LondonJohn
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- May 12, 2010
- Messages
- 21,455
Given that US Treasury secretary Jack Lew has lined up behind the IMF in support of Varoufakis' long-held position on the necessity for debt relief then perhaps V is not such a clown after all?
OF COURSE bodies such as the US Treasury and the IMF do not want to see a Grexit. The ECB and the powers behind the Eurozone don't want to see a Grexit either. But effectively they have no choice now.
That's one of the naked dichotomies of this whole fiasco. The people/institutions on the other side of the negotiations with Greece have every philosophical and practical reason to keep Greece in the Euro and to (somehow) sort out its debt problem. It's just that in practice there's now pretty much zero chance of this happening.
It's very much analogous to a bank manager who's lent an unsecured loan to a man who cannot now meet his repayments. The bank manager wants to keep the man as a customer of the bank, and to find some way to sort out the debt problem to the best outcome for the bank. The bank manager doesn't want to have to write off the loan and throw the man out as a customer of the bank. But if the man consistently raises the middle finger to the bank manager and shows no appetite whatsoever for any kind of reasonable programme of action, then there comes a time when the bank manager has no other option.
And that time has now come for the ECB and the Eurozone politicians, in respect of Greece. They're not going to like doing it. And they will, to a large extent, be humiliated themselves by doing it. But they basically have no choice now (since it's now inevitable that Greece - following the "no" vote - has no chance of a sufficient volte face in its negotiating position). Greece is going to exit the Euro, and Greece's Euro-creditors are going to have to write off most (of not pretty much all) of the debt. The only thing to sort out now is a careful timetable which will a) minimise the chance of civil unrest in Greece, b) cause the least possible adverse impact to the stability of international money markets, bond markets and equity markets, and c) make the ECB, EC, Eurozone politicians and the IMF look as least-stupid and least-incompetent as possible.
