I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[AdamSK]

I wasn't trying to model the brain as a receiver (although that is tempting),

Ah, sorry. I genuinely thought the argument was about whether the brain was transmitting thoughts that originated elsewhere (a soul or spiritual mind), or actually originated those thoughts.

The problem might be even worse though, if we want to say that only human brains do this thing we are interested in. Because disconfirming evidence comes by way of animal brains - the thing we are suggesting causes consciousness - not being conscious in the same way. Now we have brains of certain types and not other types, instead of just brains generally. That too would have to be explained.

It is, though, isn't it? I mean, we can use imaging to locate language skills and higher-order abstractions in the big, grey, wrinkly parts of the human brain and show that non-human brains don't have those parts or only have much smaller versions of them.

 

[PixyMisa]

I wasn't trying to model the brain as a receiver (although that is tempting), I was just pointing the association doesn't mean causation fallacy embedded in the experiments suggested. The argument will retain this weakness until we can model (with good fidelity) the actual causes of consciousness at a deep level and show the brain is the sort of thing that produces those causes.

But we have much, much, much more data than that. Radios don't suffer from problems like Korsakoff's syndrome, much less the really weird stuff like the Fregoli, Capgras, or Cotard delusions, that only make any sense at all if consciousness is actually produced by the brain. (For example, a lesion in the parietal lobe can make you believe you are dead.)

What's more, the receiver hypothesis is ruled out by quantum field theory. So it doesn't explain what we observe, and it's also impossible.

The problem might be even worse though, if we want to say that only human brains do this thing we are interested in. Because disconfirming evidence comes by way of animal brains - the thing we are suggesting causes consciousness - not being conscious in the same way. Now we have brains of certain types and not other types, instead of just brains generally. That too would have to be explained.

Lots of animals appear to be conscious - apes, elephants, dolphins, some birds. They don't have language, and their brains aren't generally as large or as complex as ours, but they do have some form of self-awareness. We're only talking about a difference of degree here, and there's always differences of degree.

 

[Myriad]

If there weren't a general belief that at least some animals have consciousness and experiences, then "animal cruelty" would not only not be a crime, it wouldn't even make sense as a phrase, any more than "demolition derby car cruelty" or "shrub cruelty."

 

[marplots]

But we have much, much, much more data than that. Radios don't suffer from problems like Korsakoff's syndrome, much less the really weird stuff like the Fregoli, Capgras, or Cotard delusions, that only make any sense at all if consciousness is actually produced by the brain. (For example, a lesion in the parietal lobe can make you believe you are dead.)

What's more, the receiver hypothesis is ruled out by quantum field theory. So it doesn't explain what we observe, and it's also impossible.

The bit with the radio was only to point out that association is a weaker form of proof than explained causation. I don't think the brain is a radio, although I do wonder what a brain without any outside inputs (not woo stuff, but regular experiences) would be like.

Lots of animals appear to be conscious - apes, elephants, dolphins, some birds. They don't have language, and their brains aren't generally as large or as complex as ours, but they do have some form of self-awareness. We're only talking about a difference of degree here, and there's always differences of degree.

I find this part particularly fascinating because it raises a neat question. Do you think that someone could claim to be more conscious than you or me? If, as you propose, consciousness is a sliding scale, I'm wondering what we might discover in the little variations on that scale (as opposed to say, "This guy is less conscious because he's in a coma).

If there is such a scale, is it reasonable to suspect there might actually be a state beyond where humans find themselves? Is it an argument for enlightenment?

 

[marplots]

If there weren't a general belief that at least some animals have consciousness and experiences, then "animal cruelty" would not only not be a crime, it wouldn't even make sense as a phrase, any more than "demolition derby car cruelty" or "shrub cruelty."

Deep waters. Have you considered that the only place the cruelty could reside is in the human being cruel? We'd never say, "Oh look at that lion latched on to the windpipe of that poor baby Gazelle. Why doesn't he just crush her skull and be done with it? How cruel." Nor would we say that Ebola is being cruel to that innocent woman.

It seems to need agency and choice in the mix to be seen as cruel. Cruelty as avoidable pain caused by another, an agent who enjoys the suffering of the victim.

 

[RussDill]

Deep waters. Have you considered that the only place the cruelty could reside is in the human being cruel? We'd never say, "Oh look at that lion latched on to the windpipe of that poor baby Gazelle. Why doesn't he just crush her skull and be done with it? How cruel." Nor would we say that Ebola is being cruel to that innocent woman.

