Continuation Part 11: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito

[Numbers]

No. Buratti says "intercettazioni", not "wiretap".
And does not say "Lumumba", he says "Lumumba, Guede", and, despite all attempts of denial, evidence is Guede had no phone after Oct. 20 (no phone records of him according to Latella).

{Highlighting and bold added to quote.}

Google translate renders "intercettazioni" as "eavesdropping".
And it translates "wiretapping" as "intercettazioni".

For those interested in such subtleties.

 

[Kauffer]

...and now a word from an elderly man obsessed with young ballerinas

Peter Quennell's latest missive:

"There has simply been too much documentation, too much commentary broadcast on TV, too many disturbing facts coming to light like Knox having sex for drugs with a drug kingpin right up to the night of her arrest."

Odd little man isn't he?

 

[Bill Williams]

Peter Quennell's latest missive:

"There has simply been too much documentation, too much commentary broadcast on TV, too many disturbing facts coming to light like Knox having sex for drugs with a drug kingpin right up to the night of her arrest."

Odd little man isn't he?

Too much.... too many.... to come to which conclusion?

Even Machiavelli simply asserts that last factoid without ever once showing it to be remotely true.... he holds it as a possibility, and acc. to Italian law, acc. to M., if it is possible then it is true and up to the deniers to disprove!

What are these people on about?

 

[Numbers]

As for the ECHR interpretation of Convention art. 6 and 3., Enea vs. Italy and Mole vs. Italy sets the principles that defence rights can be partly sacrified on the bìground of compelling needs to protect the public interest to security, that is pretectig the ongoing of the investigation.
Decisions Salduz vs. Turkey and Simons vs. Belgium (the latter inadmissible) also stated that the right to counsel is not absolute from the moment of arrest, and may be delayed by ahtorities on grounds of public security.

As for the Italian law, the power to delay access to counsel is set in procedure code art. 104, §§ 3 and 4. This article was applied to all three suspects.

{Highlighting added to quote.}

The quoted cases, Enea v Italy 74912/01 and Mole v Italy 24421/03, concern the applications of mafia-connected persons who were subjected to special regimes in prison, in which they were denied a variety of communication benefits, such as limitations on family visits, access to telephones, and so on. They were also limited in some other usual benefits that prisoners generally receive. They were allowed to communicate with their lawyers by mail. The special regimes were ordered by decree of the Ministry of Justice for specific periods of time and were renewed, arguably at times without an effective way for the prisoner to appeal the renewal.

Both applicants complained that the special regime was a violation of Convention Article 3, the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. They also complained of a violation of Article 6.1, in that there was a limited appeal path to return to the regular prison regime. The ECHR found a violation of Article 6.1 for specifics in each case, but no over-all violation of 6.1, and no violations of Article 3.

These cases have no bearing on the application of Amanda Knox relating to the calunnia conviction, which (based on my opinion and that of other posters) would be primarily a claim of a violation of Convention Article 6.3c (absence of legal counsel during interrogation by police) with violation of Article 6.1 (unfair trial due to use of statement obtained by violation of Article 6.3c).
For those interested, here are short summaries of the Enea and Mole cases:

Enea v Italy 74912/01

Article 3
The Court noted that the restrictions imposed on the applicant under the special prison regime had been necessary in order to prevent him from maintaining contacts with the criminal organisation to which he belonged. It also noted that the courts responsible for the execution of sentences had lifted or eased certain of those restrictions and that Mr Enea had received treatment appropriate to his state of health, either in prison or in a hospital outside prison. Accordingly, it considered that the treatment to which the applicant had been subjected did not exceed the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and concluded, by 15 votes to 2, that there had not been a violation of Article 3.

Article 6 § 1
With regard to the imposition of the special prison regime provided for in section 41 bis, the Court noted that prisoners subjected to that regime have ten days from the date on which the ministerial decree is served in which to lodge an appeal, which does not have suspensive effect, with the court responsible for the execution of sentences; the latter in its turn must give a ruling within ten days. The Court noted that for one of the 19 decrees issued against the applicant – decree no. 12 – the court responsible for the execution of sentences had given its ruling well after the 10-day deadline laid down in the legislation, and dismissed the appeal on the ground that the validity of the impugned decree had expired and that the applicant was consequently no longer subject to it. The Court considered that, since it had not resulted in a decision on the merits of the application of the special regime, the courts’ review of decree no. 12 had been deprived of its substance. It concluded, unanimously, that there had been a violation of Article 6. {Only in this special case due to court delay.}
.....
On the merits, the Court noted that, while it was true that a prisoner could not challenge per se the merits of a decision to place him or her in an E.I.V. unit, an appeal lay to the courts responsible for the execution of sentences against any restriction of a “civil” right (affecting, for instance, a prisoner's family visits). In the present case, not only was the applicant not subjected to any such restriction but, if he had been, he would have had access to a court. Accordingly, the Court concluded unanimously that there had not been a violation of Article 6 § 1 in this respect.



