From: CASE OF KHAMIDOV v. RUSSIA 72118/01 15/11/2007
This case involves a legal case addressing damage to property caused by the action of a state's military.
However, there are relevant clauses within the judgment which explain the views of the ECtHR of its responsibilities vis-a-vis domestic courts; in particular when the domestic courts do not examine evidence in what the ECtHR considers a proper and reasonable manner, or conduct trials or hearings in an arbitrary way.
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The Court .... reiterates that, being sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and cautious about taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, the Court nevertheless is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and may depart from them where this is rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, Matyar v. Turkey, no. 23423/94, § 108, 21 February 2002).
The Court reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts, which are in the best position to assess the evidence before them, establish facts and interpret domestic law. The Court will not, in principle, intervene, unless the decisions reached by the domestic courts appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable and provided that the proceedings as a whole were fair as required by Article 6 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Van Kück v. Germany, no. 35968/97, §§ 46-47, ECHR 2003‑VII).
...[W]hilst acknowledging the domestic judicial authorities' prerogative to assess the evidence and decide what is relevant and admissible, the Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 places the “tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 19, § 59).
This case involves a legal case addressing damage to property caused by the action of a state's military.
However, there are relevant clauses within the judgment which explain the views of the ECtHR of its responsibilities vis-a-vis domestic courts; in particular when the domestic courts do not examine evidence in what the ECtHR considers a proper and reasonable manner, or conduct trials or hearings in an arbitrary way.
_______{excerpts follow}
The Court .... reiterates that, being sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and cautious about taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, the Court nevertheless is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and may depart from them where this is rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (see, for example, Matyar v. Turkey, no. 23423/94, § 108, 21 February 2002).
The Court reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts, which are in the best position to assess the evidence before them, establish facts and interpret domestic law. The Court will not, in principle, intervene, unless the decisions reached by the domestic courts appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable and provided that the proceedings as a whole were fair as required by Article 6 § 1 (see, mutatis mutandis, Van Kück v. Germany, no. 35968/97, §§ 46-47, ECHR 2003‑VII).
...[W]hilst acknowledging the domestic judicial authorities' prerogative to assess the evidence and decide what is relevant and admissible, the Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 places the “tribunal” under a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 19, § 59).
