I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[Lowpro]

So suppose this feeling of nausea is a computation. Then there will be an equivalent algorithm running on a register machine. That computation should also produce a feeling of nausea, exactly as I am experiencing it now.

So we load the program and run the first instruction and inspect the machine. Say it has loaded a value from a certain memory location into register A. Then we click over the next step. It loads another value into register B. Next it adds register B to A. Then it does a logical AND operation and sets a bit in the flag register as a result. And so on.

Now we can see what is happening at each stage and the cause and effect - the effect being that certain values are stored at certain memory locations and that the state of the registers is changed. These numbers are meaningless except to a mind who understands the encoding scheme. Individually, each of these instructions will run the same, whether or not a sensation of nausea happens somewhere down the track.

So then it must be the particular order in which it is run? But each of these steps would have run the same even if the before value had been set manually and there was no previous step. The nature of the following step does not change the way the current step runs. There is no different condition created by a step if it’s previous step had not happened and the values were manually set. There is no different condition created by a step if it’s next step simply did not happen.

You could manually run one of these steps even if you knew nothing at all about the previous or the next steps.

And yet we must conclude that there is something happening here beyond those individual instructions and beyond values being written to memory. How exactly? What would be the contradiction involved in all of these steps occurring without there being any sensation of nausea produced?

EXACTLY why programmers should shut the crap up about this kind of debate. A better model would be a stochastic one first of all, and second of all materialism doesn't even suppose a deterministic approach to qualia. Your example is a strawman because it doesn't describe materialism's predictions. This is why Bernardo sucks at his ideas. The only condition of materialism is that reality/nature is material. That does NOT translate to AND functions in programming. To try and conflate the two is lying.

Bear in mind I find the idea of qualia to be an undefined attribute and has no utility. However as an approximation of sensation it's a word that is often used.

 

[PixyMisa]

What exactly is the contradiction if that nerve signal went to the brain and the brain processed it as the brain does but there was no feeling of pain?

The brain is generating the feeling (or more precisely, the experience) of pain. If the "brain processed it as the brain does" there's an experience of pain by definition because that is what the brain does.

If the brain does not produce an experience of pain, it is doing something different.

This is not complicated.

 

[PixyMisa]

The brain is a computer. Any computation it does can in principal be computed by another computer. That I can agree with. I know my brain is a computer because I can implement the logic of a Turing Machine. That does not tell me that a sensation of nausea is one of the computations that I do.

What else is there? It's a computer. It's computing. It's doing computation. Part of that is the sensation of nausea.

Again, with any computation, why would any step complete differently if there were no feeling of nausea involved?

Because it's not computing the feeling of nausea.

Again, this is not complicated.

There is no contradiction involved in any sort of computation occurring without there being a feeling of nausea accompanying it.

There's no contradiction involved in Mount Everest being in New Jersey. It's just not true.

 

[PixyMisa]

So be specific, what chemical reaction or electrical activity would happen differently if there were no feeling of nausea involved? What atom would zig where the physics say it should zag if there were no feeling of nausea?

Do you actually thing that question means something?

The feeling (or experience) of nausea is your brain performing computations.

I can see nothing in any description of any material entity that would happen differently if there was no sensation involved.

Your brain would be different. Indeed, we can test this, and your brain is different.

 

[PixyMisa]

So suppose this feeling of nausea is a computation. Then there will be an equivalent algorithm running on a register machine. That computation should also produce a feeling of nausea, exactly as I am experiencing it now.

Yes. Even if it is (as Lowpro says) a stochastic process, we can reproduce it with arbitrary precision on any sufficiently large general-purpose computer.

These numbers are meaningless except to a mind who understands the encoding scheme.

The processing is a mind.

Looking just at the static data is like reducing a human being to ash and then sifting through it searching for their personality. Like wandering onto an empty football field and wondering what the score is.

 

[GraculusTheGreenBird]

So you guys keep saying.

So remind me, which one of those chemical reactions would occur differently if a feeling of pain did not ensue?

Surely the very fact that painkillers work addresses this? After all, in various ways they are known to (or designed to) disrupt the electro-chemical action of pain nerve signals, i.e. a different chemical reaction. And this indeed different reaction results in a reduction in pain.

 

[Lowpro]

Yes. Even if it is (as Lowpro says) a stochastic process, we can reproduce it with arbitrary precision on any sufficiently large general-purpose computer.

The processing is a mind.

Looking just at the static data is like reducing a human being to ash and then sifting through it searching for their personality. Like wandering onto an empty football field and wondering what the score is.

I would argue that stochastic models approximate physiological processes because they consider the space of processes better than deterministic ones can, but as a general purpose approximation I feel we agree on the same thing. Since positive and negative feedback loops affect the sensation stochastic models seem pertinent; another word would be dynamic.

What I agree on, and what I feel needs to be reiterated, is that the processing IS the mind.

 

[PixyMisa]

Surely the very fact that painkillers work addresses this? After all, in various ways they are known to (or designed to) disrupt the electro-chemical action of pain nerve signals, i.e. a different chemical reaction. And this indeed different reaction results in a reduction in pain.

Exactly. You can alter the pain signal from the nerves, and the brain ends up chemically different, or you can alter the brain chemistry, and the pain ends up different.

Every time we look at anything like that, we see something that makes perfect sense under materialism, and requires yet another assumption under idealism.

In the face of reality, idealism* turns out to be infinitely unparsimonious.

