I challenge you: your best argument for materialism

[tsig]

My objection is to the arguments presented I have responded to, specifically, not materialism, a view I hold myself. If an argument doesn't stand up, I can't support it merely because it reaches the conclusion I hold.

Bad arguments be bad.

What arguments do you have that are better than what you have seen? It seems to me that any argument you have would fall before your insistence that we can't know things exist unless we can see them.

 

[taygatayga]

(17) There is no practical difference between monistic idealism and monistic materialism. Both present actors engaging with in- or semi-tractable "stuff" and other actors. (Furthermore, dualism is meaningless precisely for the same reason: having two "planes of existence" operating in tandem begs the question of why they would be different, and what that difference would be.)

Cpl Ferro

This is actually good point *(with one exception). It points to something like Spinozan neutral monism being a more sensible position. I agree that dualism is a ludicrous position as it necessarily sums the assumptions of both pure idealism and pure materialism and is therefore the least parsimonious of the three.

Where idealism beats materialism on the grounds of parsimony is that the only thing of which anyone can be sure is that they are having a conscious experience and therefore consciousness certainly exists. The most skeptical position, the one with no assumptions, would be solipsism. However, most of us at least opt for the assumption that those other people who look me are having a similar conscious experience and are not automata in my dream. That would only be assuming more instances of the same category of thing and would be all that is required to sustain a naive idealism.

A more refined idealism would need to account for a shared experience. Berkeley suggested that everything existed in the mind of God. This is a troublesome term that has as many meanings as there are people. Aldous Huxley preferred the term 'mind at large' where mind and consciousness are assumed to be interchangeable terms. In this case, all that exists would do so within mind at large and individual conscious entities, parts of the overall mind, would share experiences over which they had limited volition. This form of idealism holds that there is no need to propose any category of stuff other than consciousness as the unique carrier of reality and experience.

Pure materialism must posit that there is something outside consciousness which exists independent of it. Despite arguments above, this cannot be known since knowing is a conscious experience and therefore nothing outside consciousness can be known. This was pointed out by Robin.

Further to its invoking a different category of stuff (a larger leap of assumption than the idealism I outlined above), materialism must take a further leap to suggest that material which exists outside of consciousness is the source of consciousness.

Not only does materialism introduce more entities than idealism but it seeks to explain the only thing which we can be sure exists, conscious experience, in terms of an entity that can never be known. It therefore explains the tangible in terms of an imaginary basis; a position that many people mistakenly believe is attributable to idealism.

In fact, for the reasons above, materialism is inferior to idealism in terms of parsimony.

 

[tsig]

This is actually good point *(with one exception). It points to something like Spinozan neutral monism being a more sensible position. I agree that dualism is a ludicrous position as it necessarily sums the assumptions of both pure idealism and pure materialism and is therefore the least parsimonious of the three.

Where idealism beats materialism on the grounds of parsimony is that the only thing of which anyone can be sure is that they are having a conscious experience and therefore consciousness certainly exists. The most skeptical position, the one with no assumptions, would be solipsism. However, most of us at least opt for the assumption that those other people who look me are having a similar conscious experience and are not automata in my dream. That would only be assuming more instances of the same category of thing and would be all that is required to sustain a naive idealism.

A more refined idealism would need to account for a shared experience. Berkeley suggested that everything existed in the mind of God. This is a troublesome term that has as many meanings as there are people. Aldous Huxley preferred the term 'mind at large' where mind and consciousness are assumed to be interchangeable terms. In this case, all that exists would do so within mind at large and individual conscious entities, parts of the overall mind, would share experiences over which they had limited volition. This form of idealism holds that there is no need to propose any category of stuff other than consciousness as the unique carrier of reality and experience.

Pure materialism must posit that there is something outside consciousness which exists independent of it. Despite arguments above, this cannot be known since knowing is a conscious experience and therefore nothing outside consciousness can be known. This was pointed out by Robin.

