Continuation Part 11: Amanda Knox/Raffaele Sollecito

[Machiavelli]

Except this:



That's from the court that convicted of cullnnia in the second instance (affirmed by the supreme court).

Who came to the conclusion that Knox did not act under coercion.

 

[Vibio]

It's a fact rather than an arguments. Where is the argument when you say Donnino was not professional? There is not a shred of an argument. It's a wild statement. And where is the argument by those saying the interrogation was coercive or there was a false memory syndrome? There is no factual argumentation, just the statement of the pro-Knox believers. Your arguments are made of belief.

All of this becomes especially clear when reading all of the trial transcripts of those who were there that night. Even the line of questioning by the defense.

There was no coercion, no false memory syndrome.

 

[Diocletus]

But you cannot expect accusatory parties (Knox and Solllecito) to have greater prerogatives than the defendant (Guede).

You cannot expect the defendant (Guede) to be able to determine the rights of third parties (Knox and Sollecito) in their own trial.

 

[Diocletus]

Who came to the conclusion that Knox did not act under coercion.

That's just a conclusion of law, which is obviously meant to be wrong. Don't you see what Hellmann did? He made all of the findings of fact that are sufficient to compel a legal conclusion of coercion, and the supreme court affirmed him. So, maybe we don't have coercion under Italian law (according to Italian courts), but we do have incitement under ECHR law:

According to the ECHR, “[t]he admission of some evidence can render a trial unfair. Such has been found to be the case, for instance, of evidence obtained as a result of ill-treatment with the aim of extracting a confession or of evidence obtained by way of police incitement or entrapment.” Pareniuc v. Moldova.

 

[Kauffer]

All of this becomes especially clear when reading all of the trial transcripts of those who were there that night. Even the line of questioning by the defense.

There was no coercion, no false memory syndrome.

The written decision of the trial court which convicted her contradicts much of what you say and provides in essence an official confession that Ms Knox's rights were violated. It's part of the record and the ECHR will read it.

 

[Machiavelli]

(...)
In the case of the interpreter Donnino in Knox's interrogation, it is clear from verified accounts of proceedings that she (Donnino) was not presenting herself to Knox as an agent of the police, but rather as a somewhat maternal "helper" to Knox. When she (Donnino) suggested to Knox that suppressed memories following a traumatic event are a very real phenomenon - adding a personal example to give further credence to the idea - it's clear that a vulnerable and confused Knox was treating this suggestion as neutral "advice" and "help". I have no doubt that Donnino's active participation in the interrogation outside of her interpreter remit had a material impact upon Knox's oral and written statement.

Of course in a proper, fit-for-purpose system, this behaviour from Donnino - which she freely admitted to in court! - would be properly investigated. In the UK, for example, I have little doubt that she would have lost her job over this, and that the investigating police would have been severely reprimanded for their failure to control/supervise/oversee the interpreter and her role properly. Not in Perugia though, of course.........

You can't have it both ways, and you don't have grounds to accuse Donnino of wrongdoing or of being unprofessional. If her duty was to be an interpreter or mediator, you cannot blame her of anything. Not even I - hypothetically - the interrogation was coercive.
Whether the nature of an interrogation is coercive or not, a mediator can't do anything about that. It doesn't depend on the mediator in the first place. Donnino would have no responsibility, it's not up to the mediator to change the nature of the communication.
Donnino is above criticism in any event.
(obviously the interrogation was nor coercive, and above all Knox released false statements repeatedly with further false evidence much beyond the interrogation).

 

[Machiavelli]

That's just a conclusion of law, which is obviously meant to be wrong. Don't you see what Hellmann did? He made all of the findings of fact that are sufficient to compel a legal conclusion of coercion, and the supreme court affirmed him. (...)

No no, it's a conclusion of facts. Hellmann made no findings regarding the police about the interrogation actually, but concluded that Knox acted on her own will.

