I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[LarryS]

If I wished to think of 'information' in layman's terms . . . as something my Grandmother could understand . . . . Is it something along these lines? If I pickup an object, like an apple, I can see the color, feel the mass, and shape, I can taste the tartness, and if I also remember past apples I have enjoyed . . . this experience can be described as a collection of data points, IE wavelengths, measurements like mass and etc.

But the experience is not like a blank stare dispassionate recording as with a camera and mass spectrometer, there also is a sense of apprehension, or knowing . . . not knowing in the sense of right knowledge, or wrong knowledge, but knowing (because I don't know what other word to use) as in the binding of various data points into a useful collection, IE information.

Computers can also be 'taught' to bind data points together into information . . . but 'knowing' is more than that, there is also a sense of 'I' . . . and ownership of the experience.

So, then I will use this as my definition of consciousness: the capacity of 'knowing'. This capacity of knowing is a precondition to all mental states such as perception, memory, and emotive states such as being happy or sad.

 

[Lowpro]

If I wished to think of 'information' in layman's terms . . . as something my Grandmother could understand . . . . Is it something along these lines? If I pickup an object, like an apple, I can see the color, feel the mass, and shape, I can taste the tartness, and if I also remember past apples I have enjoyed . . . this experience can be described as a collection of data points, IE wavelengths, measurements like mass and etc.

But the experience is not like a blank stare dispassionate recording as with a camera and mass spectrometer, there also is a sense of apprehension, or knowing . . . not knowing in the sense of right knowledge, or wrong knowledge, but knowing (because I don't know what other word to use) as in the binding of various data points into a useful collection, IE information.

Computers can also be 'taught' to bind data points together into information . . . but 'knowing' is more than that, there is also a sense of 'I' . . . and ownership of the experience.

So, then I will use this as my definition of consciousness: the capacity of 'knowing'. This capacity of knowing is a precondition to all mental states such as perception, memory, and emotive states such as being happy or sad.

That definition may work for you but it hasn't made a distinction between how information is processed. You can say that "knowing" is a precondition to whatever mental state you want, but there's no reason to believe this. If I felt like it I could just say that "knowing" is processing interactions (fun fact: that's exactly what "knowing" is for a model anyways, but as a precondition for mental states is extraneous).

Are we going to establish axioms of "knowing" that will be no less the schmoo that consciousness was a few posts ago?

 

[Nonpareil]

If I wished to think of 'information' in layman's terms ut the experience is not like a blank stare dispassionate recording as with a camera and mass spectrometer, there also is a sense of apprehension, or knowing . . . not knowing in the sense of right knowledge, or wrong knowledge, but knowing (because I don't know what other word to use) as in the binding of various data points into a useful collection, IE information.

Computers can also be 'taught' to bind data points together into information . . . but 'knowing' is more than that, there is also a sense of 'I' . . . and ownership of the experience.

So, then I will use this as my definition of consciousness: the capacity of 'knowing'. This capacity of knowing is a precondition to all mental states such as perception, memory, and emotive states such as being happy or sad.

Congratulations.

It still comes from the brain.

 

[PixyMisa]

Congratulations.

It still comes from the brain.

Which is a computer...

 

[Brian-M]

For example, in what sense would an atom of iron be "informational"?

The presence or absence of an atom could be informational in the same way that the presence or absence of a hole in a piece of cardboard is informational (eg, punch cards).

But not only do you have the information that there is an atom in that particular location, you also have the information that any other possible atom is not in that location.

The velocity, temperature and other attributes of the atom are also pieces of information the atom contains.

 

[marplots]

The presence or absence of an atom could be informational in the same way that the presence or absence of a hole in a piece of cardboard is informational (eg, punch cards).

But not only do you have the information that there is an atom in that particular location, you also have the information that any other possible atom is not in that location.

The velocity, temperature and other attributes of the atom are also pieces of information the atom contains.

Is this a redo of the materialism/idealism dichotomy? Because I'm thinking that information requires an agent who is informed. But I get the feeling the word is being used in more of a mathematical way, not in sense of having meaning to an observer/experiencer.