Further to its invoking a different category of stuff (a larger leap of assumption than the idealism I outlined above), materialism must take a further leap to suggest that material which exists outside of consciousness is the source of consciousness.

Not only does materialism introduce more entities than idealism but it seeks to explain the only thing which we can be sure exists, conscious experience, in terms of an entity that can never be known. It therefore explains the tangible in terms of an imaginary basis; a position that many people mistakenly believe is attributable to idealism.

In fact, for the reasons above, materialism is inferior to idealism in terms of parsimony.

The existence of materiel objects does not depend on human consciousness.

 

[Dancing David]

On the good point some of you raised, that my formulation of monistic idealism is functionally equivalent to materialism (only those of you who actually understood something could have come to that conclusion), my reply is here:

http://www.bernardokastrup.com/2014/09/does-it-matter-whether-all-is-in.html

That isn't an answer at all, this is a discussion forum, not a post and run forum...

So given the fact that all ontologies equate to materialism in the universe we are in, what difference does it make?

Challenge 3: is there any way to determine ontology?

 

[taygatayga]

... we have no evidence provided for the consciousness assumed to exist.

Are you not having a conscious experience? There's your proof that consciousness exists.

(unless I am addressing a very good AI program, in which case hat tip to the conscious programmer)

 

[Dancing David]

My question is: what is the measurable difference between materialism and monistic idealism?

EXACTLY!


ooops sorry about that, I won't shout again

 

[taygatayga]

A claim which is unfalsifiable is generally false.

That's plainly a contradiction.

A claim which is unfalsifiable isn't scientific by Popperian criteria. That doesn't mean it's false.

 

[taygatayga]

Nevermind recent neurological research which literally identities the on/off switch for consciousness, his argument is just a word game.

I was very excited at the announcement of that paper but was disappointed at the content. As you may know, it concerned the switch between sleeping and waking states and it's true that one definition of conscious is 'awake' where 'asleep' means the same as unconscious. However, in the broader definition of consciousness, wherein there are different states, asleep and awake are both levels of consciousness. When we dream we are conscious of the contents of the dream during the dream but we are assuredly asleep.

 

[taygatayga]

Under idealism, we assume that mind is what exists (whatever "mind" is), and we look at the Universe, and we observe matter giving rise to consciousness. Oops. Now we have an unknowable mind, and an unexplained process by which that mind gives rise to matter.

It's a materialist assumption that matter gives rise to consciousness. Whatever type of universe we live in that process is certainly not observed.

 

[ehcks]

That's plainly a contradiction.

A claim which is unfalsifiable isn't scientific by Popperian criteria. That doesn't mean it's false.

I didn't say "is false," I said "is generally false." Usually false. Most unfalsifiable claims are false.

It's not the unfalsifiability that makes them false, it's the falseness that makes them false, and the unfalsifiability comes from the claimants poorly trying to defend them.

 

[taygatayga]

I think yes, if you buy into Idealism then you must buy into a perceiver of last resort which does all the calculations behind the scenes.

We could do speculations on models of a conscious universe if you like but it could only be speculation, of course. Many variants of the conscious universe theory point to the tendency for evolution towards increasing and persistent complexity in a framework where entropy rules in the absence of life.

 

[taygatayga]

I would suggest that it's not a good idea to promote a book by offering a sampling of its stupidest ideas.

I think you probably misunderstood the intention of Bernardo's first post. I don't think he'd expect to sell any copies of his book to ardent materialists. What he was asking for was your best shots so he could address them in a book he's working on. At least that was my understanding.

 

[tsig]

It's a materialist assumption that matter gives rise to consciousness. Whatever type of universe we live in that process is certainly not observed.

Can you show a consciousness without matter?

 

[Lowpro]

We could do speculations on models of a conscious universe if you like but it could only be speculation, of course. Many variants of the conscious universe theory point to the tendency for evolution towards increasing and persistent complexity in a framework where entropy rules in the absence of life.

