Diocletus
Illuminator
- Joined
- May 19, 2011
- Messages
- 3,969
Poor Jackie is still going on about custody. OMG.
I'll give him this, though: Zaichenko is interesting, because the court held that the applicant’s procedural rights under Art. 6 had been triggered, but then decided that his right to counsel wasn’t violated even though his right to remain silent was violated. How could one procedural right (right to be silent) be violated, at the same time that another procedural right (right to counsel) wasn’t violated?
Well, for one thing, you don’t get a lawyer at a road check. Duh. But, you do have a right not to have your statements used against you if you are already a suspect when you make them.
In Zaichenko’s particular case, his right to a lawyer wasn’t violated because: 1) he waived his right to counsel (para. 50), 2) his lawyer’s letter to the ECHR confirmed his waiver of the right (para. 46), and 3) there was no compulsion (i.e., curtailment of “freedom of action,” para. 48) in the context of the road check procedure. The guy was already a "suspect," so "custody" is not at issue here, but compulsion is, as explained in paragraphs 37-38 (which Jackie would know if he had bothered to read the whole case).
Compare this with Knox’s situation, where she not only didn’t waive counsel but was affirmatively denied counsel, her lawyer is obviously not going to tell the ECHR that everything was fine, and most importantly, the interrogation was:
So, yeah, there was compulsion and defiance of her will.
In the end, the whole issue is moot anyway, because there was a violation of the right to silence when the court used the statement to convict the applicant. Just like the ECHR will decide in Knox’s case.
I'll give him this, though: Zaichenko is interesting, because the court held that the applicant’s procedural rights under Art. 6 had been triggered, but then decided that his right to counsel wasn’t violated even though his right to remain silent was violated. How could one procedural right (right to be silent) be violated, at the same time that another procedural right (right to counsel) wasn’t violated?
Well, for one thing, you don’t get a lawyer at a road check. Duh. But, you do have a right not to have your statements used against you if you are already a suspect when you make them.
In Zaichenko’s particular case, his right to a lawyer wasn’t violated because: 1) he waived his right to counsel (para. 50), 2) his lawyer’s letter to the ECHR confirmed his waiver of the right (para. 46), and 3) there was no compulsion (i.e., curtailment of “freedom of action,” para. 48) in the context of the road check procedure. The guy was already a "suspect," so "custody" is not at issue here, but compulsion is, as explained in paragraphs 37-38 (which Jackie would know if he had bothered to read the whole case).
Compare this with Knox’s situation, where she not only didn’t waive counsel but was affirmatively denied counsel, her lawyer is obviously not going to tell the ECHR that everything was fine, and most importantly, the interrogation was:
[of] obsessive length. . . , carried out during [both] day and night, by more than one person, on a young and foreign girl who at the time did not speak Italian at all well, was unaware of her own rights, did not have the assistance of an attorney (which she should have been entitled to, being at this point suspected of very serious crimes), and was moreover being assisted by an interpreter who . . . did not limit herself to translating, but induced her to force herself to remember, explaining that she [Amanda] was confused in her memories . . .
So, yeah, there was compulsion and defiance of her will.
In the end, the whole issue is moot anyway, because there was a violation of the right to silence when the court used the statement to convict the applicant. Just like the ECHR will decide in Knox’s case.