 

[Diocletus]

You can't have it both ways, and you don't have grounds to accuse Donnino of wrongdoing or of being unprofessional. If her duty was to be an interpreter or mediator, you cannot blame her of anything. Not even I - hypothetically - the interrogation was coercive.
Whether the nature of an interrogation is coercive or not, a mediator can't do anything about that. It doesn't depend on the mediator in the first place. Donnino would have no responsibility, it's not up to the mediator to change the nature of the communication.
Donnino is above criticism in any event.
(obviously the interrogation was nor coercive, and above all Knox released false statements repeatedly with further false evidence much beyond the interrogation).

Yeah, you're right. It's actually Italy (not Donnino) that engaged in wrongdoing and unprofessionalism (at least from the perspective of the ECHR, which is all that really matters right now). That's because Italy provided an "interpreter" who "did not limit herself to translating, but induced her to force herself to remember, explaining that she [Amanda] was confused in her memories . . ." At least, that's what the court said in convicting Knox of callunnia in the second instance (affirmed by the supreme court).

 

[Machiavelli]

You cannot expect the defendant (Guede) to be able to determine the rights of third parties (Knox and Sollecito) in their own trial.

He did not. But he can place circumstantial evidence against them, through the judicial findings about him.

 

[Diocletus]

No no, it's a conclusion of facts. Hellmann made no findings regarding the police about the interrogation actually, but concluded that Knox acted on her own will.

You seem to be confused. The conclusion of law is that there was no "coercion" as defined by Italian law. Here are the conclusions of fact:

the interrogation was:

-of obsessive length

-carried out during [both] day and night

-carried out by more than one person

-carried out on a young and foreign girl

-carried out on a young and foreign girl who at the time did not speak Italian at all well,

-carried out on a young, foreign girl who was unaware of her own rights,

-carried out on a young, foreign girl who did not have the assistance of an attorney (which she should have been entitled to, being at this point suspected of very serious crimes),

-the interpreter did not limit herself to translating, but induced her to force herself to remember, explaining that she [Amanda] was confused in her memories.

The conclusion of law (in Italy): No coercion.
The conclusion of law under the ECHR: coercion.

 

[Machiavelli]

Yeah, you're right. It's actually Italy (not Donnino) that engaged in wrongdoing and unprofessionalism (at least from the perspective of the ECHR, which is all that really matters right now). That's because Italy provided an "interpreter" who "did not limit herself to translating, but induced her to force herself to remember, explaining that she [Amanda] was confused in her memories . . ." At least, that's what the court said in convicting Knox of callunnia in the second instance (affirmed by the supreme court).

But the same court who reports the defence theory also concluded that Knox committed the calunnia out of her own will and maliciously.
However the Cassazione rejected the theory about the motive for Knox's calunnia. They accepted the conclusion of guilt, but not the scenario.

 

[Diocletus]

He did not. But he can place circumstantial evidence against them, through the judicial findings about him.

Yes, he did. Guede decided that his process should be fast track, and thus that he would have no jury, a non-public trial, a limited right to disclosure of evidence, and limitations on the evidence that he could introduce.

Any fact-finding resulting from this "trial" does not satisfy the ECHR as aganisnt Knox and Sollecito, since they did not elect to have their rights curtailed in this manner.

 

[Machiavelli]

You seem to be confused. The conclusion of law is that there was no "coercion" as defined by Italian law. (...)

Coercion is a matter of fact, not a point of law.
It's a finding of fact whether a crime is malicious and voluntary, not just a definition of law.

 

[MDDVS]

You can't have it both ways, and you don't have grounds to accuse Donnino of wrongdoing or of being unprofessional. If her duty was to be an interpreter or mediator, you cannot blame her of anything. Not even I - hypothetically - the interrogation was coercive.
Whether the nature of an interrogation is coercive or not, a mediator can't do anything about that. It doesn't depend on the mediator in the first place. Donnino would have no responsibility, it's not up to the mediator to change the nature of the communication.
Donnino is above criticism in any event.
(obviously the interrogation was nor coercive, and above all Knox released false statements repeatedly with further false evidence much beyond the interrogation).