Uh entropy rules always; life happens to be a consequence of it. What makes a conscious universe unique from a materialistic universe at this juncture? Even idealism has to assume that an observer has no necessity in entropy.

 

[annnnoid]

I was very excited at the announcement of that paper but was disappointed at the content. As you may know, it concerned the switch between sleeping and waking states and it's true that one definition of conscious is 'awake' where 'asleep' means the same as unconscious. However, in the broader definition of consciousness, wherein there are different states, asleep and awake are both levels of consciousness. When we dream we are conscious of the contents of the dream during the dream but we are assuredly asleep.

….not to mention that the claims made by the paper were, in fact, far more modest than what Dessi trumpeted (…what…a …surprise!). The first sentence quite explicitly stated that the conclusions ‘could’ be interpreted to represent some variety of a consciousness switch (there was nothing even remotely definitive about it). The body of the paper was itself riddled with similar qualifications and uncertainties (where oh where have we been over all this ad infinitum?).

…yet more evidence that illustrates the vast epistemological gulf that exists between cognitive activity and its related physiology.

 

[Belz...]

Where idealism beats materialism on the grounds of parsimony is that the only thing of which anyone can be sure is that they are having a conscious experience and therefore consciousness certainly exists.

I love it when we use cheap philosophy to come up with something that was discredited centuries ago, and call it deep.

 

[Brian-M]

Bernardo, it seems you have missed my questions yet again.

For the third time:

Could you define what you mean by consciousness?
What did you mean by "carrier of reality"?​

In fact, let's just skip the carrier of reality definition and just focus on consciousness. That's the important one.

If you're going to claim that "reality is in a trans-personal form of consciousness" it would help if we knew exactly what you mean by consciousness, otherwise your statement is indistinguishable from gibberish.

And there is the little detail that I lose control of copyright on this forum (see the Ts&Cs)

Just checking the registration agreement now, and it seems to say the exact opposite.

It explicitly states that anything posted by a Member "is the copyright of the Member and may not be reproduced, copied or otherwise re-published without the express permission of the Member". In the case of things you post, the member is you.

It does give the forum a non-exclusive right to republish the post, but that only applies to the post itself (which is an important if, for example, they want to move the forum to a different site with a different name, as they recently did), but this only applies to the content of the post itself, not the entire work from which the quote in the post was taken.

Unless you're going to post a significant portion of your work in a post (which itself is against the rules), then it's not a problem.

Nobody's asking you to post your work here for us to read for free, only asking that you post some quotes from it by which we can understand the basics of what you're claiming and evaluate whether or not we think your work is worth reading.

Nothing more than anyone else with a copy of your book could freely post here under the fair-use copyright laws.

 

[Doubt]

Are you not having a conscious experience? There's your proof that consciousness exists.

(unless I am addressing a very good AI program, in which case hat tip to the conscious programmer)

Out of context quoting of half a sentence is not helping you any.

The consciousness being questioned is the one that the OP claims is the source of reality. He appears to be stating that this consciousness is not our personal one but either a collective or completely independent one from any known individual.

 

[Gord_in_Toronto]

Out of context quoting of half a sentence is not helping you any.

The consciousness being questioned is the one that the OP claims is the source of reality. He appears to be stating that this consciousness is not our personal one but either a collective or completely independent one from any known individual.

I thought that no one believed in the Argument from First Cause any more?

 

[Robin]

I didn't say "is false," I said "is generally false." Usually false. Most unfalsifiable claims are false.

It's not the unfalsifiability that makes them false, it's the falseness that makes them false, and the unfalsifiability comes from the claimants poorly trying to defend them.

Actually the whole falsifiability criterion has been problematic from the moment it was posed, even before according to Massimo Pigliucci.

Sean Carroll in his Edge piece suggested it an idea in science that should be retired.

Here is Pigliucci's reply http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/sean-carroll-edge-and-falsifiability.html