* Bernardo-style naive idealism.

 

[RussDill]

And yet we must conclude that there is something happening here beyond those individual instructions and beyond values being written to memory. How exactly? What would be the contradiction involved in all of these steps occurring without there being any sensation of nausea produced?

This is like trying to understand the philosophical details of a religion by examining the ink pigments of the holy book molecule by molecule.

 

[Darat]

As I say, an ostensible definition is as good as any. Better in fact, than most.. I assume that you are still hammering away hard at your fingers and not knowing the experience of consciousness.

Surely it would just be easier for you to say you have definition, rather than dancing around the issue. It seems quite common for those arguing brain is not mind not to be able to define what that not actually is.

 

[Belz...]

What stuff do you suppose your thoughts are made of? Or your dreams?

What stuff do you suppose "running" is made of ?

Thoughts are actions.

 

[Belz...]

Only in that it's my consciousness that decides on the letters of my keyboard I should tap with my fingers

But it isn't. Consciousness is made aware of the decision to do so after it's been taken. This is a very important discovery of modern science, which puts free will in the back seat.

 

[Belz...]

I don't know about you, but I use the words 'pain' and 'nausea' to describe sensations that I feel. I knew what they were long before I even knew what a brain was.

You say this as though it means something.

We link the brain to these sensations because of our observations that this happens. But there is nothing at all in the physical description of the brain which predicts there must be sensations.

Of course there is.

There is no chemical reaction which would fail to happen if not accompanied by a sensation, no electrical activity which would happen differently if not accompanied with a feeling of nausea or pain.

The sensation IS the reaction. Your problem is that you assume without cause that they are different things.

So be specific, what chemical reaction or electrical activity would happen differently if there were no feeling of nausea involved?

Obviously, if it didn't cause nausea, the reaction that causes it wouldn't be the same. Again, it is your assumption that causes your error, here.

So you guys keep saying.

Yes, because it matches our observations. Your position isn't based on observation; it's based on a naive understanding of existential philosophy, one that can only lead to some boring form of solipsism.

 

[Belz...]

This is a materialist assumption. The idealist position supposes that your head is inside your mind which is a part of mind at large.

Which is inconsistent with observation. Your consciousness is altered by physical events.

Furthermore, things we know are in your mind (dreams, musings, hallucinations, etc.) are internally inconsistent. If reality was in your mind, you'd expect it to be inconsistent as well, but it isn't. How does idealism explain this ?

 

[Pup]

The brain is generating the feeling (or more precisely, the experience) of pain. If the "brain processed it as the brain does" there's an experience of pain by definition because that is what the brain does.

If the brain does not produce an experience of pain, it is doing something different.

This is not complicated.

The above explains it so clearly. I don't get the problem. Pain is, by definition, what results from a specific process in the brain. If those processes are interrupted, no pain.

Like everything else, literally, we could say we're just thinking that's how the brain works but it's not real. However, like everything so far, the best understandings result from assuming a certain chain of events will cause pain. We can't rule out idealism, but we can't refute the materialistic view because it works.

 

[Pup]

Furthermore, things we know are in your mind (dreams, musings, hallucinations, etc.) are internally inconsistent. If reality was in your mind, you'd expect it to be inconsistent as well, but it isn't. How does idealism explain this ?

That never seemed a particularly strong argument against idealism, to me. There's no reason some things created by the mind couldn't be logical, while others are illogical.

I think the stronger point is: assuming "reality is in your mind" doesn't get us anywhere that we can't get by assuming "reality is external." Idealism is a solution waiting for a problem, and none has turned up yet.

 

[JoeMorgue]

But idealism lets you have Woo. And I need my Woo.

 

[Belz...]

EXACTLY why programmers should shut the crap up about this kind of debate.

No, we shouldn't.

A better model would be a stochastic one first of all, and second of all materialism doesn't even suppose a deterministic approach to qualia.

I'm not sure we should even consider qualia.

 

[Belz...]

That never seemed a particularly strong argument against idealism, to me.

To me, it's the most convincing one.

There's no reason some things created by the mind couldn't be logical, while others are illogical.

I think there is. Everything that you know for a fact is in your mind is inconsistent. No exception. Now, suddenly the thing you don't know for a fact is in your mind, but suppose it is, is totally consistent ? If mind affected reality directly, the idealists might have a point. As it stands it is the one piece of evidence they need, and don't have.

I think the stronger point is: assuming "reality is in your mind" doesn't get us anywhere that we can't get by assuming "reality is external." Idealism is a solution waiting for a problem, and none has turned up yet.

That's a very good argument, but not against idealism: it's against acting as if idealism is true even if it is.

 

[The Man]

The above explains it so clearly. I don't get the problem. Pain is, by definition, what results from a specific process in the brain. If those processes are interrupted, no pain.

Like everything else, literally, we could say we're just thinking that's how the brain works but it's not real. However, like everything so far, the best understandings result from assuming a certain chain of events will cause pain. We can't rule out idealism, but we can't refute the materialistic view because it works.

That is really the crux of it, we can't rule out idealism because even functional materialism is compatible with fundamental idealism. Heck I don't even know what would be functionally incompatible with fundamental idealism. However, functional idealism isn't compatible with fundamental materialism. If we could ignore material properties simply by virtue of our consciousness that would pretty much put the kibosh on materialism as a fundamental aspect of the universe.