Guidelines for interpreters in healthcare:

http://www.mchb.hrsa.gov/training/documents/pdf_library/National_Standards_of_Practice_for_Interpreters_in_Health_Care%20%2812-05%29.pdf

Highlights:

1. The interpreter renders all messages accurately and completely,
without adding, omitting, or substituting.

16. The interpreter limits personal involvement with all parties during
the interpreting assignment. For example, an interpreter does not share or elicit overly personal
information in conversations with a patient.

17. The interpreter limits his or her professional activity to interpreting
within an encounter.

 

[Diocletus]

But the same court who reports the defence theory also concluded that Knox committed the calunnia out of her own will and maliciously.
However the Cassazione rejected the theory about the motive for Knox's calunnia. They accepted the conclusion of guilt, but not the scenario.

They accepted that there wasn't coercion, as Hellman concluded based on the quoted passage.

I would love to see the filing where Italy argues to the ECHR that they shouldn't read those words that Hellman wrote, because even though his conviction for callunnia was affirmed, those particular words weren't. LOL. Can you find a lawyer in Italy to write that with a straight face?

 

[Machiavelli]

Yes, he did. Guede decided that his process should be fast track, and thus that he would have no jury, a non-public trial, a limited right to disclosure of evidence, and limitations on the evidence that he could introduce.

Any fact-finding resulting from this "trial" does not satisfy the ECHR as aganisnt Knox and Sollecito, since they did not elect to have their rights curtailed in this manner.

Then they should submit a complaint to ECHR after their final conviction for murder. But this is another topic. As for the representation that a party can have at Guede's trial, they were represented. The pro-Knox video and propaganda says that they were not represented, while in fact they had the same prerogatives as Rudy Guede. Thus, the pro-Knoxes are liars.

 

[Diocletus]

Then they should submit a complaint to ECHR after their final conviction for murder. But this is another topic. As for the representation that a party can have at Guede's trial, they were represented. The pro-Knox video and propaganda says that they were not represented, while in fact they had the same prerogatives as Rudy Guede. Thus, the pro-Knoxes are liars.

I don't know what you're talking about, but the fact of the matter is that while, procedurally, they might have had counsel presents for some or all of Guede's proceeding, substantively, the scope and effectiveness of such "representation" was severely limited by procedural mechanisms applied by Italy. That's not real representation.

 

[Desert Fox]

You seem to be confused. The conclusion of law is that there was no "coercion" as defined by Italian law. Here are the conclusions of fact:

the interrogation was:

-of obsessive length

-carried out during [both] day and night

-carried out by more than one person

-carried out on a young and foreign girl

-carried out on a young and foreign girl who at the time did not speak Italian at all well,

-carried out on a young, foreign girl who was unaware of her own rights,

-carried out on a young, foreign girl who did not have the assistance of an attorney (which she should have been entitled to, being at this point suspected of very serious crimes),

-the interpreter did not limit herself to translating, but induced her to force herself to remember, explaining that she [Amanda] was confused in her memories.

The conclusion of law (in Italy): No coercion.
The conclusion of law under the ECHR: coercion.

Even if these were not against Italian law, which I believe I believe a fair reading would find that they should have been considered a violation, one should be concerned that there is a problem here. That the pro guilt side cannot even see this argues volumes.

 

[Diocletus]

Coercion is a matter of fact, not a point of law.
It's a finding of fact whether a crime is malicious and voluntary, not just a definition of law.

Sorry, but coercion is a conclusion of law that is made by application of a two-part analysis of the surrounding facts. At least, that's the way it works in the ECtHR, and since Italy signed the ECHR it has a treaty obligation to make it work that way in Italy, too.

 

[Machiavelli]

They accepted that there wasn't coercion, as Hellman concluded based on the quoted passage.

I would love to see the filing where Italy argues to the ECHR that they shouldn't read those words that Hellman wrote, because even though his conviction for callunnia was affirmed, those particular words weren't. LOL. Can you find a lawyer in Italy to write that with a straight face?

They are not going to argue how Hellmann reports defence words, not even what happened during interrogation. The finding of malicious crime stands as a finding itself independent from all these.