Mole v. Italy 24421/03

The applicant, Girolamo Mole, is an Italian national who was born in 1961 and lives in Parma (Italy). He is serving a life sentence for murder and other offences connected with the activities of a mafia-type criminal organisation. Relying in particular on Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing), he complained that the exercise of his right of access to a court was restricted in that a complaint he lodged against a ministerial decree was not examined on the merits by the court responsible for the execution of sentences.

Violation of Article 6 § 1 (fairness)

 

[Machiavelli]

{Highlighting added to quote.}

The quoted cases, Enea v Italy 74912/01 and Mole v Italy 24421/03, concern the applications of mafia-connected persons who were subjected to special regimes in prison,
(...)

These cases have no bearing on the application of Amanda Knox relating to the calunnia conviction, which (based on my opinion and that of other posters) would be primarily a claim of a violation of Convention Article 6.3c (absence of legal counsel during interrogation by police) with violation of Article 6.1 (unfair trial due to use of statement obtained by violation of Article 6.3c).
(...)

But I was responding to a request by Kauffer who demanded citation for my opinion on Lumumba's denial of counsel during. I was talking about Lumumba's detention and his delay to access to counsel, not about Amanda Knox.
Lumumba's case would have to do somehow with art. 5 of the Convention.
As far as the Mole vs. Italy case, I haven't read it actually, but what I know is this case reports about delaying and disallowing defence counsel of a person under detention. The principle that security may, on reasonable grounds, reduce a detainee's right to access to defence counsel is affirmed. It's the general abstract principle "security justifies rights restrictions" what is acknowledged in those rulings.

 

[Numbers]

But I was responding to a request by Kauffer who demanded citation for my opinion on Lumumba's denial of counsel during. I was talking about Lumumba's detention and his delay to access to counsel, not about Amanda Knox.
Lumumba's case would have to do somehow with art. 5 of the Convention.
As far as the Mole vs. Italy case, I haven't read it actually, but what I know is this case reports about delaying and disallowing defence counsel of a person under detention. The principle that security may, on reasonable grounds, reduce a detainee's right to access to defence counsel is affirmed. It's the general abstract principle "security justifies rights restrictions" what is acknowledged in those rulings.

Patrick Lumumba's application to ECHR, if he filed one within the six-month time limit after a final decision, would probably claim violation of Article 3 and Article 5. But it might have been found inadmissible unless he had exhausted all practical domestic remedies.

The rights restrictions in the Enea and Mole cases did not at all involve interrogations without lawyers. And these two persons, each considered a mafia-connected criminal, were already convicted and in prison, and being subject to special regimes where their communication with the non-prison world was reduced.

The Salduz judgment does not explicitly state under what specific circumstances an interrogation without lawyer might be accepted by ECHR as not in violation of Article 6.3c.

 

[Diocletus]

As far as the Mole vs. Italy case, I haven't read it actually, but what I know is this case reports about delaying and disallowing defence counsel of a person under detention. The principle that security may, on reasonable grounds, reduce a detainee's right to access to defence counsel is affirmed. It's the general abstract principle "security justifies rights restrictions" what is acknowledged in those rulings.

Yes, and they probably would have gotten away with that in this case. Except then they went ahead and used statements ellicited while they were denying her access to counsel. That's a definite no no. Not very smart judges over there.

 

[Machiavelli]

Here are some excerpts from Salduz v Turkey 36391/02 27/11/2008

(...)

For some reason you skipped this paragraph:

52. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such circumstances, Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However, this right has so far been considered capable of being subject to restrictions for good cause. The question, in each case, has therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so, whether, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not deprived the accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction is capable of doing so in certain circumstances (see John Murray, cited above, § 63; Brennan, cited above, § 45; and Magee, cited above, § 44).

The principle that 'good cause' may cause restrictions of the right to access a lawyer is encapsuled in this ruling.
This acknowledgment of a principle should not be lost along the way.

Now, as a critical reader, I would just note a few differences that jump out before my eyes between Salduz and Knox:

1. Salduz was interrogated by an investigating judge without being assisted by a lawyer and before he had access to a lawyer.
Knox was interrogated by an investigating judge with the assistence of lawyers and on the same day when she gained access to lawyers.
2. Salduz, before the investigating judge, claimed his written confession was obtained thorugh coercive violent actions, and retracted his statement immediately and completely.
Knox refused to answer before the investigating judge, and she refused to make statements (she did not retract her previous statement before the investigating judge).
3. Salduz claimed his hand written statements were lies he was forced to sign under coercion and retracted his statement completely.
Knox claimed she wrote her hand written statements voluntarily on her own initiative and gave them voluntarily to the police.
4. Salduz claimed to having lied as he had been subjected to coercion that forced him to lie, he claimed this imediately as soon as he could speak with the investigating judge.
Knox did not claim to have been forced to lie, instead she claimed to be affected by a false memory syndrome (and presented this defensive theory not immediately but years later).
5. Salduz released his statement while being interrogated by the police.
Knox released his statements on multiple occasions, among them while releasing spontaneous statememts before a magistrate without being questioned, at the presence of witnesses.
6. Salduz released a confession.
Knox accused another person and carved for herself an innocent role.
7. Salduz was a juvenile.
Knox was an adult.
8. Salduz was one person releasing incriminating statements during interrogation.
Knox and Sollecito were two people (also another suspect released incriminating statements).