Its pretty easy to anthropomorphize cruelty in other animals. Take for instance when Ocra's toss around a seal. I'm pretty sure they know what they are doing, but again, who knows.

And yes, cruelty is a concept that we have no idea whether or not it exists beyond humans. Heck, for all we know, one day we might meet aliens and they may be completely apathetic about it. Or worse, they may not know cruelty because none amongst their species has any desires to be cruel.

 

[Belz...]

I think where we lose the radio is the second part: there are many ways in which it is impossible to alter the music by altering the radio. You can distort the music, but your only options for the radio are a clear or garbled version of what it receives. We can alter the brain in much more nuanced ways.

Thank you. I wanted to say something like that, but less eloquently.

 

[Belz...]

We'd never say, "Oh look at that lion latched on to the windpipe of that poor baby Gazelle. Why doesn't he just crush her skull and be done with it? How cruel."

Actually, we do.

 

[Reivax]

Bernardo, I congratulate you on coming up with a very comprehensive list of arguments given by materialists against idealism. As a physicalist, I don't see the need to come up with any additional arguments - as you have clearly given a potentially exhaustive list of the best arguments, and I find them convincing, especially when taken together.

I think the problem with your challenge is that the list you offer is adequate. Some of these arguments are better than others, but taken together, they are very convincing. I do not for one second doubt that an idealist can come up with a coherent response to each of the arguments individually, but by doing so they are merely rationalizing a position they already assume is true. Explanation parsimony, I think, is the decisive blow to idealism. The idealist already thinks that their position is more parsimonious, because they have a monist account which does not purport unknowable external entities. But materialism is also monistic, and I just see the arguments listed as supporting physicalist ontology.

Idealism as a world-view is so vague that it is quite easy to shape it into whatever you want. As an explanation it is completely unsatisfactory. For example, argument 4 that you list typically requires the idealist to posit that consciousness pre-dates life. The standard candidate for this pre-biological consciousness? God. It is suggested that God is observing the universe and therefore the universe is contained and simulated in God's mind. I am not convinced.

 

[LarryS]

The bit with the radio was only to point out that association is a weaker form of proof than explained causation. I don't think the brain is a radio, although I do wonder what a brain without any outside inputs (not woo stuff, but regular experiences) would be like.



I find this part particularly fascinating because it raises a neat question. Do you think that someone could claim to be more conscious than you or me? If, as you propose, consciousness is a sliding scale, I'm wondering what we might discover in the little variations on that scale (as opposed to say, "This guy is less conscious because he's in a coma).

If there is such a scale, is it reasonable to suspect there might actually be a state beyond where humans find themselves? Is it an argument for enlightenment?

The radio analogy might be too close - another image might be I'm walking thru a park on a warm summer day, eating a popsicle - I drop it and and a few minutes later someone else comes along and declares "I've seen this before, ants create popsicles."

Regarding c-ness being a continuum? Haven't we all felt drowsy? and sleep deprived? It's been awhile, but in Feynman's book "Surely You must be joking . . . " he has an extended recount of him as a student researching the act of falling asleep and slowly losing c-ness, by falling a sleep 2-3 times a day and noting his experiences. I remember being fascinated by his account and duplicating it . . . how thoughts become farther and farther apart . . . and increasingly random basketball torpedo

 

[asydhouse]

The radio analogy might be too close - another image might be I'm walking thru a park on a warm summer day, eating a popsicle - I drop it and and a few minutes later someone else comes along and declares "I've seen this before, ants create popsicles." Regarding c-ness being a continuum? Haven't we all felt drowsy? and sleep deprived? It's been awhile, but in Feynman's book "Surely You must be joking . . . " he has an extended recount of him as a student researching the act of falling asleep and slowly losing c-ness, by falling a sleep 2-3 times a day and noting his experiences. I remember being fascinated by his account and duplicating it . . . how thoughts become farther and farther apart . . . and increasingly random basketball torpedo

But can you stimulate specific regions of the ant to cause more popsicles to be created, or cause this popsicle to vanish, or to change colour etc? If you remove the ants, does the popsicle cease to exist?

One thing we do know: you see popsicles every day (every time you look in the right place), but only sometimes do you observe ants in association with them. On the other hand, we never observe consciousness without a brain.

So your analogy is more accurate as a description of the way people decide that God must exist than it is a reflection of how and what we know about consciousness: a very shallow, half-baked argument that has no bearing on reality.