I'm stuck, because saying the universe is different with an atom here instead of there I understand. But calling it information feels like a bit of semantic reshaping rather than some attribute which supports materialism.

It strikes me that by mathematizing it, we've created an idea of information that doesn't inform.

 

[Brian-M]

I'm stuck, because saying the universe is different with an atom here instead of there I understand. But calling it information feels like a bit of semantic reshaping rather than some attribute which supports materialism.

The way I look at it, a universe that exists as a vast self-contained computer-simulation would be identical to one that has its own independent existence, at least from the viewpoint of the occupants, so from a practical point of view both possibilities are essentially the same thing from a different perspective.

From the perspective of a computer-simulated universe, the iron-atom (and everything else) is nothing except information existing within the simulation.

Whether or not the universe actually is a computer simulation is irrelevant, because there's no way to distinguish between these two types of universe from within. So for the purposes of understanding the universe, regarding it as information is just as valid and useful either way.

(Of course, none of this says anything about the actual underlying nature of the universe, or whether or not there's a non-material consciousness involved.)

 

[tsig]

The way I look at it, a universe that exists as a vast self-contained computer-simulation would be identical to one that has its own independent existence, at least from the viewpoint of the occupants, so from a practical point of view both possibilities are essentially the same thing from a different perspective.

From the perspective of a computer-simulated universe, the iron-atom (and everything else) is nothing except information existing within the simulation.

Whether or not the universe actually is a computer simulation is irrelevant, because there's no way to distinguish between these two types of universe from within. So for the purposes of understanding the universe, regarding it as information is just as valid and useful either way.

(Of course, none of this says anything about the actual underlying nature of the universe, or whether or not there's a non-material consciousness involved.)

Of course before we speak of the underlying nature of the universe we ought to show there is such a thing.

 

[ehcks]

Of course before we speak of the underlying nature of the universe we ought to show there is such a thing.

Well, yes. It is important to show that there is a universe.

 

[punshhh]

Yes. And one of them is wrong.

Assumption.

And that is also wrong.

Take your blinkers off now. It is you're assertion that an idealist universe would not be identical to the universe we find ourselves in. Philosophically, ontologies all assume the phenomenal universe to be identical in all cases.

It is possible to layer infinite excuses on top of idealism so that it looks the same as materialism. And when you have done that, it is materialism.

Semantics, talk is just that talk, thinking is just thinking. The reality out there is the way it is independent of our thoughts. Idealism and materialism are simply rational perspectives on this, if you want to choose one and ignore or claim as false the other feel free(blinkered). You can massage materialism to include the possibility of some kind of idealism, but this would be disingenuous.

Or if you are going to claim that materialism is the way it is, end of story. You're going to have justify that in the light of the other philosophical considerations.

And our Universe is material.

From our current perspective.

Simple as that. Materialism is true and idealism is false.

Perhaps you will now tell me the origin of material and how it happens to exist rather than not existing?

Yes we do. It's material. Everyone knows that.

You can only make this assertion by wearing your materialist blinkers, or asserting that idealism would somehow be different than what we observe.

It's valid insofar as it is internally consistent (which dualism, for example, is not). But it's not true.

Assertion.

As I pointed out to you, baloney. Minds are physical processes.

Yes, I have never disagreed with this, or with anything else you have presented re' the workings of matter. This does not address the issue mind you, because our idealist mind (being) may be using physical matter as a vehicle and exploiting the apparatus of the body.

I repeat, your entire argument only addresses physical processes which are not in dispute, ( I can't speak for Bernando, or other idealists specifically).

 

[PixyMisa]

Assumption.

Wrong.

Take your blinkers off now. It is you're assertion that an idealist universe would not be identical to the universe we find ourselves in.

Wrong.

Philosophically, ontologies all assume the phenomenal universe to be identical in all cases.

Wrong.

Semantics, talk is just that talk, thinking is just thinking. The reality out there is the way it is independent of our thoughts.

But our thoughts are not independent of it. Reality is material, and thoughts are material processes.

From our current perspective.

From the right perspective.

Perhaps you will now tell me the origin of material and how it happens to exist rather than not existing?

Why would you even think that was a meaningful question?

You can only make this assertion by wearing your materialist blinkers, or asserting that idealism would somehow be different than what we observe.