 

[Diocletus]

For some reason you skipped this paragraph:



The principle that 'good cause' may cause restrictions of the right to access a lawyer is encapsuled in this ruling.
This acknowledgment of a principle should not be lost along the way.

Now, as a critical reader, I would just note a few differences that jump out before my eyes between Salduz and Knox:

1. Salduz was interrogated by an investigating judge without being assisted by a lawyer and before he had access to a lawyer.
Knox was interrogated by an investigating judge with the assistence of lawyers and on the same day when she gained access to lawyers.
2. Salduz, before the investigating judge, claimed his written confession was obtained thorugh coercive violent actions, and retracted his statement immediately and completely.
Knox refused to answer before the investigating judge, and she refused to make statements (she did not retract her previous statement before the investigating judge).
3. Salduz claimed his hand written statements were lies he was forced to sign under coercion and retracted his statement completely.
Knox claimed she wrote her hand written statements voluntarily on her own initiative and gave them voluntarily to the police.
4. Salduz claimed to having lied as he had been subjected to coercion that forced him to lie, he claimed this imediately as soon as he could speak with the investigating judge.
Knox did not claim to have been forced to lie, instead she claimed to be affected by a false memory syndrome (and presented this defensive theory not immediately but years later).
5. Salduz released his statement while being interrogated by the police.
Knox released his statements on multiple occasions, among them while releasing spontaneous statememts before a magistrate without being questioned, at the presence of witnesses.
6. Salduz released a confession.
Knox accused another person and carved for herself an innocent role.
7. Salduz was a juvenile.
Knox was an adult.
8. Salduz was one person releasing incriminating statements during interrogation.
Knox and Sollecito were two people (also another suspect released incriminating statements).

So which one of those things do you think will get Italy off the hook with the echr?

 

[Machiavelli]

If it was indeed 70,000 euros, then my bet is the DailyMail wanted their money's worth: "Amanda is a slut", "the police were violent".

And that's exactly what they got from Lumumba.

I find it impossible to believe that the cops in Perugia were handed a hot-off-the-press copy of the English language DailyMail and after reading it over at breakfast and getting VERY angry, pressured Lumumba into retracting his story for his Corrieri interview later that day.

Whew!

More likely: Lumumba was lying.

Exactly. I think Lumumba spoke at the Corriere - in an unpaid interview, this time - as a cautionary move in order to prevent possible defamation lawsuits from the police that may stem from the Daily Mail article. They couldn't sue someone who has just publicly denied on the Corriere della Sera.
But it would have been impossible for the 'police' to manage to read the Daily Mail (not their breakfast reading) and then somehow "pressure" Lumumba, all within one day.

We should not forget that Lumumba never lodged a complaint for mistreatment from the police; he could have sought more damage award if he did.

 

[Machiavelli]

So which one of those things do you think will get Italy off the hook with the echr?

The bottom line, is that I think Knox won't get of the hook.

 

[Machiavelli]

Patrick was a victim? Who was his victimizer? The Italian authorities. But in comparison, he didn't suffer. Meredith died and Amanda and Raffaele spent 4 years in prison for something they didn't do.

Give me a break. I don't blame him for trying to make money. I blame him for lying about Amanda and changing his story about the police. But I don't really blame him that much because of how the Italian authorities treat those that go up against it. I still think about the hell that Mignini put countless people through over the MOF case....the lying scumbag.

Those people were all found guilty. They escaped convictions for time expiration.

 

[carbonjam72]

Bumping my post#4452: - Hi LJ, wasn't sure if you saw this, but I'd love to hear if you have an opinion...(btw, I'm not sure I've seen any firm suggestion Rudy was bugged or tracked prior to being identified by his print in blood from the murder scene, and on file with immigration). Big issue for me, totally explains Mignini's motive for framing/deflecting investigation from Rudy, i.e., exactly what he charged Amanda was doing.

Originally Posted by LondonJohn
Quite. When was Guede tapped? If it was at any time prior the first of a) his prints being matched to the bloody hand print on the pillow case or b) his friend going to the police to inform them of his (the friend's) suspicions of Guede, then that in and of itself would add a considerable further layer of intrigue.