 

[Dancing David]

getting to 'What is matter', and parts and abstractions . . . is it important that matter has a 'primal state', that there is a state of matter which can not be further reduced? Or, is materialism safe even if matter can be infinitely reduced?

If matter can be infinitely reduced, then 'What is matter' is up for grabs and it would be difficult to base a metaphysics on matter . . as with What is consciousness?

Moot point.

 

[Dancing David]

I guess I'm just not as comfortable at jumping in at the state of matter (this particular anthropomorphic en masse) as you are . . . yes matter in this particular en masse has predictable properties but for me it feels too much like looking for my keys under the street light.

Um, the universe behaves as though it is material, do you have an alternative?

 

[Dancing David]

Very clever - however if collectives such as rocks, molecules, atoms and particles and etc. are abstractions of mind, then to suggest mind emerges from these abstractions is circular.

I realize you hold these collectives exist independent of mind, but I'm not sure how we can know that. BTW, I'm not an Idealist in any shape or form. I'm a materialist by day because it works big time but in my few quiet moments I'm thinking this whole thang is impossible, there's no way that I and this stuff can be here - but it is.

You have yet to show that is teh case.

the ontology is moot, the universe behaves as though it is material.

Solipsim is a dead end... why are you posting here if the only thing you know to exist is yourself?

The universe behaves as though it is material, regardless of any sill semantics...

 

[Dancing David]

Agreed, the reason Materialism works at my day job is because I'm not making any claims as to the nature of matter - my understanding of how things fit and work together keeps me from walking into walls. Am I willing to state that c-ness emerges from matter? Not yet.

And the evidence of the alternative is...

 

[Dancing David]

Robin, what you are asking is: If I take my dog for a walk, and then shoot it with a disintegration beam and reduce it to atoms, where did the walk go?

Do you understand why this is not a useful question?

Why do you hate your dog?



(The walk never went any where, it is an abstraction of communication referring to a series of events. It never existed except as communication.)

 

[Dancing David]

that's pure begging the question

Materialism doesn't care, science is all about approximate models, the ontology doesn't matter.

 

[LarryS]

But can you stimulate specific regions of the ant to cause more popsicles to be created, or cause this popsicle to vanish, or to change colour etc? If you remove the ants, does the popsicle cease to exist?

One thing we do know: you see popsicles every day (every time you look in the right place), but only sometimes do you observe ants in association with them. On the other hand, we never observe consciousness without a brain.

So your analogy is more accurate as a description of the way people decide that God must exist than it is a reflection of how and what we know about consciousness: a very shallow, half-baked argument that has no bearing on reality.

We can stimulate different regions of the brain, and with some consistency, we can generate various objects of attention, ie thoughts, images, memories, moods,etc. I can poke myself in the hand or stimulate the optic nerve, and track those stimuli to various regions of the brain.

So we can state that the brain can generate objects of experience, and in conjunction with the senses, modulate objects of experiences. We can infer that the brain generates or at least moderates all objects of experience.

From the above, how do we infer that brain is the cause or source of consciousness? For example, I am conscious of (looking at) a specific image, then, a region of my brain is stimulated and I am now conscious of a different image.

I can infer that stimulating the brain generated the 2nd object, and I became aware of it, but consciousness was there before during and after - so I can't infer consciousness was generated by the stimulation or by the brain activity. All I can infer is that the brain generates or modulates objects of experience.

 

[Nonpareil]

o we can state that the brain can generate objects of experience, and in conjunction with the senses, modulate objects of experiences. We can infer that the brain generates or at least moderates all objects of experience.

From the above, how do we infer that brain is the cause or source of consciousness? For example, I am conscious of (looking at) a specific image, then, a region of my brain is stimulated and I am now conscious of a different image.

I can infer that stimulating the brain generated the 2nd object, and I became aware of it, but consciousness was there before during and after - so I can't infer consciousness was generated by the stimulation or by the brain activity. All I can infer is that the brain generates or modulates objects of experience.

Leaving aside, for the moment, that experiencing things and interpreting them pretty much is consciousness, we can directly affect consciousness itself by affecting the brain. Damage or changes to certain areas, or introduction of foreign chemicals, results in predictable and measurable changes to the consciousness of the subject.

This is consistent with the idea that the brain produces consciousness.

It is not consistent with the idea that the brain is a receiver for something that exists independently.

 

[Belz...]

From the above, how do we infer that brain is the cause or source of consciousness?

Not only from the above. Why do you attempt to restrict the reasoning ?

Let's not forget that if something other than the brain is generating consciousness, that thing must be able to interface with the brain. So where is it ?