Wrong. What we observe is material. That's all we require.

Assertion.

Wrong.

Yes, I have never disagreed with this, or with anything else you have presented re' the workings of matter. This does not address the issue mind you, because our idealist mind (being) may be using physical matter as a vehicle and exploiting the apparatus of the body.

That means that materialism is true and idealism is false. That's the point.

I repeat, your entire argument only addresses physical processes which are not in dispute, ( I can't speak for Bernando, or other idealists specifically).

Again, that means that materialism is true and idealism is false.

 

[marplots]

Wrong.


Wrong.


Wrong.


But our thoughts are not independent of it. Reality is material, and thoughts are material processes.


From the right perspective.


Why would you even think that was a meaningful question?


Wrong. What we observe is material. That's all we require.


Wrong.


That means that materialism is true and idealism is false. That's the point.


Again, that means that materialism is true and idealism is false.

I lost track. How many wrongs make a right again? Does it have to be a prime number?

 

[Belz...]

Assumption.

Once more, you confuse assumption with conclusion.

Take your blinkers off now.

"Open your eyes" is rhetoric, not reason.

 

[tsig]

Assumption.
Take your blinkers off now. It is you're assertion that an idealist universe would not be identical to the universe we find ourselves in. Philosophically, ontologies all assume the phenomenal universe to be identical in all cases.
Semantics, talk is just that talk, thinking is just thinking. The reality out there is the way it is independent of our thoughts. Idealism and materialism are simply rational perspectives on this, if you want to choose one and ignore or claim as false the other feel free(blinkered). You can massage materialism to include the possibility of some kind of idealism, but this would be disingenuous.

Or if you are going to claim that materialism is the way it is, end of story. You're going to have justify that in the light of the other philosophical considerations.
From our current perspective.
Perhaps you will now tell me the origin of material and how it happens to exist rather than not existing?

You can only make this assertion by wearing your materialist blinkers, or asserting that idealism would somehow be different than what we observe.

Assertion.

Yes, I have never disagreed with this, or with anything else you have presented re' the workings of matter. This does not address the issue mind you, because our idealist mind (being) may be using physical matter as a vehicle and exploiting the apparatus of the body.

I repeat, your entire argument only addresses physical processes which are not in dispute, ( I can't speak for Bernando, or other idealists specifically).

Non-existing isn't an option since we are here to ask the question.

 

[punshhh]

Wrong.

Enlighten me, how come it is wrong?

Wrong.

If you're not asserting idealism is wrong, then how do you know it is wrong?

Wrong.

Mistaken.

But our thoughts are not independent of it. Reality is material, and thoughts are material processes.

Agreed, again you are not addressing the issue. It is the basis of reality we are discussing. Beyond the remit of science.

From the right perspective.

How do you know you are right?

Why would you even think that was a meaningful question?

These are valid questions, why would you want to deny this?

Wrong. What we observe is material. That's all we require.

Yes we observe material, what is the basis of this material?
This is not a question of requirements.

Wrong.

How do you know it's not true?

That means that materialism is true and idealism is false. That's the point.

Nonsense, it has nothing to do with the basis of our existence.

Again, that means that materialism is true and idealism is false.

If idealism were true, there would be no reason to consider that anything would be any different to what we experience. Also if materialism were true, there would be no requirement for sentience. (Remember you still haven't explained your insistence that sentience would be necessary)

 

[punshhh]

Non-existing isn't an option since we are here to ask the question.

Sorry, what exists?

 

[tsig]

Sorry, what exists?

Sure does, plays second.

 

[LarryS]

Which is a computer...

What do you mean by the brain is a 'computer'? Do you mean this as a metaphor, or in the sense that brain as computer answers the how of certain processes such as perception and reasoning, or perhaps as a generalized 'a machine that manipulates symbols'. Or do you mean as a general definition . . . as in the brain is a stand-alone machine - like a computer.

 

[Belz...]

How do you know you are right?

This is a problem with sophists: you're so used to using reasoning that leads nowhere that you can't fathom that people have successful methodologies that lead to the right conclusions.

 

[Belz...]

Sorry, what exists?

Fringe reset.