Now, the probabilities.
No, it's not a matter of proving it. It's a matter of proving that it's probable.
What is the probability of tertiary transfer of skin cells through drying hands on a towel and then touching an item, and transfer the DNA there, and specifically there.
You know because, if we argue about what's in rerum natura, we should know it is possible to buy a lottery ticket and win. But it is not reasonable to expect this will happen. What's just possible is not exactly what you need to dismiss a piece of evidence. You need much more than that.
Based on the same logic - probable as winning a lottery ticket - a defence lawyer could argue that each finding of Rudy Guede's DNA in the murder room was due to innocent reasons, a tertiary transfer of the same kind or another innocent reason. And there are only four instances of Guede's DNA in the room, some of them even only yielding a compatible Y-chromosome and no X profile.
Based on a reasoning in rerum natura, a defence lawyer may also argue that bruises on the victim's vagina had innocent reasons not related to sexual violence.
Obviously, no judge would consider such arguments.
The arguments above mean just failure to understanding anything about how evidence works.
It doesn't matter at all what you think of Stefanoni. There is simply no evidence of the contamination claimed by the defence.
Not me, but the defence should tell her, and they should tell her during the incidente probatorio. Or they should explain the judge clearly what they need to do with the data, what their theory of contamination is. Something the defence did not do. We all know the defence did not submit such requests of seeing raw data of DNA tests, there is no trace of such instance in the preliminary hearing, in the defence appeals reasons nor in requests to the supreme court.
In fact the fallacy of this argument is so well known that it is called the prosecutor's fallacy.