As a slight aside, I find it rather hard to believe that a person such as Guede had no cell phone at the time of the murder. Young people - especially in Italy - were near-ubiquitous owners/users of mobile phones, even back in 2007. And Guede strikes me as exactly the sort of person to whom the ownership and use of a mobile would be very important (to the point of being a necessity). I can be pretty certain that a) there was a thriving black market in Perugia for dodgy/stolen mobile handsets and SIMs, and b) Guede knew very well how to tap into that market.

Do you believe that Guede came to mind of Monica Napoleone when she was first on the scene to investigate the crime scene, on Nov 2, 2007?

Napoleone testified the police were familiar with Rudy from his earlier burglaries in Perugia. Do you have an opinion on this question?

Nencini states for some reason that polcie would have recognized Rudy's MO for breaking and entry.

Do you have a position on this issue?

 

[Machiavelli]

(...) No doubt someone will turn up article 104 of the code and remind us all once more what it says. I bet it's the one concerning terrorists or Mafiosi and thus inapplicable here.

Art. 104 is not about terrorists or mafiosi. It may apply to any suspect, whenever there is a security concern (called "quid pluris" with respect to cautionary measures).
Mafia and terrorism are dealt with by art. 416 bis penal code. There is no link between art 104 cpp and art 416bis cp.

 

[carbonjam72]

Those people were all found guilty. They escaped convictions for time expiration.

What people were found guilty?

The twenty people in Florence Mignini charged as being part of a satanic masonic cult?

Or are you referring to Vanni and Lotti, who were found guilty of being Pacciani's accomplices in the Monster of Florence crimes?

Or do you mean Pacciani, who was acquitted on appeal, when the prosecutor argued for acquittal because the case against him was so obviously bogus (although that didn't stop cassation from over-turning Pacciani's acquittal and ordering a new appeal - but Pacciani died 2 days before it was due to begin and so past into history, as you say, technically innocent.

So you must mean Vanni and Lotti. But those were not Mignini's victims, those were Giutarri's victims.

All of Mignini's victims were innocent, no? Except Mario Spezi, who the state of Italy is punishing for exposing Antonio Vinci as the Monster of Florence. That's how you know how bad things are Mach, the state is protecting the actual serial killer, and punishing Spezi for damaging the serial killers public perception.

Do you realize how Shakespearean this all is?

 

[Machiavelli]

There was no reasonable suspicion to detain Lumumba beyond the validation of the DNA results on and in Ms Kercher's body - so probably before the Matteini hearing. Are you really trying to convince us that Lumumba's status as suspect after the 20th was related to Ms Knox's coerced statement of the 5th/6th? What utter nonsense! He had an unimpeachable alibi witness. That's a straight flush defence!

Investigating Judge Matteini ruled Lumumba was not a suspect on May 27. 2008.
He was a suspect from Nov. 7 2007 to May. 27 2008.

News reported that after his release, investigations on him went on, and they lead to "gradually find out" that he had nothing to do with the crime:

Anche dopo la remissione in libertà dell'uomo, le indagini degli investigatori nei suoi confronti sono proseguite e ''da tali accertamenti si veniva, a mano a mano, a delineare la sua estraneità ai fatti'' (...)

http://italiachiamaitalia.net/news/121/ARTICLE/9240/2008-05-28.html

Certainly his phone was bugged after his release for invewstigation purposes, according to the Investigating Judge's ruling as reported on the news.

 

[carbonjam72]

Those people were all found guilty. They escaped convictions for time expiration.

By the way, didn't exactly that scenario happen to Mignini?

Found guilty at first level trial, ON THE MERITS. Reversed on a technicality of venue, then charges allowed to expire. Was Mignini also found guilty and sentenced to jail, and would have lost his job if that sentence had been confirmed?

 

[carbonjam72]

The bottom line, is that I think Knox won't get of the hook.

She's not on the hook. Italy is on the hook. haven't you been paying attention?

 

[Machiavelli]

What people were found guilty?

The twenty people in Florence Mignini charged as being part of a satanic masonic cult?

Or are you referring to Vanni and Lotti, who were found guilty of being Pacciani's accomplices in the Monster of Florence crimes?

(...)

I am talking about those 20 investigated by Mignini. They were almost all guilty even in Micheli's ruling of dropping of charges, even if Micheli did not upheld the heavviest charge criminal association under 416bis; the single allegations were standing but most of the charges were dropped because time barred.
Spezi and Brizioli were acquitted from the heavviest charges only recently, Spezi because time barred (but he did attempt to place false evidence against an innocent) and Brizioli was acquitted of "covering for a criminal" because the actions he performed were not crimes or were not accomplished.

 

[Machiavelli]

She's not on the hook. Italy is on the hook. haven't you been paying attention?

You will be in need to sharp your attention skills soon.