (note that the archaeological investigation was after more than a century of souvenir hunters picked the site clean) was more like a half-dozen or fewer rounds fired per trooper per station. As for the rest, there again we're back to not enough men to fight like that. They were not trained to be infantry, to wheel and advance and fire by ranks, like men who lived on the parade ground in the off-season. For that matter, those tactics had already been shown to be obsolete in the ACW when used against Western troops, and here they weren't fighting Napoleon. The Indians would've found comfy places where they could hide and lob bullets into the massed formation, killing honkies at their leisure.

 

[Axxman300]

I don't think Custer made any tactical mistakes. I'm not defending Reno or Benteen, both were sub-par officers, and perhaps had Reno pressed the attack for a few minutes longer with more audacity things might have been different.

Custer's scouts left him under the impression that the Indians knew he was coming, and for the most part they didn't he was there until Reno's attack, and then they were surprised again when he and his element appeared on the ridge above the main village. He was moving so fast they though Custer's force was larger than it was, and this confusion might have been useful.

At the end of the day, the Sioux and Cheyenne had not only the better weapons, but better marksmen, and since they were fighting to protect their families they had extra motivation.

I'll share this link for those who'd like to read more on this subject:

http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn

 

[WayneK]

I don't think Custer made any tactical mistakes. ]

So you think it was fine to leave Reno fighting by himself while Custer delayed his own attack? I won't repeat the arguments I made earlier.

I'd read your linked article before. I appreciate the sound testing they did but it'd be difficult to ever draw firm conclusions from such testing. The transmission of battlefield noise is notoriously fickle. I guess the best that could be done would be to match the weather conditions of that day as close as possible.

The article has a heavy pro-Custer agenda complete with cherry-picked evidence that Custer crossed the river and fought inside the village. That idea is overwhelmingly refuted by the eyewitness testimony of the Indians, as well as Herendeen and the other men left behind in the timber adjacent to the village.

It also is inconsistent with where the bodies were found. If he'd attacked the village in force, his men wouldn't have died on a ridge across the river and two miles away.

 

[anglolawyer]

May I ask - on what basis is this encounter considered to be 'a battle'? It seems to have involved a tiny number of individuals, comparatively speaking. In fact, I can't call to mind any well-known battles involving so few. Would it unduly diminish the event to dismiss it as a cavalry skirmish that went badly wrong for one side?

 

[WayneK]

May I ask - on what basis is this encounter considered to be 'a battle'? It seems to have involved a tiny number of individuals, comparatively speaking. In fact, I can't call to mind any well-known battles involving so few. Would it unduly diminish the event to dismiss it as a cavalry skirmish that went badly wrong for one side?

I don't know that there's a definitive way to answer that. In the context of the Civil War, it would have been a skirmish but an extremely bloody one. In the context of the Indian Wars, it was a very big battle. Many smaller Indian fights are called battles.

 

[Garrette]

May I ask - on what basis is this encounter considered to be 'a battle'? It seems to have involved a tiny number of individuals, comparatively speaking. In fact, I can't call to mind any well-known battles involving so few. Would it unduly diminish the event to dismiss it as a cavalry skirmish that went badly wrong for one side?

While numbers obviously matter, they are not the only factor. Alfred the Great's battles were small but historically significant. The Battle of Edington was very small -- probably fewer than a thousand on each side -- but few battles in history match its impact.

Plus, it's really a matter of size relative to the environment. Cowpens in the American Revolution wasn't much larger than Ashdown in numbers. The Southern theater in that war had several battles with fewer than 1,000 on each side.

 

[Border Reiver]

As an example, most of the Battles of the Northwest Rebellion (really two separate conflicts fought in the same general area at the same time) had no more than a 1200 participants in total - the naming of conflicts/battles/skirmishes is dependent on who writes the histories afterward.

 

[anglolawyer]

I don't know that there's a definitive way to answer that. In the context of the Civil War, it would have been a skirmish but an extremely bloody one. In the context of the Indian Wars, it was a very big battle. Many smaller Indian fights are called battles.

While numbers obviously matter, they are not the only factor. Alfred the Great's battles were small but historically significant. The Battle of Edington was very small -- probably fewer than a thousand on each side -- but few battles in history match its impact.

Plus, it's really a matter of size relative to the environment. Cowpens in the American Revolution wasn't much larger than Ashdown in numbers. The Southern theater in that war had several battles with fewer than 1,000 on each side.

As an example, most of the Battles of the Northwest Rebellion (really two separate conflicts fought in the same general area at the same time) had no more than a 1200 participants in total - the naming of conflicts/battles/skirmishes is dependent on who writes the histories afterward.

Thanks for these replies. Clearly, it can't be simply a question of numbers, although a duel between two individuals, however momentous the outcome, could hardly be considered a battle in the sense we are using here. Now I must look up the battle of Edington. Never heard of the battle or even the place.

 

[SonOfLaertes]

Thanks for these replies. Clearly, it can't be simply a question of numbers, although a duel between two individuals, however momentous the outcome, could hardly be considered a battle in the sense we are using here. Now I must look up the battle of Edington. Never heard of the battle or even the place.

Even before smallpox and cholera decimated Native American populations, the Tribes had a hard time keeping up their numbers. This is why adoption of captured children was such a widespread practice. Well aware of this fact, Native Americans made cowardice a virtue and disengaged from any fight which promised a large loss of life. The Indian Wars were most often hit and run affairs. In this context Little Big Horn was a massive concentration of force.